# Daily Report

# Soviet Union

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Friday
4 January 1991

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## Soviet Union

*FBIS-SOV-91-003* *4 January 1991*

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## U.S. Experts Urge Complete Nuclear Test Ban

*LD0301161591 Moscow TASS in English 1604 GMT 3 Jan 90*

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow January 3 TASS—A group of eminent U.S. specialists in the field of armaments has sent a letter to George Bush, calling for a complete ban on nuclear tests.

U.S. experts justly emphasise that this ban is the most decisive measure that can be taken to stem the proliferation of nuclear armaments.

The time is right for a decisive step: the complete prohibition of tests. The 1963 treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater (or partial test ban treaty) could be made complete and universal at a U.N.-sponsored conference, which is scheduled for this month. This unique chance that should not be let slip away. [sentence as received]

The current international situation is clearly favourable for this drastic move. As Soviet-U.S. relations become more friendly, nuclear rivalry between the United States and the USSR can be regarded as almost ended.

A comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests would suit ideally the new world order, about which the U.S. President speaks so frequently. It would leave rivalry in the nuclear field far behind and prevent a new twist in the nuclear arms race. What can be the meaning of the programmes to build third-generation nuclear weapons, now being implemented in the United States?

It will be recalled that in ratifying the so-called threshold treaties—the 1974 treaty on the limitation on underground nuclear weapon tests and the 1976 treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes—the Soviet parliament adopted the appeal to the parliaments of the world to halt all nuclear tests.

In the view of the urgency of this problem, the USSR proposed the United Nations member-states think about the expediency of a world parliamentary referendum on the complete ban on nuclear tests.

In 1985-1987, the Soviet Union imposed the 19-month moratorium on nuclear tests and Soviet nuclear test ranges were again silent for almost a year—from October 1989 to October 1990.

What is the official stance of the United States' leadership? It continues to argue that as long as nuclear weapons exist, it should preserve for itself the right to test them. But full-scale tests, including nuclear explosions, are not the only means to verify the reliability and safety of nuclear weapons. Many experts, both in the USSR and the United States, think that this can be done by checking separate components of nuclear weapons and also mathematical experiments.

Finally, one more circumstance is also important. The fate of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the extention of the term of which will be considered in 1995, will be unclear without the complete ban on nuclear tests. By denying nuclear weapons their special status, the regime of this important treaty can undoubtedly be preserved and strengthened.

## TV Shows Soviet Troop Withdrawal From CSFR

*LD0201211691*

[Editorial Report] Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian, in its "Vremya" newscast at 1800 GMT on 2 January, carries a two-minute video report by correspondent A. Samylin stating that all Soviet units will be withdrawn from the CSFR within six months. Quoting M. Sychra, deputy chairman of the CSFR Federal Assembly commission for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, Samylin reports that "of all the formations stationed in the CSFR just 10 months ago, only 25 percent still remain in the country."

Samylin says: "The fact that the troops have been withdrawn ahead of schedule is important from a political point of view. There are still controversial issues concerning compensation for damages. And a draft treaty has been drawn up. Miroslav Sychra says that the talks were not easy. But there is a protocol which will underpin the inter-governmental agreement. Mutual pledges also exist. But a great deal still needs to be revised. In the words of Miroslav Sychra, I would like to add that the competent Soviet commission which will arrive here in January, consisting of USSR Supreme Soviet deputies and experts from the USSR Ministry of defense, will also help to put the final touches in the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops."

The video shows scenes of marching troops in Slovakia.

**Foreign Policy Changes Foreseen After Shevardnadze**

*PM0401093191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jan 91 First Edition p 3*

["Viewpoint" article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA observer Aleksandr Golts: "Will We Have Enough Parcels?"]

[Text] So the new year, 1991, has arrived. Consequently, the astrologers, with their optimistic forecasts, must again give way in the newspapers to those who think about the future not in terms of the positions of the planets, but in terms of other, earthly realities. In the sphere of world diplomacy one such reality is Soviet foreign policy. But the dominant theme in this area in recent days is USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze's resignation statement. Not surprisingly, the announcement caused bewilderment at home and abroad.

In foreign capitals and in Moscow people connected in one way or another with the foreign policy sphere never tire of asking what the real reasons were for the resignation. Indeed, for all the perfectly sincere—and I emphasize this—respect for E.A. Shevardnadze, they find it hard to accept as the main reasons those he adduced when he addressed the Congress of People's Deputies. The rather vague allusions to dictatorship on the way, the references to persecution by certain "men wearing colonels' shoulderboards," when compared with the scale of the activities of the Foreign Ministry's head, appear at best an emotional reflection of far deeper and more serious circumstances.

These are what I want to discuss today. Without mincing words, what happened, in my view, was what had to happen. Shevardnadze's departure was, it seems to me, not so much the result of a struggle between "right" and "left" as a reflection of the dramatic conflict between foreign policy and the internal situation in the Soviet Union. The official statements after E.A. Shevardnadze's departure that the foreign policy course will not change are true. But only in the sense that the principles of the new political thinking, nonconfrontation, and noninterference in other countries' internal affairs will remain intact. As for the actual content of Soviet foreign policy, it cannot remain as it was, it seems to me.

Unlike E.A. Shevardnadze's critics, I do not intend to question his department's achievements. They are well-known and indisputable. The international climate has changed radically. The cold war is becoming a thing of the past and, with it, the direct threat of nuclear catastrophe. Mankind's retreat from the nuclear precipice will accelerate with the conclusion of the treaty on strategic offensive armaments. I find it hard also to agree with those who think we made unwarranted concessions, with those who see the development of the situation in East Europe as a defeat. However, dozens of articles have already been written on this and there will be hundreds more. I want to talk about something else.

No matter how you assess what has happened, with a "plus" or a "minus" sign, it is objectively clear that all this, albeit momentous, as is customary to say nowadays, is past. There is no second Berlin Wall that we might prevent from being destroyed, albeit in theory. There are no longer any states that we might force to live in a way we see fit. As for the disarmament process, following the conclusion of the treaty on strategic offensive armaments and the treaty on armaments in Europe, for a certain period, seemingly a relatively long period, it will switch largely from the plane of the quest for political solutions to the plane of practical implementation. That is, of spadework by experts.

Thus, even if things had been better in our country than they are at present, it would still be time to think about new perspectives in foreign policy. And the primary ones would certainly be the questions of involving other regions, in particular Asia, in the disarmament process and transforming the Warsaw Pact, and NATO as well. There are many other promising areas of foreign policy activity.

But the situation is such that the Soviet Union is increasingly forced to deal with its own internal problems while somehow trying to make them compatible with the positive changes in the world which it itself initiated. For example, the idea of a common European home, which our country put forward. There was a time when it was not accepted, when it was considered utopian. But now that it appears to have gained recognition among the majority of politicians, the internal development of the USSR is becoming an obstacle to the creation of the common European home. While integration impulses are increasingly making themselves felt throughout the rest of Europe and when many old contradictions are being removed, the USSR resembles a communal apartment in which wrangling neighbors are about to splash kerosene over one another's doors. What are the residents on the other floors supposed to do? Have faith in earlier agreements with the USSR or not?

There are many examples of this kind. They are all indicative of a process which, to be honest, is as painful for me, as a journalist, as it is for the foreign minister. It is that as a result of a profound internal crisis our country is increasingly losing its status as a great power. "There is no sense any more in believing," THE WASHINGTON POST claims, "that the Soviet Union is a great power.... The main symptoms of this are the following factors: The economy is in decline; politicians are locked in struggle between those who are trying to impose one or another version of stability from on high and those who place more reliance on the forces of democracy; ethnic tension has reached a peak; foreign policy is loath to make even the slightest attempt to be a significant part of the world system and, instead, concentrates on improving access to investments."

It is bitter to read that. But I would not quarrel with it today. It seems to me that certain statements by E.A. Shevardnadze on the Persian Gulf containing vague

hints at the use of military force were dictated by a desire to demonstrate that our country still plays the part of a great power. The very statements that caused such revulsion in the legislature and in the country.

At first glance it is a paradox. A politician who played a key role in pulling our country out of the Afghan war hinted at the possibility of again using armed forces beyond its borders. But if it is a paradox it is only superficially so. In fact, all these years our military might has been the only confirmation of our world power status. Our foreign minister simply had no other proof.

I do not flatter myself by hoping that the reader will remember an article I wrote some six months ago: "Will We Have Enough Missiles?" Therefore I will remind you: I said that our country's status and its position in the world were determined, unfortunately, by military might alone, and I put the question: Will we be able, during the period of the reduction of armed forces and armaments (something other countries are interested in too) to scale new heights ensuring us by other means a proper place in the world? Since so far it has been the army—the "guys in colonels' shoulderboards" and their colleagues—that, by its very existence, has enabled Comrade Shevardnadze to conduct foreign affairs successfully.

It is clear now that the period of arms reduction has not been put to proper use. We are losing international authority more rapidly than we are destroying our missiles. Moreover, we are turning from being a subject in international relations, from being a country that used to shape the world political process, into being their object. Because our partners in the West and in the East consider not how to combine their policies with ours, but what to do to ensure that the Soviet Union does not pose a danger because of its internal crisis. We are all deeply grateful to those who are giving us assistance at this difficult time. But when it comes to states rather than ordinary people, it has to be said that this assistance is prompted primarily by fear of the unpredictable consequences of a domestic political crisis in a nuclear power.

What kind of diplomacy should we have at this time? Should we expend effort and resources on foreign policy initiatives or, as was said in the last century, is it time we concentrated our efforts? This is the dilemma E.A. Shevardnadze was unable to resolve, it seems to me. He could no longer be foreign minister of a great power and he did not want to be a minister begging for foreign aid.

The dilemma remains unresolved. Therefore, if the question of a new Foreign Ministry head arises, the Supreme Soviet will have to evaluate not only his competence and training, but also the foreign policy concept for the period to come. What the specific content of this concept should be is a separate topic.

But it is clear right now that to link up more closely with the country's life it has to incorporate an integral system for the elaboration of foreign policy decisions in the Supreme Soviet. So that our legislators are able to influence diplomatic activity and do not confine themselves to analyzing its results. The discussion of candidates for foreign minister would be the first step in that direction.

## Soviet, U.S. Strategies in Gulf Crisis Assessed

*91UF0290A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Dec 90 Second Edition p 3*

[Article by G. Savin: "The Headache Will Not Go Away"]

[Text] The first half of the time period granted to Iraq by Resolution 678 of the UN Security Council as a "good-will pause" until 15 January 1991, has expired. In the event that Iraq fails to fulfill all the previously adopted resolutions, the "UN members will use all necessary means to restore international peace and security in this region."

A medieval politician once said that in politics a mistake is worse than a crime. If one considered that Iraq's aggression against Kuwait was a crime on the part of the Baghdad regime against the Arab community, now its leaders are on the verge of committing a political mistake that will be worse than the crime that was committed.

As we know, Iraq rejected Resolution 678 out of hand, but its subsequent actions show that it still does not regard this document as a kind of ultimatum and that after this time period has expired military actions will be taken against it. Apparently, at this point Baghdad sees this resolution more as a complex of measures and actions directed toward avoiding a military resolution to the crisis; it sees the "all necessary" means mentioned in it, that is, the application of force, as measures for the most extreme case. Hence not only Baghdad's agreement to release some of the hostages and move toward a resolution to the problem as a whole, but also its negotiations concerning dialogue with the United States directed toward implementation of Resolution 678.

But it is not only Baghdad's position that determines further development of events in the zone of conflict. At least two forces are participating in the confrontation: Baghdad and the anti-Iraq coalition that opposes it, no small part of which is comprised of Arab states. Although the majority of Arab capitals included in this coalition emphasize that they consider the concentration of foreign Armed Forces in the Gulf zone only as a means of protecting Saudi Arabia from possible Iraqi aggression, there are many Arab political figures who would not be against seeing these Armed Forces as troops brought in to do their dirty work.

The fact is that certain forces of the Arab world regard Saddam Husayn as their opponent in the struggle for influence in the Arab world and they would only welcome his military defeat.

The Iraq-Kuwait crisis is the first worldwide crisis since the cold war and we must give its due to the world community, which has been extraordinarily scrupulous

and extremely restrained in its approach to resolving this conflict and in its measures against the aggressor, thus clearly striving to avoid attempts to eliminate this crisis with a "hot war." The Bush administration, in this stage anyway, is adhering to the spirit and letter of the decisions of the UN Security Council regarding the Gulf crisis. A prolonged war—and Iraq is not Grenada or Panama—could be a catastrophe for the United States: Oil prices will sky-rocket, according to predictions, to $40 per barrel, and this will spur on inflation and undermine consumer confidence. A sharp reduction of industrial output will undoubtedly begin, increasing unemployment in the country and extending and exacerbating the already recognized recession until the middle of next year. According to predictions of Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates groups, one of the leading American forecasting firms, a prolonged war in the Gulf with U.S. participation would lead to a decline in the production of motor vehicles by 26 percent in the first quarter of 1991.

Let us now sketch a picture of the possible future. As soon as the crisis in the Gulf is ended—by any means—the division, above all in the Arab world, along the Iraq-Kuwait line will be consigned to oblivion. The Israeli-Arab formula for dividing up the area, which for decades has determined the alignment of forces and the situation in the Near East, will go into full force again.

In this renewed situation, the position of the United States will be on the side not of the Arab states, but of Israel, as was the case during the 23 years of Israeli aggression against the Arabs. Israel does not want any shifts in the American position that has developed as of today for regulating the Near East conflict, and today it is doing everything possible to push Washington toward the military path for resolving the crisis in the Gulf, hoping that the Arab blood spilled by Americans in battle will only bind the United States to Israel more tightly in the forthcoming difficult period of Near East regulation.

Finally, regarding the position of the USSR. Moscow has exerted considerable effort to direct the process of regulation into the political channel. This is apparently why, in spite of Moscow's precise fulfillment of all resolutions of the UN Security Council and participation in the blockade of Iraq which they raised, Baghdad is not even raising the question of breaking the treaty for friendship and cooperation between the two countries that was signed back in 1972. Moscow, for its part, thinks that this treaty can be not only a good basis for bilateral cooperation after the regulation of the crisis in the Gulf, but it will also make a constructive contribution to the inevitable process of regulation of the Near East conflict, where Iraq cannot remain on the sidelines.

In conclusion, one cannot but note the assertions by certain circles that in the Near Eastern region, the crisis in the Gulf and the approaches to its regulation, only one great power has any weight—the United States, since the USSR has lost its power. The Soviet Union, by taking a position of principle regarding aggression and a constructive and balanced position regarding regulation of the crisis, not only has not lost face in this region, but has also expanded its diplomatic presence there. The preservation of the treaty with Baghdad and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Bahrain and the heart of the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia, speaks not of Moscow's losses but of her gains in the Arab East.

At the same time, the United States, having overreacted to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and located—somewhat hastily, in my view—its Armed Forces to the Arab land, has painted itself into a corner. On the one hand it had the threat of armed conflict hanging over it and on the other the problem of the approach to Near East regulation after the resolution of the crisis in the Gulf. Even after the crisis in the Gulf, they will not be able to look the other way at Israeli occupation of Arab land without losing their positions in the Arab world. Even now this situation is creating a headache for the United States when voting in the UN on resolutions related to the Near East crisis, and the further they go the more of these situations there will be. The world community will undoubtedly demand that Washington not use a double standard, which will create serious problems for the administration not only in the international arena and in relations with Israel but also within the country—with the Jewish community and the Zionist organizations in the United States.

## CEMA Committee Discusses Group's Future

*LD0401102391 Moscow TASS in English 0946 GMT 4 Jan 91*

[By TASS correspondent Georg Mikhailin]

[Text] Moscow January 4 TASS—The Executive Committee of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) opened its 134th meeting here today to discuss draft rules of the organization that will succeed it, and its future activities.

During the two-day meeting, deputy prime ministers and ministers from the nine CMEA member-countries are expected to discuss relations between the CMEA and international organisations, the council budget during a transitional period and the terms for mutual deliveries of goods in 1991.

On the results of the meeting, participants are expected to sign agreements that will be submitted to the February CMEA session in Budapest.

## 4 Jan Session May Be Last

*LD3012153190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 30 Dec 90*

[Text] The meeting of the CEMA executive committee scheduled for 4 January will probably be the last. INTERFAX was told this by Denisov, learned secretary of the International Institutes of Economic Problems of the World Socialist System, which is one of the CEMA's

research centers. Proposals will be worked out at the meeting for the disabandment or the transformation of this international organization and its research centers.

CEMA's final fate will be decided by its session which is provisionally scheduled for 20 February.

### Soviet Olympic Committee Gains Independence

*91P50067A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Dec 90 Union Edition p 8*

[TASS item: "New Status of the Olympic Committee"]

[Text] By decree of the Union government on carrying out the USSR Law "On Social Associations," the USSR Olympic Committee has been removed from the jursidiction of USSR Goskomsport [State Committee for Physical Culture and Sports]. This is in response to the social nature of the committee's activity and to the principles of the Olympic Charter.

The USSR Olympic Committee has been granted, specifically, the right to carry out direct foreign economic activities, corresponding to its goals and tasks, to establish a foreign currency fund which will be used for developing international sports relations, preparing sportsmen for the Olympic Games, and for other goals as stipulated by its charter.

A National Olympic Committee of the Ukraine has also been created. Participants in the assembly, which took place in Kiev, adopted a charter. It states, in particular, that the Ukrainian National Olympic Committee is an independent social organization.

### U.S.-Soviet Summit Monument Unveiled in Malta

*LD0201173291 Moscow TASS in English 1557 GMT 2 Dec 91*

[Text] Valletta January 2 TASS—A monument marking the end of the "Cold War" was unveiled yesterday in the town of Birzebbuga, Malta on Tuesday. It was built in memory of the Malta Soviet-American summit of 1989.

"The monument, standing a few hundred of metres away from the place where the talks were held, symbolises the meeting of two great powers, which ushered in a new era of world cooperation and mutual understanding," Malta's Prime Minister Eduard Fennek Adami said during the unveiling ceremony. "This historical meeting has resulted in the creation of a fundamentally new world order, in which the countries of the East and the West, the North and the South are able to live in peace and harmony."

Soviet Ambassador to Malta V. Plechko conveyed President Gorbachev's gratitude to the leadership and people of Malta for their contribution to the building of a more secure peace and for the hospitality accorded to the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States during the summit meeting.

A statement was also made by U.S. Charge d'Affaires Howard Lang.

## United States & Canada

### U.S. Intelligence Aims Unaltered in Post-Cold War

*PM0301130591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jan 91 First Edition p 3*

[Article by I. Kulkov: "Is the CIA Changing? U.S. Intelligence in the Era of Glasnost"]

[Text] Tremendous changes are taking place in the modern world. The fundamental breakthrough in Soviet-U.S. relations ushered in a process of reforms and everything positive that led, as a result, to the all-European meeting in Paris, where the end of the cold war was officially announced. In this light special interest is aroused by U.S. press reports that detente supposedly does not affect intelligence. Thus, a conceptual article entitled "Intelligence in the Age of Glasnost," carried in the magazine FORTUNE AFFAIRS [as published], states that "the cold war may be ending, but there is no detente in the intelligence war." For his part CIA Director W. Webster, addressing the National Press Club, declared that "the need for intelligence has increased today. As the sharp corners in the world are being smoothed, the threats which we encounter are becoming more numerous, diverse, and hard to predict."

Where do these threats stem from? What, above all, are the U.S. intelligence services aiming at under the new conditions? Their leaders do not conceal it. The same Webster said last February: "The need for the United States to continue intelligence and counterintelligence operations is of decisive significance during the period of changes in the Soviet Union and the East European countries. It is a matter of exceptional importance to obtain information on those countries' plans, intentions, and potentials." To judge from the same statement, countries such as China, Vietnam, Cuba, and others will not be overlooked.

I believe that here our reader has the right to ask himself this question: So, is the CIA not changing? Yet the press has even reported some links between the CIA and our KGB. All correct. There are no contradictions here. Of course, the leaders of U.S. intelligence have been forced to take into account the realities of the times—the USSR and U.S. wish for very broad cooperation to the benefit of the two peoples and for close collaboration in the interests of peace and security. This is borne out by the first KGB-CIA contacts in the struggle against the drugs mafia and international terrorism. Nevertheless, covert operations against the USSR are still part of the U.S. special services' arsenal, and the United States makes no secret of this.

The gathering of data on various spheres of Soviet society, i.e. intelligence work, is a constituent part of these operations. As spokesmen for the CIA and other special services point out, they are interested in everything taking place in our country. Recently, for example, the question of Soviet nuclear weapons has come to the fore. The growing significance of this problem is directly linked with the emergence in the Soviet Union of demands by separatist circles for the country's nuclear potential to be shared in connection with the transformation of the Union. Addressing Council on International Affairs organizations, the CIA director pointed out that, if the Soviet Union as a rigid confederation breaks up, "we will have to keep an eye on which people take over control of these weapons. This will be of considerable interest to our country from the viewpoint of national security."

When examining the areas of U.S. intelligence activity in respect of the USSR, which are not as a whole noted for their novelty, we should, however, single out a really new aspect. This is the priority given to obtaining economic information, since, in the U.S. leadership's view, economic competition is now taking the place of military rivalry. This is also confirmed by W. Webster, who has declared that "the economic rival's ability to create, capture, and control markets in the future plays a definite role for national security...." True, when the author of this article asked former CIA Director W. Colby at a news conference in the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center to confirm the existence of such a task in respect of the Soviet Union, he replied that there was no need for it. According to him, the Soviet mass media speak so openly about the crisis and the country's other difficulties that the CIA has no need to get information by any other means. Yet surveillance of technological improvements and new inventions and monitoring of everything that might substantially affect the national security and the economic and other interests of the United States are becoming, in the CIA leaders' opinion, one of the intelligence community's chief tasks.

How, by what means and methods, do the U.S. special services intend to get the data they need?

The admirers of technical intelligence, who mainly include its actual employees—which means the National Security Agency—consider it more reliable and accurate to obtain information by using communications facilities, electronic intelligence, satellites, and other national technical means. But CIA workers and their supporters say that there are many intelligence tasks which only people can perform—and far better than technical means. No satellite, they claim, can sense the mood of people in the market, the atmosphere in the capital of a foreign state, the uneasy situation in a particular part of the world, or the reasons why it has become complicated. This can only be done by people operating with a legal cover or illegally in certain places. This means, it is concluded, that the CIA's numerical strength should be not reduced but increased and that no expense should be spared for the purpose.

The carrying out of "clandestine operations" is another area of the U.S. special services' activity against the USSR. It follows from the law on appropriations for intelligence activity in fiscal year 1991 that what should be understood by this is actions undertaken by any U.S. Government organizations with a view to influencing

the political, economic, or military situation outside the country in such a way that Washington's role is not obvious or publicly recognized.

"Clandestine operations" against the USSR will, to all appearances, be stepped up. At any rate, they will not be cut back. This stems from the aforementioned statements by the CIA director and also from the fact that he considers himself a supporter of clandestine operations and advocates their extensive use where open foreign policy actions do not work.

On analyzing the substance of the "clandestine operations" against the USSR, it is possible to conclude that it has both an external and an internal thrust. Britain's THE TIMES wrote about one of them not so long ago. It was connected with events in the Persian Gulf region. Although President G. Bush called Moscow's conduct in the UN vote on the question of measures aimed at complying with the sanctions against Iraq "outstanding," the newspaper writes, nevertheless the CIA is persistently organizing information leaks on the opposition to Mikhail Gorbachev's policy which supposedly exists in the USSR Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry. From such reports it turned out that some Soviet exports are still being sent to Iraq, thereby violating the UN embargo, while Soviet military intelligence workers are supposedly passing to S. Husayn data on the deployment of U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf region.

As for the tasks of the "clandestine operations" directed against the Soviet Union within our country itself, in my view USSR KGB Chairman V. Kryuchkov spoke convincingly about them in his speech at the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies. He emphasized, in particular, that they are trying to put overt as well as disguised pressure on us from outside and to foist onto us dubious ideas and plans for extricating the country from the complex situation. A desire to strengthen not so much us as their own positions in the Soviet Union can frequently be perceived behind all this.

Very diverse forms and methods are used here. Thus, a subdepartment has been set up in the U.S. intelligence structure to gather information on the workers' movement in the USSR, with a view to having a purposeful effect on it. Here are the words of a former CIA analyst, cited by THE LOS ANGELES TIMES: "We must know the telephone numbers of the Soviet missile troop commanders in Siberia, in order to be able to ask them what they think about the present situation and not just chat with the Soviet chief of General Staff and the Soviet defense minister in Moscow."

Foreign anti-Soviet centers, which, as is known, are maintained by Western special services, are stepping up their activities. Using nationalist and separatist organizations and other destructive forces, they interfere directly in the USSR's internal affairs, creating in the country an atmosphere of tension and discontent among the broad masses. These centers operate methodically, exerting pressure over a wide range of problems, seeking out the most vulnerable places, and allowing no time to adopt specific measures to surmount them. It cannot be ruled out that the rumors and slander campaigns, notably against the Army, which disturb our society from time to time also stem from the same anti-Soviet centers. Because they come from the special services' arsenal.

It is possible to conclude from the above as a whole that some real changes are planned in the CIA's activities. The fact that the need for clandestine actions in the future has been confirmed in the CIA attests that these changes are aimed, above all, at enhancing the quality and efficiency of intelligence under the new conditions of glasnost and openness. All this is to secure political, economic, and military advantages for the United States under the conditions of a changing world.

## U.S. 'Gloomy Prophecies' for USSR Challenged

*PM0301095191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Jan 91 Second Edition p 5*

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent V. Linnik: "Americans' New Year Reflections: Will There Be a Meeting With Destiny?"]

[Excerpt] New York—TIME magazine has presented George Bush with a New Year's gift by naming him "man of the year." The cover has a photomontage of the President. One half, showing him with a resolute expression, symbolizes his success in foreign policy (which the magazine acknowledges). The other half, in which he has a dismayed look, symbolizes his domestic policy course, which is a tissue of hesitations and contradictions. The many months of marking time in a search for the best budget for the country and the repudiation of previous promises not to raise taxes have won the President no kudos among his fellow-citizens. It is foreign policy that has created the positive balance in the assessment of his activity. The main thing here is the undoubted improvement in relations with the Soviet Union. People here, moreover, consider that Bush has skillfully steered the ship of American diplomacy through the reefs of the first post-cold war international crisis—in the Persian Gulf. You have to agree with this when you remember the impressive successes scored by the United States in pursuing its line in the United Nations in the months since the start of Iraqi aggression.

Recent weeks have seen no shortage of gloomy prophecies here regarding the prospects for our own domestic development. "A turn to the right," "a reactionary offensive," "farewell to reforms" are a selection of today's most frequently met headlines about the state of affairs in our country. This can be answered as follows: The recent raptures were as immoderate as the present upsurge of obloquy is unjustified. We did not set about making changes in our life out of a desire to please anyone. Nor do we want to preserve our home and instill order in it out of a wish to annoy anyone. Incidentally, ordinary Americans understand this better than the writing, commentating, and analyzing constituency in

the United States. They remember here that, when President Lincoln wanted to preserve the Union, the Southerners who had just risen up in revolt described this as a move toward tyranny.

There is something unbecoming about the wailing over Eduard Shevardnadze's resignation which has abounded in the American press. James Baker's resignation would probably not generate half the grief. Why is there so much grieving? Shevardnadaze undoubtedly became a very capable tactician and exponent of Gorbachev's foreign policy strategy in his five years. But no more than that. Incidentally the objections, and highly justified ones, raised against our foreign policy are directed precisely at its tactical implementation. That is to say, not against what we do, but how we do it. The actual course, however, is not in doubt and remains unchanged. [passage omitted].

## Near East & South Asia

### Reports Continue on Evacuations From Iraq

#### Gorbachev Sends Belousov

*LD0301112191 Moscow TASS in English 1056 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Postanogov]

[Text] Moscow January 3 TASS—A group of 116 Soviet citizens returned from Iraq to Moscow on Wednesday night [2 January], a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman told TASS.

On August 11, 1990, President Mikhail Gorbachev ordered setting up an inter-departmental group under Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Igor Belousov in connection with the sharpening situation in the Gulf.

The group sought to resolve all aspects of evacuating Soviet citizens from the conflict zone. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, 7,830 Soviet citizens were living in Iraq and 880 in Kuwait.

Due to intense work by the Soviet Government and the group, on August 24 the last group of Soviet citizens returned to Moscow from Kuwait.

The evacuation of Soviet specialists and their families from Iraq is proceeding according to the schedule. During Belousov's recent visit to Baghdad and his meeting with President Saddam Husayn, they discussed the return of all Soviet specialists working in Iraq. The Iraqi side guaranteed their unimpeded return to the Soviet Union.

A total of 721 Soviet citizens are still in Iraq. The evacuation is expected to be completed by January 10.

#### Departures Continue 4, 7 Jan

*LD0401092691 Moscow TASS in English 0857 GMT 4 Jan 91*

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Postanogov]

[Text] Moscow January 4 TASS—Another group of Soviet citizens numbering 181 returned from Iraq to the Soviet Union last night, Soviet Foreign Ministry officials told TASS.

During a recent visit by Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Igor Belousov to Iraq and his meeting with President Saddam Husayn, the Iraqi side guaranteed a free return of all Soviet citizens to the Soviet Union.

The next group is expected to come on January 7. Another 540 Soviet citizens remain in Iraq now. Their evacuation will be completed by January 10.

### Reader Defends Right To Volunteer for Gulf

*PM0301134991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jan 91 Union Edition p 3*

[Roundup under the rubric: "Letters to Chief Editor"—first three paragraphs are introduction]

[Excerpts] The title of this new rubric comes from the IZVESTIYA editorial mailbag. The authors of some of the letters, wishing to emphasize the social significance of the problem raised, often address them directly to the chief editor. Many of them give assessments of individual articles, or of the newspaper's position as a whole.

It must be said that the practice of publishing such letters is accepted in many publications. For example, one of England's oldest newspapers, THE TIMES, has been running a similar rubric for a long time.

Like our foreign colleagues we do not propose appending replies from the chief editor to the letters published under this rubric. We see the newspaper's task primarily in drawing the attention of those people on whom the solution of the problems raised in the letters depends to what our readers are saying, and in molding public opinion around these problems. It is our view that the readers' opinions on individual publications in the newspaper should not remain a secret known only to the editorial office. [passage omitted]

#### Register Me as a Volunteer

So, why do I want to be a volunteer if it proves impossible to avoid military confrontation with Iraq? I shall try to explain.

First because I believe that the USSR and all of us bear special responsibility for the present crisis in the Persian Gulf. Because it was we who pandered to Saddam Husayn and his political regime and, most important, helped his Armed Forces, which are now the main threat to peace. So are we entitled now to limit ourselves to merely condemning the aggressor—then washing our

hands and leaving the dirty work (which we actually created) to the soldiers of the United States and the other countries now opposing the aggressor in Saudi Arabia?

I believe that our country's present policy toward this crisis as a whole is right (especially in view of our "Afghan syndrome"). But, bearing in mind our special responsibility for the situation which has been created, and without resorting to the use of the regular Armed Forces, we should allow USSR citizens who want to take part in the international community's operation to curb the aggressor to volunteer for a special subunit created on USSR territory. The creation of such a subunit would demonstrate to the whole world and the aggressor our firmness and resolve.

But if the government does not approve this option, it should not prevent our volunteers from joining the armed forces of other states. [passage omitted]

I do not think there will be too many volunteers, so that the cost of forming and arming this force will not be significant either (especially viewed against our costs in equipping the Iraqi Army). But our country's prestige would increase greatly from this step.

V. Pimenov, Nikolayevka village, Iliyskiy Rayon, Alma-Ata Oblast [passage omitted]

### Consulate Opening Highlights Israeli Ties

*LD0301130191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1200 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[From the "Television News Service" Program]

[Text] The Israeli consulate opened in Moscow today. From this moment it will be housed quite officially in a building on the premises of the Netherlands Embassy in our country, the embassy which until recently has processed the documents of all those departing to the Promised Land. After 23 years of ignoring each other, this is the first step toward rapprochement that Soviet and Israeli leaders have taken since diplomatic relations between our countries have been restored.

## West Europe

### NATO Planes to Turkey Linked to Iraqi Actions

*LD0301200391 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[Commentary by station political observer Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Text] The NATO Council has decided to dispatch to Turkey aviation subunits from the so-called rapid deployment forces. Our political observer Aleksandr Zholkver comments on this decision.

[Zholkver] I admit that the latest NATO measure evokes contradictory feelings in me; incidentally, to judge from the abundant commentaries in the world press it seems to have had the same effect on many of my foreign colleagues as well. On the one hand, the NATO Council, which met in Brussels at the level of ambassadors from the 16 states, explained that its decision had been occasioned by a request from Turkey, which, as is known, is a member of the Atlantic alliance. Turkey in turn justified the request by referring to the threat of attack by Iraq, which borders on Turkey.

Of course, in the case of aggression, every state has undoubted rights to self-defense and to support from any alliance in which it is a member. In the present case, however, the situation is highly specific. It is a question of measures undertaken by the world community against Iraq, which has occupied Kuwait. As you know, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait before 15 January. Otherwise, the United Nations may take military measures against Iraq.

I stress once more, however, these measures may be taken through the United Nations, but certainly not through NATO. This is pointed out by many countries that are members of NATO, especially by those whose aircraft are now to be redeployed to Turkey. It is a question of 40 fighter bombers from Italy, Belgium, and Germany. Of course, in comparison with the immense armed forces that Iraq and the United States have concentrated in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf, 40 planes are a mere trifle, as they say. Yet NATO's latest decision has given rise to very sharp debate, especially in Germany. Many politicians and legal experts point to the fact that the Persian Gulf area does not feature in the operational sphere of the North Atlantic alliance. The Social Democratic Party of Germany demands that the question of dispatching Air Force subunits of the Bundeswehr to Turkey should be considered in legislature, and that a decision should be made there by a two-thirds majority. Many German newspapers are now pointing to the fact that such a decision would be unpopular both within the country and abroad. Especially if one bears in mind the recollections, still very much alive, of German aggression in the recent past.

People are perhaps worried more than anything else—not just in Germany, but also in other countries—by the fact that in no case should reliance be placed on force alone. The foreign minister of that same Germany has again called for a peaceful settlement of the crisis in the Persian Gulf, and intends to hold talks on the question today with his counterpart from Algeria. In London, similar talks are to take place with the king of Jordan. The chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the French legislature has left Paris for Baghdad. Tomorrow the question of resolving the crisis in the Persian Gulf will be discussed by the foreign ministers of the 12 EC member countries. So, it seems that if diplomats are no less active than the military, war may yet be prevented.

## Reports Follow Diplomats' Expulsion From Sweden

### Sweden Details 'Subversive' Acts

*PM0401111191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jan 91 Union Edition p 6*

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent M. Zubko: "Soviet Staffers Expelled"]

[Text] Stockholm—The first few days of the new year brought news which will obviously cloud the development of good-neighborly relations between the Soviet Union and Sweden: The Swedish authorities have adopted a decision to expel three staffers from Soviet establishments in the country.

These are staffers at the USSR Embassy in Sweden, the trade mission, and one other Soviet establishment. All three have been accused of engaging in "unlawful subversive activity." What form did this activity take? Mats Borjesson, director of Sapo, the Swedish security service, gave a quite detailed answer to that question on television yesterday evening.

All three, he said, tried to recruit agents for the purpose of obtaining defense and economic information. Their activity was directed against Sweden.

"How long had this activity gone on?" the news program anchorman asked Mats Borjesson.

"I can say that we kept them under surveillance for a long time."

"Did they manage to do Sweden any harm?"

"No, they did not, because we took the necessary measures in time."

"Does that mean that this activity has been continuing even during the period of detente?"

"Despite detente the Soviet Union has not reduced its efforts in the intelligence sphere. We are of the firm opinion that espionage is still being conducted against our defense system."

Those are the Swedish reasons for the expulsion decision. It is not impossible that the Soviet assessment will be different. What is it? Probably we will learn that a little later. But for the moment I want to add the following. In all, the Swedes have declared six foreign citizens persona non grata. The other three are Chinese representatives. Swedish television has reported that Beijing has already retaliated by expelling the first secretary at the Swedish Embassy.

Stockholm's DAGENS NYHETER claims that since 1982 Sweden has expelled 15 Soviet citizens.

### Charges, Expulsions Protested

*LD0301203891 Moscow World Service in English 2000 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[Text] The Soviet Union has protested to Sweden against the expulsion of three Soviet nationals charged with espionage.

The Soviet Embassy in Stockholm declared that the decision was groundless. It said the Swedish side has no evidence of a violation of Swedish or international law by the three persons. Last Wednesday Sweden demanded that one Soviet diplomat and two official representatives leave the country because of activities incompatible with their official status.

## Latin America & Caribbean

### Trade Official Views Trade Agreement With Cuba

*PY0301193091 Moscow in Spanish to Latin America 2300 GMT 2 Jan 91*

[Interview with Nikolay Shishkov, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relation specialist—recorded; Shishkov's comments are in Russian with superimposed translation into Spanish]

[Text] In connection with the deep changes that East Europe is experiencing in its previous political, ideological, and economic positions, much has recently been said about the [words indistinct] with Cuba. The USSR has also been considered in this case.

Truthfully, in our country there are also groups that are driven by their emotions rather than by actual circumstances. These groups demand that we reduce our economic and commercial cooperation with Cuba. At the same time, however, they do not hesitate to demand humanitarian aid from the Western world. Well, that is their business.

I spoke about this topic on the phone with Nikolay Shishkov, one of the main specialists from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. I asked him for his opinion on a recently signed Soviet-Cuban agreement.

[Begin Shishkov recording] This important document provides the necessary legal structure for the traditional comprehensive cooperation between our two countries in two major areas: commercial exchange and investment.

In the past, these two areas were regulated by different documents. That is why the new agreement does not have many details, although it outlines the specifics for economic-commercial cooperation for this year. [end recording]

What are the main Cuban products that may be exported to the USSR? This was the second question I asked Shishkov.

[Begin Shishkov recording] Under the terms of this agreement, Cuba will continue to export its traditional products to the USSR, namely crude sugar, nickel, and citrus. Medical industry products will be a new feature in Cuban exports to the USSR this year. A great variety of medical equipment and substances will be exported. [end recording]

I asked Shishkov the following question: What will the USSR sell to Cuba?

[Begin Shishkov recording] The USSR will continue to supply raw materials for the production of energy, chemicals, industrial materials, fertilizers, and various machines.

The USSR will also continue to extend technical cooperation for the construction and modernization of various economic structures in Cuba, like the (Juragua) nuclear central, the Cienfuegos oil refineries, the expansion of the Jose Marti iron and steel factory, and the construction of nickel factories and other objectives. [end recording]

Dear listeners, this has been a phone conversation with Nikolay Shishkov, a specialist from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, with whom we discussed a Cuban-Soviet economic and commercial cooperation agreement which was recently signed in Moscow.

### Diplomatic, Economic Relations With Cuba Viewed

*PY0301204091 Moscow in Spanish to Latin America 2300 GMT 2 Jan 91*

[Text] The issue of the USSR's diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba has returned to the forefront following the signing in Moscow of a new economic and commercial cooperation agreement between the two countries and because of the victory anniversary of the Cuban Revolution on 1 January.

Our colleague Gaston Vargas talked about the issue with Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Komplektov.

[Begin Vargas recording] The issue has been widely publicized in the Soviet press because of the character of our political and economic relations with Cuba. The discussions in the media have included some criticisms which, according to Komplektov, are the result of a lack of knowledge of the true situation in both countries.

Komplektov, who is in charge of Soviet diplomatic relations with Latin America, is clear in defining the problem. Komplektov said that we should not forget that Cuba has a lot of support in the international diplomatic arena, not only in Latin America but the entire Third World as well.

Komplektov stressed that many Latin American countries have established diplomatic relations with Cuba and that the country has been integrated into the region's political and economic processes. As for our economic links, Komplektov told our station, the Cuban economy was regrettably built on our model. In order to adapt to recent changes in East Europe and the Soviet Union which affect the character of those links and our mutual economic agreements, there must be a transition period. Changes cannot be introduced in a rushed or drastic manner.

Komplektov added that the two countries—not only Cuba—are interested in these links and that the agreements between Cuba and the Soviet Union that were signed on 29 December are proof of that interest.

The other topic that always surfaces when people talk about Cuba is the United States and its attitude against the regime headed by Fidel Castro.

Komplektov said that a good part of Cuba's international situation depends on the hard, confrontational attitude of the United States, which he characterized as illogical and which complicates a relaxation of the situation.

For the past 30 years, Cuba has been opposing what they see as a threat, and it has been suffering through a political and economic blockade. The Cubans will not accept the imposition of changes in their domestic policy from the outside.

Komplektov concluded by saying that the Americans should try to overcome this psychological and ideological barrier and leave Cuba in peace. The Soviet Union, Komplektov said, is trying to help establish a process of mutual understanding between the United States and Cuba to make possible a direct dialogue between the two countries. Komplektov added that the dialogue should eliminate mutual mistrust, which is one of the factors hindering the normalization of relations. [end recording]

## Political & Social

### Dzasokhov Reportedly To Replace Shevardnadze

*AU0401113191 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 4 Jan 91*

[Text] Alexandr Dzasokhov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, will probably be appointed new Soviet minister of foreign affairs, to replace Shevardnadze, who has resigned. This has been learned from well-informed sources in Moscow.

The same sources state that as early as next week the Soviet legislature will discuss the resignation of Shevardnadze, who seems to be insisting upon leaving the ministry.

### Gorbachev Interviewed on Government Structure

*LD0301200191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[Interview with President Mikhail Gorbachev by correspondents V. Lyubovtsev and S. Lomakin in the Kremlin in Moscow on 3 January; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] We begin the program with a report from our correspondents in the Kremlin.

The first session of the Council of the Federation was held in the Kremlin today. Heads of the legislatures and the councils of ministers of the Union republics met in the conference room. Deputy heads of the USSR Government and ministers were also invited. The USSR president and the heads of the supreme bodies of state power used the decisions of the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies as a basis for discussing the most pressing and top priority measures that need to be adopted today, now, to stabilize the social and economic situation in the country. They dealt, above all, with the formulation of a coordinated economic policy on the main parameters of our lives, such as prices, taxes, and social guarantees for working people during the transition to the market. After the proceedings ended, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev granted an interview to the "Vremya" program.

[Lyubovtsev] Mikhail Sergeyevich, an important conference on stabilizing the social and economic situation in the country has come to an end.

[Gorbachev] It was not a conference, but a session of the Council of the Federation...

[Lyubovtsev] A session of the Council of the Federation.

[Gorbachev] It is a very crucial distinction I am making, because this constitutional body is already functioning, with new powers on the basis of supplementary provisions.

[Lyubovtsev] Was the discussion constructive?

[Gorbachev] Yes, I must say that the discussion was a continuation of what the Council of the Federation was already doing during the congress. But at the time it did not manage to complete this work, and you will know what this brought about. The process of coordination progressed with great difficulty: We are talking about an economic agreement for 1991 to stabilize the economy.

This is a matter of anxiety for all our people because it affects all labor collectives and the whole of our society, along with the manner in which the economy is going to function. Economic and social results depend on it. Political stability and other matters depend on it. So it is a key question. It is a vital matter. At the same time we need to broaden its scope to bring in new forms of economic management as quickly as possible on the basis of reforming ownership relations and progress toward a market economy. You will see what a major issue—pivotal, I would call it—it is in all respects. That is why we have acted so rapidly and without delay.

It has to be said bluntly that because much, as far as the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic is concerned, has not been clarified—and you will recall that this surfaced very sharply during the congress—the comrades have been working throughout these days on my instructions from the center, and on the instructions of the republican leadership from the republic, including 31 [December] and 1 January. This enabled us to reach decisions that made it possible for the session of the Council of the Federation to be held today and for overall agreement on an economic accord.

[Lomakin] I believe that the Council discussed the drawing up of the Union budget. Allow me to suggest—perhaps I am not correct—but it seems to me that this is the first step in the signing of the Union treaty. What did you manage to decide?

[Gorbachev] Yes, you are right. That was indeed the central point—new approaches to the drawing up of the Union budget. Well, in the first place, we found principles on the basis of which we will be able to draw up both the Union budget and the budgets of the Union republics. You must understand that it is difficult to change over immediately to new mechanisms for the drawing up of the republics' budgets and the Union budget because we used to have a single structure. This was determined to a significant extent by the structure of the economy and the price structure. As a result, raw material industries always found themselves in a difficult situation, since the final product was marketed somewhere else, and that was where the final revenues were realized, as it were, and the benefits derived. But...

[Lomakin, interrupting] That is a normal phenonemon for the country.

[Gorbachev] Yes.

[Lomakin] Prices?

[Gorbachev] But at that time we handled the matter by means of redistribution through the budget, to even out the situation. An attempt was made to suggest that each component should decide what to do with its own revenues. But, obviously, all the raw material producing republics then raised another question. You have now given us fixed prices to avoid a big increase in wholesale, procurement, and retail prices, they said. We reject this. If you do this, we will set prices that guarantee us income. But, without raw materials, energy, fuel, and metal, nobody will be able to live. Nothing will work. The result is a paradox. No, we do not want to let prices take off. This being the case, we had to find a mechanism, a certain mechanism to help these industries and raw material producing republics. We have found these mechanisms. In general we have found them. It was a difficult search. But we have, nevertheless, achieved agreement.

Well, this shows that the most difficult questions can be solved. And, in connection with this, and by way of self-criticism, I have to say that probably—no, not probably—months were indeed wasted while this tug-of-war went on between the center and the republics, and between the republics.

[Lyubovtsev] Mikhail Sergeyevich, is it possible even today to say something encouraging to the Soviet people who are weary of the uncertainties and shortages and other problems?

[Gorbachev] Well, you know, this is really a reaction to a situation. An agreement on food supplies has been signed, both for the first quarter and for the whole of the 1991, on all mutual supplies and mutual obligations and questions of material-technical supplies to the agrarian sector, and what must be acquired by imports. In other words, everything has been thought out to ensure that food supplies do not worsen, and, if we get a combination of favorable circumstances, then we might even improve them. Especially since much is being envisaged to open up to the peasantry and everyone who lives in the countryside, and townspeople too, so as to give them greater opportunities and initiative through the reform in land relations. And I believe they will do more.

That is the first thing, and its important, the main issue, that of food. And the second thing is the economy as a whole—economic contracts, all questions connected with maintaining a certain economic rhythm. If we are going to have rhythm then we will not permit a big slump in production, because a slump also means a slump in income, a slump in profits, deductions, and in taxes, and this will affect everything. This is important, too. Incidentally, I was told yesterday—I found this out on the eve of today's session of the Council of the Federation—that 71 percent of enterprises had by 25 December concluded contracts for 1991, and 90 percent for the first quarter.

There still remain a number of unresolved matters concerning the work of our chemical enterprises. They require attention. Nevertheless, the main issues have been decided, and this gives me confidence that we will get the situation under control.

[Lomakin] Mikhail Sergeyevich, availing myself of this opportunity I would like to ask you another question. How will the new state structure be formed? There was much talk of this at the congress.

[Gorbachev] We even had exchanges today. First there will be proposals on what it should be, what the Cabinet of Ministers should be, what the structure of the Security Council should be, and what the functions of the Council of the Federation should be and who should serve it. It was on this that there was an exchange of views today. We agreed that alongside the Council of the Federation there will be an interrepublican committee that will carry out all the preparatory work for the Council of the Federation. It will consist of plenipotentiary representatives who will be assigned, appointed by the Supreme Soviets of the republics, and the representative of each republic will chair it in turn. In turn, there will be people representing the republics; competent people who are trusted and who indeed have experience in state work. That was what was discussed.

We also discussed the issue of how we are to make the transition from the current structure of the Council of Ministers, where there are many sectors and many ministries and departments, to another structure in line, indeed, with those powers that have now been recorded in the new Constitution. I do not think that we can make the transition tomorrow, and we cannot have one structure today and still another structure tomorrow, especially with the economy at such a stage of stabilization when it is necessary to maintain the entire economy of this enormous country.

Nevertheless, there will indeed be initial steps, and we have agreed to the following: In two to three days' time... [changes thought] I have now set up a group headed by the vice president and consisting of economists and major specialists. They are preparing proposals on the structure of the cabinet, which is due to function during this transitional stage. It will not yet be the structure to which we are transferring but the structure that will correspond to this transitional stage. In two to three days' time I will be sending out these proposals to leaders, the members of the Council of the Federation.

After securing their approval and talking with them—that is what we agreed, that is what was recorded in the congress' decisions—we will submit these proposals to the Supreme Soviet. The Supreme Soviet considers and endorses them, and, on this basis, personnel appointments are already being made. But all this has to be done quickly. I think that it has to be done like this: As far as both the structure and personnel are concerned, renewal must proceed and continuity must be retained, since one can move toward... [changes thought] fall into some extreme. There is...

[Lomakin, interrupting] No point in that.

[Gorbachev] No. Although we are specialists in extremes. But we do not always have sufficient common sense, as it were. I personally am in favor of common sense. I think that that corresponds to what distinguishes our whole people—common sense, common sense—not losing one's head in any situation and finding answers. I think we will find them. That is what was discussed, as well as other matters.

[Lyubovtsev] Thank you, Mikhail Sergeyevich.

[Lomakin] Thank you for giving us an interview.

[Gorbachev] Thank you.

### Gorbachev Holds Hour Meeting With Shevardnadze

*AU0301172091 Paris AFP in English 1709 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[Text] Moscow, Jan 3 (AFP) — Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev held a one-hour meeting Thursday [3 January] with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who last month shocked parliament with the announcement of his resignation, the INTERFAX news agency reported.

No details were given on the meeting, but Mr. Gorbachev might have sought to convince his minister to stay on for a while, observers said here.

Mr. Gorbachev said in a recent interview with the Japanese Asahi newspaper that he had "not ruled out" the possibility that Mr. Shevardnadze, formerly a key ally, might stay.

"There are no differences of opinion or views between us," Mr. Gorbachev told the newspaper.

Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vitaly Churkin, for his part, has denied that his minister was considering remaining in office.

Mr. Shevardnadze resigned on December 20 warning of possible "dictatorship" ahead as "reactionaries" make a come-back.

In an interview published Wednesday by the MOSCOW NEWS newspaper, Mr. Shevardnadze repeated his warning, adding that his resignation had not been the result "of an emotional outburst", but was meant to warn parliament "of a real danger".

### Council Approves Stabilization Agreement

*LD0301165291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1627 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Orlov from the Kremlin]

[Text] Moscow, 3 Jan (TASS)—An agreement for 1991 on stabilizing the country's socioeconomic situation was approved at a meeting of the USSR Council of the Federation which took place here today. For the first time, top leaders or representatives of all Union republics and also of the Union of SSR [as received] and the USSR Government took part in the meeting.

All the participants spoke in the course of the meeting. The results of discussion were summed up by USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev. Within the next few days the USSR president will dispatch the text of agreement to Union republics for signing.

### Council Participants Listed

*PM0401102991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Jan 91 Second Edition p 1*

[TASS report: "Council of the Federation Session"]

[Text] A Council of the Federation session in which the top leaders of all Union republics and the Soviet state and government took part was held 3 January in the Kremlin under the chairmanship of the USSR president.

Proceeding from the country's general interests and their responsibility to its peoples and guided by the resolution of the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies "On the Situation in the Country and Priority Measures To Overcome the Prevailing Socioeconomic and Political Crisis," the session participants approved in principle an agreement for 1991 on stabilizing the socioeconomic situation in the country.

They deemed it necessary to complete work as soon as possible on concluding economic contracts between enterprises regardless of their location and to promote the preservation of existing economic links and also the free movement of production and technical output and consumer goods between enterprises and regions.

A broad exchange of opinions took place. The following spoke in the debate, which was held in a constructive atmosphere: B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet; K.M. Makhkamov, president of the Tajik SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]; L.A. Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet; T.I. Sigua, chairman of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers; L.M. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet; I.A. Karimov, president of the Uzbek SSR; A.N. Mutalibov, president of the Azerbaijan SSR; I.S. Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers; U.K. Karamanov, prime minister of the Kazakh SSR; I.T. Godmanis, chairman of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers; K.I. Masik, first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers; V.S. Pavlov, USSR minister of finance; Ya.A. Leymann, Estonian SSR minister of the economy; V.I. Shcherbakov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems; and E.V. Bichkauskas, permanent representative of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers at the USSR Council of Ministers.

Work on the document has entered the final stage, they noted. It was decided that in the next few days the USSR president will send the text of the agreement for signing in the Union republics.

### Commentator Criticizes Komin PRAVDA Interview

*LD0301220991 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[Commentary by Valeriy Kioso]

[Text] The interview of Anatoliy Nikolayevich Komin, first deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee on Prices, published in yesterday's issue of PRAVDA, has given rise to numerous calls to our editorial office. Radio listeners have been asking whether in fact a decision has been adopted on increasing the prices of many goods. Our commentator Valeriy Kioso ponders the complex situation connected with this article.

[Kioso] To begin with, let us note one very important point. We are not talking about a presidential decree or about a government decision. This was only an interview, although of course given by an authoritative person, of course not only expressing his own point of view, but also the position of his committee; but this was nonetheless just the point of view of a department.

In a few days the Supreme Soviet will convene, which will discuss vitally important issues, including the plan and budget, which unfortunately we have not got yet. The country's president will probably lend specific content to this program which he expounded at the last Congress of People's Deputies. Therefore, let us say, it is a little early yet to talk about price increases as a fait accompli, especially in precise figures.

Of course, reform must be carried out on our frankly ossified price system, which has resulted in the country's budget, or rather its expenditure part, consisting to a large extent, of subsidies. And, of course, many prices will be higher than those at the moment. We will have to reconcile ourselves to this sad reality. But the main questions are, how will this reform be carried out, what should definitely accompany it and, in the final analysis, what this should all lead to, and in this sense the interview with Anatoliy Nikolayevich Komin, quite honestly, surprised me. He talks about the only reform option acceptable to us as being its central execution with obligatory compensation.

You see, however, that this is nothing other than the proposal of the government program of last May, which was not in any case supported by the country's Supreme Soviet. But it is again being suggested to us that we should believe that this time the State Committee on Prices will calculate the new prices justly.

And one more point which, in my view, is very important. The basic guidelines for the transition to a market economy approved by the legislature speak of the necessity of bringing prices in order and the staged liberalization of prices. Incidentally, the country's president also talked about this at the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies. He spoke about the multi-phase expansion of the ranges of free prices, combined with measures for social protection. From this, playing with prices will lead to no good, while the budget deficit, as economists Yasin and (Alekseyshenko) recently wrote in IZVESTIYA, will be over 250 billion rubles this year. This is where the root of the problem lies. Only after cutting this budget deficit will it be necessary to start liberalizing prices. But what Anatoliy Nikolayevich Komin is suggesting, you see, is centralized increase of prices not together with, but in place of, an improvement in finances, in my view. In a word, whichever way you look at it, it is difficult to agree with the point of view of the State Committee on Prices, and it is even incomprehensible why this interview was given. And in any case you cannot call it a felicitous one.

## 1991 Economic Agreement Outlined

*LD0301200591 Moscow TASS in English 1954 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow January 3 TASS—The USSR Federation Council, chaired by President Mikhail Gorbachev, met today to discuss an economic agreement for 1991.

The agreement aims to preserve economic links between Soviet republics and stabilise the social and economic situation in the country.

The Federation Council endorsed the document in principle.

The Union and republican budgets are formed with taxes, envisaged by the USSR law on taxes and other revenues, the document says.

It envisages the creation of an all-Union and republican non-budgetary funds to stabilise the economy.

The document calls for a coordinated policy on price-formation, ensuring equality and free competition between Soviet producers.

It suggests to introduce new wholesale and purchasing prices and tariffs beginning from January 1, 1991. The new prices will be used by enterprises and organisations when concluding new economic contracts for 1991.

The agreement envisages a coordinated policy on wages, employment, migration and minimum state guarantees in the social sphere.

Foreign economic policy will be pursued jointly and will be realised by a Union-republican currency committee, the document says.

Loans and credits will be taken on behalf of the Soviet Union on agreement with republics; republics will take loans and credits independently and will be responsible for them.

Violations of the agreement and disputes between republics will be tackled at the Federation Council. The agreement will be in force until a new Union treaty is signed.

In the next few days, after the document is edited, President Mikhail Gorbachev will forward the agreement to Union republics for signing.

## Sources of U.S. 'Clandestine Operations' Viewed

*91UF0271A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Dec 90 Second Edition p 5*

[Article by PRAVDA special correspondent Yevgeniy Spekhov under the rubric "Notes on Fields of Foreign Instructions": "Clandestine and Overt"]

[Text] The longer you live the more you are surprised.

I would never have thought that just one sentence could irritate a reader. Just what are we are talking about!

In the article "You All Seethe" (PRAVDA, May 11), I permitted myself to express an opinion: Should we not, I said, rule out those who support the new wave of anticommunism. I had in mind foreign influence on the well-known events in Central and East Europe.

I did not support what I said with facts. I just cited the opinion of one ambassador to the USSR. He pointed out that certain foreign circles support the extreme right wing. These circles are assisting the right wing with money, equipment, and propaganda material.

The meaning of a number of readers' reactions was categorical: All of this is "rubbish" and PRAVDA has an old-regime reporter.

Vexed by these critical remarks, I then turned to foreign sources. What I found out is what I am revealing to the skeptics. To accept or to refute what has been said is their concern.

How should I begin?

Briefly with an understanding of today's world. The arrow of the political barometer does not now flicker on the cold war scale. The climate is changing for the better.

The Paris Charter for a New Europe, signed by the leaders of 34 states, announces that the era of confrontation and division has ended and henceforth relations between countries will be based on mutual respect and cooperation. An element of trust between the USSR and the United States and a readiness for mutual cooperation in the interests of peace and security which is particularly important has arisen and is predominant in the new historical current. This is reality.

But I return to the beginning of my remarks. We cannot refute that intelligence services are operating in their country and in our country and that they are carrying out their missions. It is considered unpopular to write about this today. Some regard this view as nearly a return to the times of bitter confrontation. God forbid that we repeat what we have already gone through. But... there are clandestine operations and the United States is not making a secret of this.

The intelligence activity appropriations bill for fiscal year 1991 frankly states: "'clandestine operations'—activities undertaken by any United States governmental organization for the purpose of influencing the political, economic, or military situation outside the borders of the country so that the role of the United States government is not obvious or is not publicly acknowledged."

Perhaps the thoughts CIA Director W. Webster stated at the Association of Former Intelligence Agents in April 1989 are appropriate. The text was published in America.

"I am a strong advocate of clandestine operations and I consider this type of activity extremely important for implementing national foreign policy in those regions and countries where open foreign policy acts simply do not work. And consequently I am defending the importance of clandestine operations to Congress and to other concerned groups. I am convinced that we need to preserve the capability to conduct well-thought-out and totally controlled clandestine operations so that we are always able to defend the appropriateness of what we are doing."

But this is still not against us, writes another reader. This will not occur in our country.

It is hard to say.

"Until now a significant portion of our efforts have been expended against the Soviet Union," the CIA director popularly explains the essence of his department's policy. "That resulted in periods when up to 85 percent of all our resources were directed into intelligence work against the Soviet Union. I think that this direction of work has not lost its importance."

It is possible that this is so. And we need to assume that America has the resources. According to preliminary data, U.S. intelligence is requesting 30 billion dollars for the new fiscal year.

Mention of East Europe vexes my opponents; they say they do not really believe it. The processes there are complex and that is why I do not intend to link them to "CIA schemes" as has previously been done. But then I read a column in THE LOS ANGELES TIMES under the headline "The United States is implicated in the Bulgarian downfall" and I do not know, do I believe it or not? "The expectation of American aid and the support of U.S. diplomats seemed to inspire the Bulgarian opposition in its six month effort to topple the only Communist government in East Europe which emerged victorious during multi-party elections. Officials in the United States openly shared the disappointment of anti-communist activists within the union of democratic forces when the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] won the elections in June. Since that time, continued financial aid to the opposition and large-scale soviets and how to employ pressure against elected leaders resulted in raising the hopes of the United States to compel Communist leaders to leave office."

Let us look at other materials, for example, in documents of the so-called "Heritage Foundation."

This is a solid American research center and representatives of big business and right-wing forces founded it. Clarity was needed in order to do business and they obtained it.

"The Initiative for 1989" read: "A period of disorder in Central and East Europe is very likely. While using the experience of supporting the Polish underground, we need to create a support infrastructure for the democratic and national-liberation forces in Central and East Europe."

The initiative goes on to talk about overt and clandestine financing of programs to deliver printing equipment, printing ink, computers and printers, video equipment and video cassettes. Simultaneously, it recommends that the National Fund in Support of Democracy carry out recruitment of suitable candidates in these countries to

whom money could also be openly transferred in the form of donations as was done in Poland through international free trade union organizations, for example.

It is obvious from materials published in the West that a special tactic for conducting clandestine operations has been developed which takes into account the specific features of the countries against which they are being conducted. Although some of my colleagues also say: this is not new, nevertheless let us listen.

Judging by those same articles, the main thing with regard to the Soviet Union is to exert pressure using all possible methods, to not provide time to seal up the cracks which will appear in the Soviet system but, on the contrary, "we need to be always prepared to use these situations in the interests of the United States."

It points out that the Soviet system has vulnerable areas and naturally political, economic, and social weaknesses which are inherent to it and which can be used....

I recently read the following in that same LOS ANGELES TIMES: Intelligence organs began comprehensive research to study the consequences for the United States of the breakup of the Soviet Union and possible changes in the country's leadership.

There they are troubled but the concern, from my point of view, is peculiar: To limit the explosion to within the Union's borders and to prevent it from gushing beyond the confines of the USSR's borders.

Judging by everything, American experts are concerned about further increases of the effectiveness of clandestine operations as one of the most important instruments of U.S. foreign policy. These thoughts are concentrated in materials of the Consortium on Studying U.S. Intelligence Problems. I am paraphrasing the text....

The United States must in the 1990's significantly increase the use of clandestine operations to protect American state interests. This will only become possible under conditions of the total support of clandestine operations by the U.S. Government and society. Planning of clandestine operations needs to be integrated into nationwide national security policy programs so that clandestine operations can really become an effective foreign policy instrument. No statewide regional program must be compiled without participation of clandestine operations intelligence experts or without considering the use of intelligence capabilities in realizing this program.

Experts and policymakers may be used when necessary for strategic operational planning.

These are just a few of my thoughts on the subject. And as a conclusion: Overt support of pro-Western political forces abroad can turn out to be very effective in the 1990's.

I have already mentioned the existence of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence Activity in the United States. This public organ was created in 1979 at the initiative of and under the control of the U.S. National and Strategic Information Center. Current and former leading American intelligence agents, scientists, and members of congressional committees participate in the Consortium's work. And in America, as our readers know, that which has been founded and into which money is invested, also works. One thing is unchanged—U.S. state interests. You can waive whatever you want other than the country's interests.

Now about methods and techniques. They are precisely formulated. The article in THE LOS ANGELES TIMES is indicative in this regard. I cite the words of one former CIA analyst: "We must know the telephone numbers of Soviet missile forces commanders in Siberia so that we can have the opportunity to ask them what they think about the situation which has developed and not only talk with the Soviet chief of the General Staff or with the Soviet minister of defense in Moscow."

These people are operating with a good institution. They know their business and therefore they also phrase things precisely. Each individual who wants to become involved with clandestine operations must select certain key influential political figures in a foreign state who could turn out to be useful. They study the desires, ambitions, prejudices, and vulnerabilities of these people in order to make them easier to control. It is thought that some of them will act like idealists gone astray and others will attempt to acquire power or money.

Recommendations delve deeper.

Consortium researchers advise that one can influence the adoption of political decisions through bribery and by secretly assisting or creating interference for activities of certain individuals or organizations. The method of disseminating false information is most widely used. At the same time, the fact that all of this originates with a foreign government or at least must serve its interests is maintained in secrecy.

When supplying this information to a political leader, they can either stimulate a certain reaction from him, reinforce this leader's intentions, or compel him to change his plans.

Of course, these are serious concerns.

False information can weaken or strengthen factional disagreements, increase or decrease the degree of trust, or increase or undermine the reputation of some political figure.

Leaders can be discredited as a result of the dissemination of information about their corruption or disloyalty. However, this information must be supported by the involvement of the person it is directed against and compromise his activities.

According to the words of former CIA Deputy Director Vernon Walters, "clandestine operations directed even

just at influencing public opinion can bring enormous benefit. Often a clandestine operation will consist only of making certain information available to our friends or to help them attract society's attention to this information."

And so forth on many pages: instructions, instructions....

I will limit myself to this for now even though I have somewhat greater information at my disposal.

I admit that digging into "clandestine" matters, all the more so in our time, did not provide any particular satisfaction. But I considered it to be my obligation to answer the letters' authors. If they had not vexed me, I probably would not have reached for my pen. So, are the recommendations of the American intelligence elite so harmless? Judge for yourselves.

## Gromov Discusses New Internal Affairs Job

*91UN0592A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Dec 90 First Edition p 1*

[Unattributed interview with Colonel General B. Gromov; place and date not given; under the rubric: "Faces on the Scene"; "Deputy Boris Gromov"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Colonel General B. Gromov is one of those people's deputies most often besieged by the press. The reasons are well-known. Recently he was appointed first deputy USSR minister of internal affairs. Previously he commanded the 40th Army, withdrew it from Afghanistan, then served as commander of troops, Kiev Military District. And now a new turn of events in his destiny.

Without a doubt, this has enhanced the attention journalists are focusing on the general. But Boris Vsevolodovich apologizes and refuses to give interviews, saying: "Let us wait until the end of the congress. I have to get more settled into my job." An exception was made for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Boris Vsevolodovich, was this new appointment unexpected for you?

[Gromov] Yes, unexpected. Entirely unexpected. What did I do? I had meetings planned with the electorate. And I went. I got many questions. Why is there such chaos in the country? Why are there no products? The usual meetings. I think they are asking each of us such questions today. Then I went to Moscow.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] We have seen quite a bit of commentary on this in the press. Have you read it?

[Gromov] Clippings are put on my desk. But, frankly speaking, I put them aside. I even requested that none of this material be brought to me for the time being. It is the right of every journalist to write and provide commentary on my appointment. And I will read all of it when I am better settled into my position. At that time, I myself will be able to know whether or not they have written the truth about me.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Indeed, it is difficult to delve into everything right now. But perhaps you can just tell us what spheres of MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] activity you will be overseeing?

[Gromov] Maintaining public order and everything related to MVD activity in emergency situations. I am assimilating all of this right now.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And what was your mood upon leaving the military district?

[Gromov] It was distressing. I have just now gotten over this mood, calmed down about things.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] In all honesty, what did you not get done there?

[Gromov] A great deal. I did not finish receiving the troops from abroad. And so I didn't get done what I had planned. The main problem is getting officers and their families settled in. This affects everything. It influences training and morale. It affects absolutely everything.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And has the military district changed over the year and a half of your command?

[Gromov] This is difficult for me myself to judge. Let others do this. I feel that the district has not changed for the worse.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The minister of defense held a press conference at the congress. Will the minister of internal affairs meet with journalists?

[Gromov] We spoke with Boris Karlovich Pugo about a press conference and decided that it would be early for us to do this right now.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] From whom do you expect support?

[Gromov] In Afghanistan I took over a division from Yuriy Vasilyevich Shatalin. Now, as you know, he is commanding Internal Troops. We are good friends and comrades, and so are happy to be working together. This will provide support. We both hope that work will start going better.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How do you presently begin the working day?

[Gromov] With an assessment of the operational situation. I have already spoken about my responsibilities, and it is here that I must concern myself first of all.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] A final question, Boris Vsevolodovich. Will you continue to collaborate as before with KRASNAYA ZVEZDA?

[Gromov] With great pleasure, if KRASNAYA ZVEZDA does not reject me.

### Ministry Reports Data on Speculation Cases

*LD0301215891 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Now a report from our Internal Affairs Ministry on the results of this department's work in the past month.

The report says that internal affairs bodies, along with worker inspectors and the public, exposed over 5,000 cases of abuse in the country. Three thousand are concealment of goods and their sale from bases, storehouses, and backrooms in December of last year alone. Goods worth a total of seven million rubles hidden from free sale were discovered, R1.3 worth of them being foodstuffs.

Some 100 instances of selling foodstuffs and other goods to dealers were detected. Over 6,000 cases of speculation in foodstuffs, including by financially responsible persons and retail trade officials, were foiled.

Measures in accordance with the legislation in force were applied to all offenders.

### TRUD Notes Atomic Bomb Test Effects on Soldiers

*LD0301140991 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[Text] The history of a country is its attitude toward its people, TRUD notes. The paper writes today about the first test of the atom bomb in our country involving people in September 1954 in Totskiy Rayon, Orenburg Oblast.

The infantry were put on to armoured carriers and rushed to the epicenter of the blast. That is an excerpt from a conversation with a former private of a guards tank unit. Also talking about their experiences are other former servicemen who in that year 1954 were really turned into guinea pigs. Some time after the blast they started developing a whole series of illnesses, and they could not go to the doctor, they had signed the military secrets act. Now they are fruitlessly appealing to the Defense Ministry for aid. TRUD says they need to stand up for their rights independently without relying on anyone. Indeed, the servicemen have set up the Committee of Special Risk Veterans. The participants in the tests themselves are now collecting money to build at least one small hospital to treat their terrible diseases.

### New Radio Transmitter Inaugurated in Tynda

*LD0201173491 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 2 Jan 91*

[Summary] A new radio transmitter has been put into operation in Tynda, and as a result listeners in the northern part of Priamurye will be able to listen to Mayak almost continuously in the long-wave band.

### Unregistered Media Face Fines, Confiscation

*LD0301135791 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[Text] Hard times are ahead for functioning mass media that have not registered with the USSR State Committee for the Press. Their founders are in danger of being fined up to 500 rubles [R] and all the copies being confiscated. In case of a repeated issue of a unregistered publication they will face criminal charges and will be fined up to R1,000 with confiscation of technical equipment. Only those owners of newspapers and magazines who applied for registration before 31 December 1990 will evade these measures. A total of 1,500 applications were received, almost 800 of which are new.

### Statistices on KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Cited

*PM0301123991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jan 91 First Edition p 1*

[Editorial Office feature: "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA-91"]

[Text] Dear reader! In your hands is the first 1991 issue of the central military-political newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. It was published in a print run of 1,059,355 copies, with 645,629 copies delivered to subscribers, while 413,726 copies in accordance with applications from Soyuzpechat [Main Administration for the Distribution of the Press] have gone on sale in the retail trade.

According to the USSR Law "On the press and other mass media" our newspaper was registered by the USSR State Committee for the Press 17 October 1990. The registration number is 509. The founder of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is the USSR Defense Ministry.

Like the majority of other central newspapers, in previous years there were 300 issues of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA a year (determined by the paper quota). The newspaper was published five times a week with four pages and once a week—on Saturday—with six pages. In 1991 KRASNAYA ZVEZDA will remain the same size but will be published five times a week: with four pages on Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday, with six pages on Wednesday, and with eight pages on Friday. These changes have been enforced and are distressing for the editorial office. The point is that the mail is altering its work regime. It has refused to deliver newspapers to subscribers on Sundays and State holidays. Nor will there be any retail sale of newspapers on Sundays through the kiosks.

As is well known, the cost of newspapers has also changed. The cost of a four-page issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA this year is eight kopeks, of a six-page issue 10 kopeks and of an eight-page issue 12 kopeks. For those who acquire our newspaper at kiosks the total annual cost will be 22 rubles 96 kopeks. For subscribers it is far cheaper—13 rubles 80 kopeks a year. It is possible to subscribe to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA at any time and at any mail department.

In addition to Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is printed in 36 other cities in the country. It is transmitted via phototelegraph to Alma-Ata, Arkhangelsk, Baku, Vilnius, Vladivostok, Volgograd, Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Irkutsk, Kazan, Kiev, Kishinev, Krasnodar, Krasnoyarsk, Kuybyshev, Leningrad, Lugansk, Lvov, Mineralnyye Vody, Minsk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Odessa, Omsk, Perm, Rostov-na-Donu, Saratov, Sverdlovsk, Simferopol, Tashkent, Tbilisi, Frunze, Kharkov, and Chelyabinsk. Original dies of the issues are delivered by aircraft to Khabarovsk and Chita.

In 1991, as in previous years, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA will have two editions. This is so that in remote regions the newspaper as a rule reaches readers on the day of publication and also by the production potential of the decentralized press centers.

Work on the first edition ends at 1645 and the second is signed off at 2230. Part of the up to date information coming in through various channels in the afternoon is published in a later issue of the first edition than in the second.

In 1991 the first edition of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA will be published in 860,155 copies and the second in 199,200 copies. The second edition is published in Moscow, Donetsk, and Krasnoyarsk. This year KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has subscribers in 83 countries.

### Mailmen Fail to Deliver 1 January Newspapers

*PM0301105791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian*
*3 Jan 91 Second Edition p 3*

[Article by S. Oganyan under the "What Happened?" rubric: "The Newspapers Didn't Arrive"]

[Text] V. Leontyev, director of the PRAVDA publishing house, showed me an unusual document yesterday. It is called "Information on the Dispatch of Newspapers for 1 January 1991." On the morning of the first day of the New Year, subscribers in such towns as Nizhniy Novgorod, Zaporozhye, Karaganda, Novosibirsk, Riga, Chelyabinsk, and many others (including to some extent Moscow and Leningrad, too) discovered that their mail boxes were empty.

On the day that this information was produced, the newspapers for 1 and 2 January were still at the printing press. What is going on? And did this happen so unexpectedly? I put these questions to the publishing house director.

"I find it hard to understand what is going on," Vyacheslav Petrovich said. "It is well known that as of this year the cost of postage has doubled. It would seem that mail workers ought to be working, if not better than last year, then at least no worse. Yet just before New Year the USSR Communications Ministry began sending us "warning" telegrams signed by deputy minister Ye. Manyakin. At first they reported that there would be no deliveries on Sundays or state festivals declared to be public holidays. A week later they promised that there would be deliveries after all. And in between these two reports came a telegram from V. Antonov, chief of the Moscow Main Administration for the Distribution of Printed Matter: Please do not allocate editions of newspaper for retail sale in Moscow on public holidays...

"And Antonov kept his word. Our drivers toured Moscow on 1 January and brought their newspapers back to the printing houses. It seems that Manyakin is not to be believed. There is no one to sue either: The Communications Ministry transferred all its rights to local communications organs no longer under the ministry's jurisdiction. You can have the best equipped printing press in the world but it will not stand up to such a godless attitude."

The publishing house director invoked the name of God with good reason: Christmas Day [7 January] is approaching—a day declared a holiday. On that day, too, subscribers will probably be left without their newspapers...

## Economic

### Aganbegyan on Economy, Future Form of State

*AU0301202591 Vienna PROFIL in German*
*31 Dec 90 p 40*

[Interview with economic expert Abel Aganbegyan by Artem Ohandyanian in Moscow; date not given: "The People's Anger Threatens Everybody"]

[Text] Abel Aganbegyan, 57, was Gorbachev's closest economic adviser in the first stage of perestroyka. Between 1961 and 1985, the Armenian economic expert worked at the Siberian branch of the Academy of Sciences in Novosibirsk, where he studied the introduction of market elements into the Soviet system. For a certain time, Mikhail Gorbachev favored Stanislav Shatalin, a radical supporter of the market economy, yet Aganbegyan's compromise plan was adopted in the fall. As rector of the Moscow National Economy Academy at the USSR Council of Ministers, the Armenian is observing the economic decline of the USSR.

[Ohandyanian] Mr. Aganbegyan, as early as in September you explained to the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies that the economic situation is much more serious that one would imagine. What do you say now?

[Aganbegyan] The situation has become even more serious, because the strings of the economy are breaking apart at breakneck pace. I expected that we would change over to the market economy beginning November. We destroyed the old administrative system and thus also the central supply system, which worked badly, yet without creating a new system. To act like this is very dangerous. We must change over to the market economy

as quickly as possible. Yet there has been no progress in this direction yet. All we do is indulge in endless discussions about it.

[Ohandyanian] You also said that "we will be in for great trouble" if things continue like this. "What is this "great trouble" for you?

[Aganbegyan] This is chaos, the decline of the standard of living and the production decrease of 30 to 40 percent. This has created social unrest, strikes, and chaos, both on an economic and social level—exactly the same as happened in Poland.

[Ohandyanian] Can this "great trouble" also mean the seizure of power by the military?

[Aganbegyan] I hope not. However, this question does not belong to my field. I am an economist and I deal with economic questions. Nevertheless, I shall remain an optimist. The destruction of the economic relations is bad for all political forces of our country. The anger of the people threatens to wipe out everything. This dangerous state has created a situation where within the individual republics and their leading strata—irrespective of political ideology—a common interest has emerged, calling for stability, law, and order. I hope that Gorbachev knows how to take advantage of this situation, and that the deputies of the People's Congress can consolidate their power and create a political atmosphere that paves the way for economic reform.

[Ohandyanian] Gorbachev has failed to implement perestroyka in six years. Is it conceivable that he himself will call in the military?

[Aganbegyan] Perestroyka does not only mean economic reform but also changes in domestic policy: democracy and freedom of expression; perestroyka wants social reconstruction. As far as military support is concerned I cannot say anything, because it is not my field. I do not deal with politics. Ask me questions that are related to the economy.

[Ohandyanian] Why was it not possible to implement perestroyka?

[Aganbegyan] The reason is that there is no political power. The reason that there is no political power is that simultaneously with the perestroyka movement a process of introducing a new order in the republics is taking place in the USSR. However, this process is developing in an unorderly way and has gotten out of control, which has paralyzed the government and deprived it of its power.

[Ohandyanian] It has been said that this year there has been a good harvest and production is sufficient; nevertheless, there are supply problems. Why?

[Aganbegyan] Because the system of supply administration has been destroyed, because there is no working market, and because the value of the ruble is declining on a daily basis.

[Ohandyanian] The USSR has asked foreign countries for food aid. Would technological assistance not be more effective?

[Aganbegyan] Ignoring the current difficult situation—yes. However, considering the current—although temporary—yet critical situation, we realize that it was a necessary step. We had no other alternative.

[Ohandyanian] How will the prices be worked out in the new market system?

[Aganbegyan] The changeover to the free market economy implies the creation of a mechanism to motivate the people. Prices will be determined by supply and demand. Well, this is how a free economy works.

[Ohandyanian] How will the question of the privatization of land be solved?

[Aganbegyan] This depends on the individual republics. Their laws must determine the way their land is used.

[Ohandyanian] Gorbachev rejects the privatization of land.

[Aganbegyan] He rejects a general law for the entire USSR because, in reality, most people are against it. Gorbachev represents the opinion of the majority of people. However, at the same time the president's program stipulates that the land reform be determined by the individual laws of the republics.

[Ohandyanian] In what form will foreigners be given the opportunity to invest in the USSR in the future?

[Aganbegyan] There will be a presidential decree and a new law, enlarging the possibilities for investment with capital from the outside. Thus, it will be possible to acquire shares of enterprises. It will then also be possible for foreign investors to establish enterprises with 100 percent of their own capital. In addition, it will be possible to get long-term leases for land and natural resources of the country.

[Ohandyanian] What guarantees will such investors be given?

[Aganbegyan] The guarantees are contained in the new law and also in the presidential decree. If these are not sufficient one can also conclude bilateral agreements, which is what we do with several countries that provide mutual guarantees.

[Ohandyanian] Will the central power continue to exist at all?

[Aganbegyan] In the future there will no longer be a central power in the present form, that is to say a single center of power within the state. We will be a union of republics. There will be another center—the central government of the union of sovereign republics. The supreme authority will be the council of the federation, made up of the presidents of the republics. The central

government of the union will only have limited functions, functions the republics voluntarily cede to the central government.

## Yavlinskiy, Others Hit Ryzhkov Economic View

*PM0301155091 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jan 91 Union Edition p 3*

["Expert report" by Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, Mikhail Zadornov, and Aleksey Mikhaylov: "Perestroyka and a 'Breathing Space'"]

[Text] Against the background of heated debates about the Union treaty, E. Shevardnadze's resignation announcement, warnings of an incipient dictatorship, and arguments over the need for referendums, the head of government's speech at the Congress may not have made much of an impact. But it was no ordinary speech, in fact it was by way of being a program speech.

In this article we want to propose a different view of the problems of perestroyka and the causes of the economic crisis, and to evaluate the proposed measures for emerging from the crisis.

### Perestroyka

The starting point for the speech was this: "Perestroyka, in its conceived form, has not been implemented"; there has been "political and ideological wrecking of the process of transformations." A very serious statement—both in its premises and in its conclusions.

If you look at perestroyka as a measure conceived by a group of leaders as some kind of limited "reform from above," whose aims and intentions were known in full only to its organizers, then they are best placed, so to speak, to see whether or not it has been wrecked. But if you see perestroyka as a profound, objectively necessary process reflecting society's real needs and expressing the potential for change that has accumulated in society over many decades, then the thesis of the wrecking of perestroyka is unfounded.

Hence the differing attitudes to what is happening in the country. In the first case, a panicky feeling that society is being "destroyed" and convulsive efforts to "save" it; in the second, conscious participation in perestroyka as a painful but inevitable process of reforms, coupled with efforts to facilitate these transformations.

The processes that began five years ago are continuing, but there has been a major change—as is only natural—in the sources and motive forces of these processes. In the first two years actions "from above" were necessary to resurrect people's sociopolitical and economic activeness. And society did indeed become reanimated and began itself to act as initiator of transformations (this is the watershed mentioned in the head of government's speech). Many of the leaders who began perestroyka were unable or unwilling to understand and accept this new, most important stage in it. They began—deliberately or unwittingly—to delay further transformations, propose dead-end decisions, and postpone essential steps, taking these steps only under pressure from society.

From this standpoint it is also only natural to find the explanation that has now been put forward as to why perestroyka was wrecked—the "influence of destructive forces" and the "breakdown of established structures in both state and party."

Who are these destructive forces? How did they manage, in a short space of time, to ruin the economy of a huge country? Who was responsible for the antialcohol campaign, or at least the strange idea of "regional economic accountability"—the prototype of today's territorial separatism—or the incompetent organization of the cooperative sector, causing a natural sense of irritation in people? Was it not the government that insisted on the adoption in December 1989 of a program that did not take account of political and economic realities obviously failing three months later? Let us recall: The proposed price increases were announced seven months beforehand, which caused panic and speculation on the consumer market. Was it not the government that followed the principle of a "gradual" and "considered" approach—resulting in "neither plan nor market"? After all, did not the building of a realistic plan always depend on a government capable, as they always used to assure us, of "seeing an integrated picture of the existing situation and its possible consequences"?

There can be only one answer: These destructive forces are incomprehension and incompetence.

The inability or unwillingness to understand the processes taking place in the economy gives rise to a new thesis—that of "political warfare under the banner of the market, lacking any serious economic content." All who insist on a different approach from the government's to economic reforms—republics calling for sovereignty, economists proposing different programs for the transition to the market—are declared to be virtually political enemies who are ruining the country.

Now for the "breakdown of state structures." It may be asserted confidently that none of these structures has been destroyed in the years of perestroyka: Neither legislative nor executive organs of power have been disbanded; the militia, the courts, and the prosecutor's office remain whole. Party structures have also survived, in the main. Numerous and, as it turns out, futile mergers and divisions of ministries and sector organs of management have been carried out by the government's own decisions. The ineffectiveness of these structures' operations is the direct consequence of unskilled leadership, organizational impotence, gross personnel blunders...

Why was a "political-ideological" explanation of the wrecking of perestroyka needed? This explanation is a way of evading responsibility for the economic crisis and shifting the blame to those who determined the policy of

the country as a whole. But this too is a position leading to a reluctance to change the means and methods of state economic policy.

**The Economy**

Explaining the economic crisis in terms of political-ideological factors, rather than in terms of the "exacerbation of internal contradictions in the production sphere," means that everything is fine in the economy, and as soon as order is imposed in the political sphere, society's progressive development will resume. But in that case, why did they begin the transformations in 1985, when political stability was not in doubt?

The crisis afflicting our economy is determined by two main factors. The first lies in the deformed economic structure that we inherited, along with the absence of serious incentives for labor; the second lies in the major mistakes made in economic leadership in recent years.

The course of "acceleration," making the structure of the national economy even more cumbersome, together with the attempt to pursue broad social programs, sharply exacerbated the inflationary potential in the economy. The transition to so-called self-financing without the simultaneous creation of a credit and finance market led to the exacerbation of the state's shortage of funds for fulfilling its programs—the budget deficit increased rapidly. This shortfall began to be covered more actively with money that was not backed up by goods. Since that time this "inflationary pumping" of the economy has acquired the nature of a financial disaster. Also the growth in enterprises' monetary funds has sharply aggravated the existing shortage of all types of resources, and also predetermined an increase in monetary payments to the population, immediately pouring into the consumer market. There was no substantial restructuring of the foreign economic sphere—the fall in hard currency revenue arising from the fall in prices for energy sources was covered by means of accelerated growth of the foreign debt and the sale abroad of an increasing quantity of gold.

These examples alone are more than enough to refute the thesis that there are no economic causes for the present crisis.

It is state policy (and not mythical destructive forces) that is today driving the market "into the shadows," simply by depriving it of a place "in the sun." A "wild," uncontrolled transition to the market is taking place, not because it is uncontrollable in principle, but because the state is not creating the conditions to facilitate this transition. On the contrary, it is in effect resisting the development of market relations by continuing to pursue, in the main areas, that same policy that led to today's results.

Thus, while the head of government thinks that the cause of the economic difficulties are political and ideological in nature, in our view exactly the reverse is true: It was economic factors that largely predetermined both the present acute political situation and the paralysis of vertical management structures that has begun to set in. Just as the proclamation of sovereignty by the republics, the fragmentation of the all-union market and the introduction of internal customs, and the crisis of confidence in the government are not deliberate actions on someone's part, but an objective reflection of the existing economic situation, a kind of defense against erroneous decisions. We must treat not the external manifestations of the disease in the sphere of politics and ideology, but the economy itself.

What methods of treating it are proposed?

**Breathing Space**

The measures proposed by the government head should be viewed from his thesis on the "failure of transformational processes" and the formation of the future cabinet's program.

The content of the economic policy in the new year should be viewed in terms of "emergency blocking of the mounting crisis," it is proposed. The term "stabilization" is no longer strong enough...

The measures proposed for blocking the crisis include abandoning the "primacy of laws in its primitive form"(?), a moratorium on strikes and ecological movements, and so on.

The actual economic part of the "crisis blocking" policy includes the introduction of numerous new taxes and various means of confiscating financial resources.

A sales tax, stabilization currency deductions, higher social insurance contributions, regulating taxes on consumption fund growth and a new income tax based on earning capacity, confiscation of part of the depreciation allowance, excise duty, rent, freezing of some economic incentive fund resources, utilization of some of the revenue from privatization and destatization, and so on. The most futile fiscal measures the government is using in its efforts to balance the budget have been removed from the collection of potential stabilization measures.

Whereas before, various methods were used to conceal the budget deficit of tens of billions of rubles, this will be practically impossible next year—as expected, the deficit will be as much as R4 trillion—hence the need for new taxes. The vast proportion of enterprises' income will be centralized in various state funds—the border between the budget and nonbudget funds (pension and stabilization funds) will be rather arbitrary.

But the main emphasis in economic policy will continue to be placed on controlling the flow of materials, although the forms of control will change: Hopes were formerly pinned on state orders, quotas, stocks and state plan supplies; now the chief instrument is the freezing of old economic links and the cancelation of new ones.

But economic processes have acquired such an inertia that the planned sanctions for breaking contracts are

unlikely to be taken seriously by managers. Moreover, the switch to wholesale contract prices itself torpedoes the idea of freezing links—after all, crucial conditions of their observance are changing.

The purpose of the proposed measures is clear—to come to a halt and try to freeze the situation, by using entirely traditional, very familiar methods. Alas, they are naive hopes. For the umpteenth time a system of measures is being proposed that does not fit the conditions that obtain. That is why the potential for a mighty crisis has built up in the economy: Next year will see a further decline in production, the rapid growth of prices and incomes will lead to a steeper inflation spiral, and the structural imbalance and shortages will get even worse. Enterprises, despite all the bans, will seek and establish links that benefit them, thousands of small new enterprises and banks will appear, people's desire to become entrepreneurs will increase, and the quest for foreign economic contacts will not cease.

State regulation, attempting to block these processes, will not only be unable to counter them, but will lead to market relations' assuming increasingly distorted forms and heading deeper and deeper "into the shadows." The new economy will increasingly acquire monstrous, semi-criminal features. This will be the price of the latest attempt to obstruct the objective processes we sparked off in the first place.

You cannot announce the failure of perestroyka and on that pretext try to return to measures that in principle can no longer provide positive results. We must act without a pause, supporting, controlling, and organizing the new processes, expanding the sphere of market methods of regulation, actively implementing destatization and privatization, creating commodity and stock exchanges, demonopolizing production, reducing the budget deficit, gradually freeing prices, developing employment and social protection services...

The main thing is finally to ensure the redistribution of economic power between the center and the republics, not by the tug-of-war method, but by genuinely political, treaty means, which would not weaken, but, on the contrary, would intensify control of the economic situation in the country.

We were told of the failure of the course the country has followed over the past five years and we were told to stop, under the banner of "emergency crisis blocking."

A pause in the political and ideological reforms, in economic transformations and cadre renewal, and in perestroyka is far more dangerous than movement forward.

## Arbatov Gives Recipe for Economic Success

*PM0301172991 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 1 Jan 91 (special supplement) p 6*

[Article by Soviet presidential adviser Georgiy Arbatov, head of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute: "The Soviet Union Cannot and Will Not Catch Up With the West"]

[Text] Moscow—I have been asked to write on the question: "What is the likelihood of the East European (including the Soviet Union) countries' catching up with the West?"

I have changed the question a little. For two reasons. First, I do not think that it is fitting for me to speak on behalf of the East European countries—that would be in line with the imperialist traditions that we have definitely abandoned. Second, I do not know enough about the situation in those countries, moreover they are very different. It is clear, for example, that the GDR finds itself in a special position, just as Poland is different from Czechoslovakia, and Hungary from Romania.

At the same time I would like to stress that I have no doubts at all that the East European countries will make progress and secure a worthy place for themselves in Europe and the world at large. However, the road to economic and political reform will not be easy; we in the Soviet Union probably realize this better than others, since we are facing similar challenges and running into similar problems and difficulties.

But now to the heart of the above question. I must admit that I am not too keen on the expression "catch up with." This is not just because a desire to catch up implies that you have fallen behind. We are actually a long way behind—we were actually behind long before the revolution. We were also far behind after the revolution. It is particularly worrying that the gap has increased in the last few years. It would be self-delusion not to admit this.

There is something else about the expression that I am not too keen on. In the past we have for far too long been too eager to set ourselves the goal of "outdoing and overtaking" the West; in doing so we demanded colossal sacrifices of our country and people, while we compared our progress with that of the West, with that of the United States, and in the process failed to implement other, more basic measures.

### We Shall Not Follow the West

Are we to follow the West in all we do—and should we do so? This is the first question to be answered. My answer is "no." Despite all its technological and economic achievements the West has also suffered setbacks. We are living through a difficult and critical period in our development. But once we are through it, I think that we will have to carefully define our requirements and goals in a new way, taking account not only of our own possibilities and needs, but also the experience which has been accumulated in the world.

Also, the "catch-up-with-your-neighbor" criterion does not square with the new understanding of the mutual dependence and integration of countries. In my view, the challenge facing the Soviet Union today is not to catch up with the West but to solve its economic, social, and

political problems through organic integration in the complex system which is the interplay of the world economy—the system in which the countries of the West are currently the leaders.

Progress in this area proved to be difficult for us; to be completely truthful, more difficult than we had expected. This was partly due to hangovers from the past—problems with the economy, the environment—and in many other areas turned out to be more serious than we had thought—and by "we" I do not only mean the general public, but also the leaders.

The inevitable happened: The strict regime of secrecy and propaganda created to conceal the truth and influence domestic and global opinion also distorted the information on which the leaders' planning was based and consequently hid the real state of affairs from the decisionmakers. Over the last few years Gorbachev has regularly admitted that in the beginning even the leaders of perestroyka were unable to imagine how complicated were the problems facing them.

**The Sacred Cows**

Another cause of the difficulties is to be found in the mistakes that were made back in the drafting stage of perestroyka. In many ways this was a result of incompetence in the control of the economy, where a series of halfhearted decisions were made. And the third cause is ideological or, as I would prefer to call them, "technological" obstacles. We have created a number of "sacred cows" which blocked the road to economic reform by linking the state's (which most often meant the bureaucracy's) ownership rights with socialism, equality, the condemnation of enterprise, and so on.

Because of these "sacred cows," laws adopted to promote reform often suffer from ambiguity or lack of clear direction when they are to be implemented. They are often sabotaged quite easily.

This is true not only of the reform of the Soviet economy, but also of our economic relations with other, particularly Western countries. In 1989-1990 this weakness—that good intentions are not enough to bring about changes—became completely obvious, because it became clear that the economic decline was continuing. This has actually brought the country to the verge of a political crisis (I am convinced that the problems between some Soviet republics and the tensions between various ethnic groups in several regions are the result of the deterioration in the country's economic situation).

**The Struggle Against the Center**

It seems to me that in the last few months we have seen signs that it is possible to emerge from the crisis. As a result of increased democratization and political reform, power in a number of cities and some republics, including the largest—Russia, the Russian Federation—has passed to new people who are not or for the most part are not tied to old dogmas.

People who have decided to act, even though the "Center," the Council of Ministers, is temporizing and shelving decisions. It seems that this has already begun to change the rules of the game. It is not the "Center" which dictates to the provinces, but vice versa: The provinces have begun to set the "Center" in motion.

One example is the decision to combine the efforts of the leaders of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation in the field of economic reform. I dare not predict the outcome of the activities set in motion by the joint committee that has been set up in this context.

But I know that single-minded political forces have risen up against the central bureaucracy which is blocking the way to radical reform. They have actually raised the issue in the following way: Either you support our efforts to achieve reform or we will implement the reforms without you and the Council of Ministers and other central bodies will be left behind in the ditch.

That is why I dare give a clear answer to the next question in the title. Yes, we can catch up with the West or, to put it more precisely, we can take major steps forward economically and participate in the international economic system.

With well thought-out guidelines I am convinced that our country could achieve progress in these fields very soon. The country possesses great natural and intellectual (science, culture, technology) resources. By ditching unnecessary spending we could rapidly stabilize the political and economic situation in this country and create conditions enabling us to exploit this potential.

I am thinking of two very practical areas—radical cuts in investment sums (at present we have unfinished production plant to a value of more than 400 billion rubles [R]) and in the production of unwanted goods (we produce twice as much steel and artificial fertilizers as the United States, three and a half times as many shoes, six times as many tractors, and so on) which, according to economic experts, account for 25-30 percent of goods produced—that is, another R400 billion or more that are of no use to society.

To this can be added superfluous stockpiles at enterprises to a value totaling more than R200 billion, which would have an immediate economic effect if the goods were sold and circulated. And, finally, there are enormous resources in cuts in defense spending and the conversion of the defense industry.

We are a rich country living a poor life thanks to poor leadership. Reform aims at a radical change in the situation. If it succeeds, we will see rapid progress in the Soviet economy as well as the opening of the Soviet market to foreign interests and more active participation by our country in the international division of labor.

And finally: Will reform succeed? The most recent developments in the Russian Federation and some other

republics, in Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, and other cities make it possible for me to answer this question in the affirmative.

### Bureaucracy Exacerbates Food Unloading Delays

*PM0301160391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1530 GMT 2 Jan 91*

[Report by correspondents V. Anuchin, A. Uchinin, and G. Ivashchenko in Murmansk; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The following reportage from Murmansk could be described as a sharp warning. Food deliveries have run into departmental barriers.

[Anuchin] The Far East trawler "German Madern" arrived at the Murmansk merchant port from Amsterdam back on 24 December with 4,900 tonnes of meat on board. This cargo was intended for inhabitants of the Kola Peninsula, Arkhangelsk Oblast, and the Karelian and Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics. The ship spent two days waiting at the quayside and it was almost the New Year before a single train section consisting of five refrigerator freightcars was made available. Several more sections have now arrived.

What is the reason for the delays? Staffers of a mobile unit of the Oblast KGB Administration monitoring the movement of imported goods have established that the USSR Ministry of Trade Food Importation Department did not notify the merchant port and the railroad in time of the arrival of this cargo.

[V.V. Voronskiy, captain of the "German Madern"] In view of the importance of this cargo we tried to arrive a day early, 24 December. Murmansk welcomed us, we were given a berth as soon as we arrived, but there the hospitality ended. You get the impression that the inhabitants of Murmansk city and oblast do not need this meat. The ship waited for two days for unloading to begin. For your information, the ship costs 10,129 rubles a day.

[Anuchin] It is true that several trains comprising refrigerator cars have now arrived from Leningrad. Thirty-two "ice-box" cars in all. But here is a paradox. Ten of them have arrived without the documentation to prove that they have been disinfected. So they cannot be loaded. The other freightcars are standing around because of the slow progress of loading.

Here is a further detail. Literally on the eve of the New Year another ship carrying meat arrived, this time at the fishing port. But the picture is the same. When we shot this film, the harbor cranes were idle. The reason given was the same one again—the port and the railroad had not been notified in time. You get the impression that the aforementioned Food Importation Department of the USSR Ministry for Foreign Economic Ties, the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Office for Wholesale Trade in Meat and Milk, the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet Main Administration for the Transportation and Operation of the Fleet and Ports, and the USSR Ministry of Railways are in no way concerned about this situation. One ministry has bought the freight, the next has drawn up a table of how it is to be distributed between RSFSR oblasts, the third specified the transshipment port, and the fourth defined the addressees. As to what happens next, it is of no interest to them at all.

## Scientific

### Titov Denies Reports of Space Deaths

*PM0301165091 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jan 91 First Edition p 4*

[Answer to reader's letter by Colonel General of Aviation G. Titov; first paragraph is reader's letter: "Cana.ds in Space"]

[Text] In 1991 the whole world will be celebrating the 30th anniversary of the first manned space flight. I have heard that there were unsuccessful manned launches prior to 12 April 1961. Is this so?
Senior Lieutenant O. Leshchenko

[Titov] Speculation as to whether any Soviet cosmonauts flew before Yu. A. Gagarin is not new. Even in the sixties there were rumors about this and they have surfaced again today. It was said at that time that Vladimir Sergeyevich Ilyushin was allegedly involved in an accident in a "Vostok" spacecraft launch. In actual fact he was involved in a traffic incident and suffered a severe leg injury.

Also at that time, it was rumored that an unknown cosmonaut transmitted an international SOS distress signal from space, requesting help in Russian. There are even some publications which give the names of "unknown" cosmonauts who perished in catastrophes while in orbit. I have never heard of these people. Quite simply, they were never cosmonauts.

With regard to the "distress signals from space," radio amateurs were indeed able to intercept a voice in orbit shortly before Gagarin's space flight because human speech was recorded on tape and transmitted from a satellite to a ground tracking station as one of a series of checks on the ultrashort wave channel Yu. A. Gagarin communicated with Earth during his space flight on 12 April 1961. There was, however, absolutely no connection between this voice and any cosmonaut. I don't think it was speech; it was counting, recorded by one of the engineers who set up the "Zarya" communications system. We had to find out about the distortion which occurs in the intonation of the human voice during radio communication with Earth. But Western radio stations thought that these were coded distress signals.

Naturally, not all space flights and the preparations for them proceeded smoothly. The death of Valentin Vasilyevich Bondarenko in March 1961 left a scar on each member of the group of candidates for the first space flight. He died from burns sustained during a training session in an anechoic pressure chamber. Bondarenko was buried in his home town—Kharkov. It is possible that a rumor then sprang up that he had died during a space flight.

Six out of 20 future cosmonauts were then selected for immediate training for the first space flight. These first six were Yu.A. Gagarin, V.F. Bykovskiy, A.G. Nikolayev, P.R. Popovich, G.G. Nelyubov, and myself. In 1963 Grigoriy Nelyubov and comrades I.N. Anikeyev and V.I. Filatyev were excluded from the program for disobeying procedures. Nelyubov died in an accident after taking up a new post in the Far East. But again this was not a space or even an aviation accident.

In my opinion these rumors were started in the main by unqualified people trying to supply their own interpretation for the events connected with space exploration. And without bothering to check their facts, journalists on the lookout for sensational stories eagerly pass them on to their readers, who sometimes do not know what to believe.

### Nuclear Station Faults Threaten Volga

*PM0301165791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Jan 91 Second Edition p 3*

[Interview with Doctor of Technical Sciences Professor A. Andryushchenko by A. Vorotnikov in Balakovo, Saratov Oblast; date not given: "When You Live Next to an AES (Nuclear Power Station)... The AES Failed the Ecological Examination"]

[Text] Balakovo, Saratov Oblast—There is a lovely little village called Balakovo on the Volga covered with snow in winter and drenched in greenery in summer. Its inhabitants are chemists, machine-builders, river transport workers, and AES constructors. Nearby, eight km away near the village of Natalino, tower the AES buildings. Both the village and the AES have in recent years attracted increasing attention not just from physicists and power engineering specialists, but also representatives of various public organizations, and particularly the "greens."

"What is this all about?" I asked Doctor of Technical Sciences Professor A. Andryushchenko, one of the eminent scientists in Saratov, who chaired a seminar on nuclear power engineering just held in Balakovo. "Is there an undesirable ecological situation?"

"Yes," Anatoliy Ivanovich answered. "The total discharge of harmful substances into the atmosphere by various industrial enterprises in the city comes to 72,000 tonnes annually. This includes sulfurous compounds, ammonia, and hydrogen fluoride. They exceed the maximum permissible norms by between two and eleven times. The annual total of harmful waste is up to 360 kg for every inhabitant of Balakovo. That is why there are now more people suffering from diabetes, bronchial asthma, cancer, and diseases of the circulatory organs. A total of 82 percent of children have signs of various illnesses. Balakovo has the highest percentage of occupational poisoning in Saratov Oblast.

Despite this undesirable ecological situation and the burden of industrial installations on the area, the first stage of the Balakovo AES was designed and then built nearby in 1985.

[Vorotnikov] And that, I believe, violated a resolution.

[Andryushchenko] That is quite correct. The local AES was erected in contravention of USSR Council of Ministers and CPSU Central Committee Resolution 567, dated 18 July 1981, which was in force at that time. Under that resolution, new industrial construction and the extension of existing production facilities were prohibited in such places. The city's housing areas were squeezed between the AES site on the northeast side and the safety protection zones of the "Minudobreniy" and "Khimvolokno" production associations in the south.

[Vorotnikov] Anatoliy Ivanovich, has the Balakovo AES project passed the state environmental examination?

[Andryushchenko] That is the whole problem—so far it has not. Nevertheless, its construction has continued from year to year. During its use there have been frequent unplanned interruptions in the operation of the power units. In 1989 there were 30, and in 1990 rather fewer.

[Vorotnikov] Why does this happen?

[Andryushchenko] Primarily because sub-standard technological equipment breaks down, particularly the steam generators. For example, in the first power unit they worked for only five years instead of the 30 years they were guaranteed.

[Vorotnikov] The cooling reservoir has also been causing a great deal of criticism....

[Andryushchenko] Exactly. It is part of the Volga reservoir, sealed off with a sand embankment which is very permeable. In the event of a serious accident this will create potential danger to the great river.

[Vorotnikov] And what is the personnel training situation?

[Andryushchenko] Unfortunately, because of a lack of modern training equipment, practices do not conform with world standards.

[Vorotnikov] Is there a system of economic and social protection for the population living in the area of this AES?

[Andryushchenko] No. Different options for predicting local, regional, and global damage to the environment

and the population in the event of a serious accident have not been drawn up either. Nor are the inhabitants of Natalino village being granted privileged conditions for living there.

[Vorotnikov] What conclusion did the participants in your seminar reach?

[Andryushchenko] We decided to appeal to the USSR and Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviets to speed up the adoption of a law on nuclear energy, governing the economic and legal aspects of regulating mutual relations between this sector and the population. The scientists recommended that the USSR Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering and Industry put the resources allocated for the construction of the second stage of the station into making sure that the power units in the first stage of the AES work more efficiently and reliably. Also that it ensure a stage by stage transition to a closed cooling system—through cooling towers—thus eliminating the danger of polluting the Volga from the cooling reservoir. Also, in the short term that a modern training system be used. All equipment provided for these stations must also be reliable. It is scandalous that steam generators break down five or six times more quickly than they should. And finally we determined the subject matter for joint scientific research to improve the reliability and safety of AES's. We are involving scientists from the Volga region and the whole country in this.

## Military

### Commander Interviewed on Paratroopers

*LD0401110491 Moscow TASS in English 1047 GMT 4 Jan 91*

[Text] January 4 TASS—"My attitude to the use of paratroopers in inter-ethnic conflicts is negative. Interior Ministry or KGB troops should be called in for these purposes," Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General Pavel Grachev, commander of airborne troops in the Soviet Army, said in an interview published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (RED STAR) today.

Grachev is 42 years old and has two sons. He graduated from Ryazan's Leninskiy Komsomol Higher Airborne Command School in 1969 and the Frunze Military Academy in 1981.

He was a battalion commander, deputy commander of a paratroop regiment, and headed division headquarters. He twice served with the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and was in command of an airborne division there for almost three years.

Following his graduation from the Military Academy of the General Staff in June 1990, Grachev was appointed first deputy commander of airborne troops. He favours a professional army.

### Deputy Defense Minister on Reforms in 1991

*LD0401110991 Moscow TASS in English 1052 GMT 4 Jan 90*

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow January 4 TASS—"The military reform, the beginning with the adoption of a new defensive doctrine, will be continued in the Soviet Union in 1991," Colonel General Vladislav Achalov, 45, Soviet deputy defense minister, told TASS today.

The unilateral cut in the Soviet Armed Forces by 500,000 men will be completed this year, he added.

Because of reductions in the Soviet Army, Achalov said he sees maintaining the combat readiness of troops and the Navy at the "Level guaranteeing a reliable defence of the country" as his main task.

According to arrangements made, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary will be completed in the first half of 1991, and the withdrawal of Soviet units from Mongolia will be continued, Achalov recalled. "The USSR will begin a large-scale redeployment of troops from Germany to the Soviet Union's territory," he emphasised.

The treaty on the elimination of intermediate and shorter-range missiles will be fully implemented in 1991, Achalov said. The Soviet Union has already eliminated 96.4 per cent of intermediate- range missiles.

According to Achalov, cuts will be continued in the main types of armaments and military hardware of land forces and the Air Force under the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe, signed in Paris at the end of last year. "Cuts will apply to a large number of tanks, combat vehicles, artillery systems of 100 mm and larger calibre, aircraft and helicopters. So, a vast amount of work lies ahead," Achalov said.

### Service in Caucasus Trouble Spots Voluntary

*PM0201125391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Jan 91 Union Edition p 2*

[Interview with Lieutenant Colonel N. Medvedev, staffer of the USSR Defense Ministry Press Center, by N. Burbyga, date and place not specified: "Transcaucasus: Military Service for Volunteers"]

[Text] As the INTERFAX news agency has reported, a commission to recruit military servicemen for units in the Transcaucasus has begun working in the Kiev Military District.

We asked Lieutenant Colonel N. Medvedev, staffer of the USSR Defense Ministry Press Center, to comment on this report.

"Indeed, henceforth recruitment to units of the Transcaucasus Military District and ships of the Caspian Flotilla will be voluntary. This applies to draftees from

other republics, as well as fixed-term servicemen stationed outside the Transcaucasus. The volunteers being sent here are NCO's who have graduated from training subunits, and enlisted men who have served at least 5 months.

"This is due to the difficult conditions the military servicemen there now find themselves—in 1990 in Armenia alone there were more than 120 attacks on Army posts, depots, and subunits. There have been quite a few instances in which servicemen have been wounded or even killed by extremists' bullets. That is why the Defense Ministry leadership has been forced to resort to this measure."

[Burbyga] But where will the youngsters from the Transcaucasus serve?

[Medvedev] It has been decided to send volunteers to military construction units on the territory of those republics. I would note that approximately one in three or four soldiers from the Transcaucasus Military District is from that region. They are being allowed to serve closer to home—taking into account family circumstances and other reasons. It should be remembered here that the country's integrated Armed Forces, which is what our Army and Navy still are, cannot be staffed solely by servicemen of a single nationality. It is not hard to imagine the outcome of a different approach in the conditions of the Transcaucasus...

[Burbyga] Is any material incentive being envisaged for those who volunteer for service in the Transcaucasus?

[Medvedev] The Defense Ministry is proposing the introduction of a series of significant benefits for both officers and warrant officers, NCO's and enlisted men, including material benefits. For example, it is planned to grant officers and warrant officers the right to reserved housing in other parts of the country. But, as you yourself realize, the final word belongs to the USSR Council of Ministers.

### Journalist Visits Aircraft Carrier

*PM0301165291 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Jan 91 Second Edition p 2*

[Article by PRAVDA special correspondent Colonel V. Izgarshev under the rubric "Very Personal": "Three Meetings With the Admiral: Reflections on Board a Heavy Aircraft-Carrying Cruiser"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] I gaze upon this beauty which is our ship. On the stern beneath the insignia of the Soviet Union is the name of the new flagship of our Navy: "Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza N.G. Kuznetsov."

After less than 40 steps up the gangplank, with its traditional polished copper handrails, I'm on the deck. A strapping broad-shouldered sailor invites me into the elevator, presses the fourth button, and I am on an airfield. A floating airfield. The takeoff strip runs off—to put it in nautical language—to the very end of the ship's forecastle, rising up like a little hillock above the perfectly level surface of the deck. This is the springboard for the plane's leap skywards. The Americans shoot their planes out of catapults. We solved the problem of the launch in a different way: a blistering run up to the hillock followed by a leap from it.

Our ship does not compare with American ones. In its displacement and consequently its overall dimensions. In its armaments. And in its crew size.

To be accurate, we do not even call our vessel an aircraft carrier. It is the next in a series of aircraft-carrying cruisers. Well of course it is more powerful than its forerunners: the Minsk, the Kiyev, and the Novorossiysk.

For the moment the shipbuilders are still working together with the crew on board. We see the final brush strokes of the artists' collective which has created this wonderful picture.

As yet there are no missiles or combat aircraft on board the ship. And it was really very uncomfortable to find yourself in a hulking great empty hangar. I thought that if I was to lay the 14-storied house in which I live on its side, then it would comfortably fit inside this gigantic metal ship's belly. On board the ship there are six cafeterias and more than 3,500 other rooms for various purposes.

But I will not tire out the reader with figures and comparisons. The striking thing about the ship is not this, after all, but its technical perfection. Here everything from the rivets to the radar station and the computer are produced here at home. The general designer Professor Gennadiy Gromov, a radio specialist of world renown, said to me:

"If anybody thinks that our equipment is inferior to foreign equipment, he or she is making a serious error. People here are capable of the most incredible discoveries and inventions..."

Gennadiy Nikolayevich is a person who is simply obsessed with his field of expertise, and is prepared to work days and nights on end, if only to achieve his desired aim a bit quicker. Take for instance his contribution to the development of the "Buran" landing system.

And so, on the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser the apparatus for navigation and for the control of weapons and combat hardware is on a par with the best achievements today.

But here is a question: Isn't all this costly, especially in the country's present economic situation? And do we need aircraft-carrying ships? This is something you can hear not only from the man on the street but also at parliamentary hearings.

But, good people, let us all not forget that we are a power. And a great one, when all is said and done.

The world, even now that it is collecting packages for us, which, I will be frank, humiliates me personally, still calls the Soviet Union a superpower. But how on earth can a superpower not have such a class of oceangoing ships? Not as a deterrent, and not, God forbid, to fulfill a policing role on the seas and oceans. But first and foremost for the progress of Soviet science and technology. For in this ship the achievements of modern science and technology are concentrated.

So what of it—they can do such things, but we are not up to it, is that it? Does it cost us dear? Of course it does, but we're not after all producing tinned sprats. But if we're going to be sensible then let us refrain from producing five or even 10 rockets, let us economize in the launching of satellites. That money will be sufficient both to build the ship and to provide housing for its crew.

As it says in the Bible "we do not live not by bread alone." Of course bread is necessary, and we will not survive without it.

However, this is but one side of the matter, the emotional one. The other side concerns our partners in the talks not even wanting to listen, if we so much as begin to talk about disarmament on the seas. Hell, they say, whatever do they want now. We have communication routes throughout the world's waters and cannot leave them unprotected.

Well of course they have communication routes. They lead to all their bases. To Okinawa and Diego Garcia. And to 1,500 other naval and air bases, whose arms, including the most destructive, are pointed in one direction. You do not have be a participant in the television game show "What? Where? When?" to guess which direction.

I realize that to create a counterweight in tonnage to all their "Eisenhowers" and "Nimitzes" would be futile, and it would be genuinely ruinous for the country. But to not possess at least one aircraft-carrying ship in each fleet is also probably unwise...

Our country is not preparing to attack anyone—that has been solemnly proclaimed at the highest and most authoritative level. But at the same time everyone should know that the new defensive military doctrine in no way means that in defending ourselves, we will retreat to Moscow or the Volga, like 50 years ago.

But for this we must remain strong.

The freezing water gently laps around the mighty side of the ship. Raucous sea gulls circle above the vast deck soliciting scraps from the sailors. A light breeze plays in the flag and the jack on the flagpoles.

I had an interview with Captain 2d Rank Nikolay Ivanov, the ship's deputy commanding officer. He said:

"People of 32 nationalities serve on this ship."

[Izgarshev] "From which republics?"

[Ivanov] "From practically all of them. They are from Georgia, Uzbekistan, Lithuania, Latvia, and Moldova."

[Izgarshev] "And how is morale?"

[Ivanov] "As always excellent. And the crew's is, too. Only sometimes the guys suffer terribly when they hear that in one place or another interethnic conflicts are breaking out. Some find these quarrels between people useful. And we condemn these quarrels and conflicts."

It occurred to me that this ship is grist to the mill of those who haven't yet come to terms with the daft idea of tearing the Army and Navy apart into national groupings. OK then, have a go, tear this monolith into 32 pieces.

The ship was built by 2,500 Union enterprises. The labor and intellectual contributions of people from all 15 republics are seen here.

No doubt this is the reason that it turned out so beautiful and strong.

[Editorial postscript] Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, visited the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser on New Year's Eve. He met the shipbuilders and the ship's crew, and addressed officers and warrant officers in the wardroom.

## Baltic Republics

### Baltic Staff Chief Deplores Anti-Army Actions

*PM0301170191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Dec 90 Second Edition p 1*

["Direct Line" report by unidentified TASS correspondent: "Military Council Statement"]

[Text] On 18 December, Lieutenant General P.G. Chaus, Baltic Military District chief of staff, made a statement on behalf of the district Military Council to Ivars Godmanis, chairman of the Latvian Republic Council of Ministers. It says, in part:

"The official organs of power in the Latvian Republic, the leaders of the People's Front and the Latvian Citizens' Congress, and the republic's media have dramatically stepped up their anti-army activity.

"Leaflets distributed among the district personnel urge the soldiers to break the oath and contravene the USSR Constitution, thus attempting to make them enter into conflict with Soviet laws and inciting inexperienced young people to crime, and attempts are being made to commit acts of terrorism involving the use of explosives.

"While saying that they want to improve servicemen's material and everyday conditions and blaming the CPSU for every problem, the leaders of the People's Front deliberately omit to mention the fact that it was on their insistence that the Latvian Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution on 4 August 1990 depriving servicemen of the right to register where they are stationed, and it was under pressure from them that the Latvian Council of Ministers, on 19 October 1990, banned the allocation of plots of land for the construction of houses for servicemen, and it was the People's Front leadership which drew up an extremely discriminatory resolution depriving servicemen of basic human rights, a resolution ratified by the Supreme Soviet on 14 November 1990. Finally, a Council of Ministers resolution of 30 November 1990 effectively confirms all previously issued unlawful legislative acts against servicemen.

"The leadership of the People's Front, the Citizens' Congress, and other similar organizations realizes that the district command will make every effort to ensure that servicemen in barracks and women and children in married quarters are not left without heat, water, light, and bread. The leaders of extremist organizations are forcefully inciting us to take extreme measures.

"We demand that the Latvian Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers and local organs of power provide a normal life for military units and military installations on Latvian territory.

"We consider it our duty to point out that the district forces are loyal to the oath they have given to their people and will not yield to the provocations by so-called 'protectors of the people's interests' in the shape of the leaders of the Latvian People's Front, Latvian Citizens' Congress, and such like."

### Baltic Commander Comments on Troop Presence

*LD0401092491 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 0100 GMT 4 Jan 91*

[Text] The Baltic Sea is a sea of peace. Soviet propaganda has been stating this for a long time. This has been repeated once more by the commander of the Soviet Baltic fleet, Admiral Vitaliy Ivanov, in an interview with the Vilnius newspaper LIETUVOS RYTAS.

Commenting on the presence of the Soviet Army in the Baltic states, he said that, especially now, when the Army is leaving East Europe, it is essential to strengthen the Soviet Union's western border and establish more military garrisons there.

Commenting on the intensified military patrolling introduced in December and then cancelled in the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda, the commander of the Baltic fleet justified it by citing many unconfirmed facts of attacks on the military. Admiral Ivanov affirmed that even he himself, the commander of the Baltic fleet, has no right to introduce martial law in the smallest military garrison. This must be a decision by the supreme commander; or, to be more precise, the president and the Soviet Union's Supreme Soviet. He added: There is no need for you to be afraid. He asserted that the situation in the Army is being controlled very strictly and there cannot be any chance incidents.

It is not known whether the sea commander was including the ground forces. The political organization—the CPSU branch in Lithuania—assisted by interior troops—continues to exert pressure as regards two buildings in the center of Vilnius which previously belonged to the Communist Party of Lithuania.

### Baltics Invited to 7 Jan Helsinki Meeting

*LD0301232691 Vilnius International Service in English 2230 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[Text] Radio Vilnius has received information from Helsinki saying that the Finnish legislature had launched an initiative to call in Helsinki as early as next Monday [7 January] a conference of legislators of the Baltic Sea countries. It is to deal with issues of cooperation, and a five-member delegation of each legislature is invited. Besides these, there are going to be observers, representatives of many international organizations, as well as envoys of all institutions of popular representation of Nordic countries.

The Lithuanian leadership pins much hope on the favorable stand Scandinavian countries have been recently taking regarding Lithuania's independence. Among the positive developments are the recently established relations on partnership between the Nordic Council and the Baltic Council, the latter being a political consultative

institution of the three freedom-seeking countries. Contacts with separate Baltic countries are also intensively expanded, and these days Chairman of the Lithuanian legislature Vytautas Landsbergis is on a visit to Norway, meeting leaders of that Nordic country.

### Stockholm Reports Latvia, Lithuania Situation

*LD0301170591 Stockholm Domestic Service in Swedish 1545 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[Text] The situation in Latvia is still tense after Soviet Internal Affairs Ministry troops surrounded the press building in the capital of Riga. The director of the central press building, (Kazimirs Dondros), was temporarily detained yesterday and has gone into hiding today. His wife, (Albine Dondros), talked to us on the telephone from Riga.

[Begin (Albine Dondros) recording in Latvian fading into report by correspondent Lars Kobbe] This morning we were very much afraid, (Albine Dondros) tells Juris Kasha of the Latvian section of Riksradio [Swedish National Radio Company]. She says her husband said he was going to see a doctor and that she no longer knew where he was. Later she had assurances that (Kamimirs Dondros) was in safely with the aid of the Latvian Government. (Kazmirs Dondros) fulfills an important functions in Latvian public life; he is head of the press building in Riga, which houses the editorial offices, and, above all, the printing works of the most important papers in the country. If the press building cannot function, a large part of the Latvian press will be silenced, with all that implies with suppressed information.

In the chaos which is increasingly noticeable in Latvia and the other Baltic republics, different authorities are functioning side by side. Soviet Internal Affairs Ministry troops are operating on the orders of local groups which are close to the pro-Moscow Communist Party; while the Latvian Government is trying to maintain its authority and even is hiding key persons.

From Lithuania, too, reports are coming of similar incidents. There, Internal Affairs Ministry troops are reported to have surrounded a couple of properties, which were previously owned by the Communist Party but which the government wants to make available to other groups. [end recording]

### Tension Continues Over Latvian Press Building

#### Workers Strike

*LD0301185391 Moscow TASS in English 1842 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Zaytsev]

[Text] Riga January 3 TASS—Latvian subscribers did not get republican and national newspapers today due to a strike at the Latvian Communist Party publishing plant.

On Wednesday, a special police unit took the publishing plant under protection, in compliance with President Gorbachev's decree, designed to protect property.

The Latvian Parliament denounced the move as "planned action by the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee aimed to destabilise the situation in the republic", actually giving the green light to the strike.

The republican parliament told the government to ensure an alternative printing of newspapers and magazines—this is not realistic in the near future: about one million copies have to be published daily—and to compensate workers of the publishing plant for not working.

#### Troops Fire on Ministry Car

*LD0401123191 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1105 GMT 4 Jan 91*

[From the press review]

[Excerpts] Today's republican press comments on yesterday's and the day before yesterday's events in Riga. RESPUBLIKA even managed to print a photograph and describe in detail a statement by the head of the Latvian Information Service of the Latvian Council of Ministers, Gunars [surname indistinct]. Yesterday, Latvia's newspapers did not reach the readers. The Press Palace is blockaded. The republican government is looking for ways to print publications at other printing works. The Black Berets [USSR troops] play the masters where the newspapers formerly were printed. [passage omitted]

The soldiers feel like they are on a training ground, and on Wednesday [2 January] they opened fire at a car of the Internal Affairs Ministry of the Republic of Latvia. Luckily, there were no casualties. [passage omitted]

### Gorbunovs Meets Interior Minister

*LD0301202291 Berlin ADN in German 1939 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—Anatolijs Gorbunovs, the Latvian head of state, has described the occupation of the Riga printing plant by special militia units as a "crude act of arbitrariness." BALTFAX [as received] reported that Gorbunovs was received in Moscow this afternoon by USSR Interior Minister Boris Pugo. According to a participant, they did not establish a dialogue because, at the time of the conversation, Pugo had not been fully informed about the situation.

Afterward Gorbunovs spoke to Army General Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the general staff of the USSR Armed Forces. The two agreed on forming a working group in the Defense Ministry for contacts with the Latvian leadership to improve mutual understanding.

### Says Meeting 'Reassuring'

*LD0401064691 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 4 Jan 91*

[Text] Anatoliy Gorbunovs, chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, who is in Moscow, has held talks with Boris Pugo, USSR minister of internal affairs. According to data from the BALTFAX agency, nothing came of the dialogue between Gorbunovs and Pugo regarding a solution to the conflict surrounding the printing plant in Riga.

According to information from the same agency, Army General Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, met with the head of the Latvian Supreme Soviet. Anatoliy Gorbunovs called the results of the meeting reassuring. An accord has been reached on setting up a working group at the Ministry of Defense for contacts with Latvia's legislature.

### Gorbachev To Investigate Incident

*AU0401083191 Paris AFP in English 2250 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[Excerpt] Moscow, Jan 3 (AFP)—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev assured Latvian Premier Ivars Godmanis here Thursday that he had not been informed of recent events in Riga, and promised a probe into the seizure by Soviet Interior Ministry troops of the Communist Party's printing press in the city.

Mr. Godmanis met here with Mr. Gorbachev on the sidelines of a meeting of the Soviet Union's Council of the Federation.

Latvian officials said he had protested against the occupation of the printing press by the troops. Reports from neighbouring Lithuania, another Baltic republic, said that the party's presses had been seized there too.

Mr. Gorbachev, who is secretary general of the Soviet Communist Party, said he would investigate the situation in Riga and make decisions through the party's Central Committee.

Mr. Godmanis said the military operation came only days after the Latvian party's printing press was transformed into a limited company, 51 per cent owned by the editors, 26 per cent by the Lithuanian government and 23 per cent by the party's central committee.

Meanwhile, the Soviet army's chief of staff General Mikhail Moiseyev met here Thursday with an official Latvian delegation, led by President Anatolijs Gorbunovs.

Latvian officials said the meeting was "open and active" and led to optimism on the "possibility of finding a common language with representatives of the army," said Vice Premier Ilmars Bichers. [passage omitted]

### Latvians To Publish Elsewhere

*LD0401073191 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 4 Jan 91*

[Text] I remind you that a detachment of special purpose militia occupied the printing plant in the Latvian capital. As a result, the republic's printing center had to stop publishing newspapers. As has become known to our editorial office, the printshop workers have declared a strike to protest against the action by the militia.

The leadership of the Republic, the government, has announced it will attempt to publish the newspapers at other printshops and, in spite of the strike, they will pay the print workers their wages.

### Latvian Organizations Protest Price Hikes

*LD0301141291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0927 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[Text] Riga, 3 Jan (TASS)—A statement by a number of public political organizations and people's deputies of the republic circulated here today was prompted by alarm and the worsening social position of thousands of inhabitants in Latvia.

The statement says that as of 3 January 1991 the government is hiking retail prices for basic groups of foodstuffs—bread, meat, and milk—by 3 to 3.2 times, having revoked state subsidies for them. The statement was adopted by the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, the all-Latvian Committee for Public Salvation, the United Council for Working Collectives and the Republican Council of the International Front of Working People of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Servicemen of the Baltic, the "Equal Rights" grouping of the republican Supreme Soviet, and other organizations.

"Without having an integrated social program, the government is undertaking a new offensive on the population's living standard and the social achievements of working people," the statement stresses. "All this is being done without defining the minimum consumer budget and the indexation of incomes in relation to retail price increases. As a result, the increased cost of living of the Latvian population bears heavily upon the shoulders of working people."

From budget allocations, the government envisages compensating for the price increases only those working in institutions financed out of the budget, and also students, nonworking pensioners, and mothers with children, the authors of the statement report. The Council of Ministers proposes paying compensation to staff of financially autonomous enterprises and organizations out of their wage fund.

"Making this libertarian decision on the payment of compensation at the expense of working collectives, the government is blatantly infringing upon their rights in the disposal of earned resources," the document notes

further. In republican industry alone, in order to pay compensation to workers it will be necessary to take more than 800 million rubles per year from working collectives.

The government is not taking into account the fact that the monetary compensation being introduced will inevitably bring with it an increase in the unit cost of production, and will provoke price increases for consumer goods being produced by enterprises."

While lowering the living standard of the population and transferring to its shoulders the whole burden of the price increases, the republican government at the same time is significantly increasing expenditure on the financing of establishments of state authority and government, envisaging 65 million rubles for these purposes in the 1991 budget, which is more than four times higher by comparison with the preceding year, the statement points out.

"Such a policy from the government can be described as antipopular; it leads toward a sharp increase in political and social tension and unforseen consequences," the statement concludes.

The transition to a market economy and to overcoming the crisis in the republic can only be by way of implementing the measures proposed by the country's president, Mikhail Gorbachev, and adopted at the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

The authors of the statement reserve the right to take measures aimed at achieving the resignation of the republican government which is conducting an antipopular policy. "We have been forced to appeal to the USSR president and the USSR Supreme Soviet, demanding that the rights and the vital interests of USSR citizens be defended and that the implementation of the resolution of the republican government on increasing retail prices for food products not be permitted," the document says.

## Landsbergis Warns 'Explosion' on Martial Law

*LD2312150490 Hamburg DPA in German 1323 GMT 23 Dec 90*

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis has called on the Western world to direct its attention to the events in the USSR and especially the Baltic Republics Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. Against the background of increased Soviet troop movements in Lithuania since Friday, Landsbergis said in an interview with DIE WELT (Monday edition) in the Lithuanian capital Vilnius over the weekend that the danger of military action in the three Baltic republics, which are seeking independence, could not be overestimated.

Landsbergis said: "They (the military) have already started to deploy armed patrols in our cities. In Klaipeda (Memel) there is a law according to which the patrols can arrest anyone whom they—for whatever reason—consider suspect."

Tanks appeared in this former German city on Friday. Landsbergis said: Should the Moscow government place our country under martial law then this will trigger chain reactions that will lead to an explosion in all the 15 republics.

All the peoples of the Soviet Union "and finally also the world" are threatened by these activities. According to Landsbergis the latest events in the Baltic region are a sign of the danger "from right-wing forces" threatening the USSR. President Mikhail Gorbachev is now merely "sort of a facade." He is being used by the conservatives in the Kremlin "on account of his image." The Western world will finally have to recognize the realities.

## Lithuanian Party Defends Police Removal

*LD0301201491 Moscow TASS in English 2002 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[By TASS correspondent Serafim Bykhun]

[Text] Vilnius January 3 TASS—"There is nothing criminal or unexpected in the actions of the Communist Party of Lithuania. All is being done in accordance with the law, "Algimantas Naudzunas, secretary of the central committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, told TASS, commenting on the republican mass media report that "a special unit of the Soviet Interior Ministry troops, deployed in Vilnius, began the new year with a demonstration of the 'law of the fist' against Lithuanian policemen."

On January 1 officers of Lithuanian law enforcement agencies, who guarded the building of the Institute of History of the Lithuanian Communist Party together with servicemen of the Soviet Interior Ministry troops, were removed from their check points. Interior Ministry troops took upon themselves the protection of the building. A similar operation was carried out on January 2 in the building belonging to two parties—the Lithuanian Communist Party and the Lithuanian Democratic Party of Labour (former Independent Lithuanian Communist Party). According to IZVESTIYA, even Lithuanian Interior Minister Mairionas Misjukonis was not let into the building. Workers of the apparatus of the Lithuanian Democratic Party of Labour were let in only after a thorough checking of documents.

According to the Lithuanian Communist Party official, the decision on the removal of Lithuanian police posts, taken by the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee on January 1, was aimed at "putting in order the system of letting people into the central committee premises and creating conditions for normal work in the building of the Lithuanian Communist Party archives." According to Naudzunas, the decision was response to the law on political parties, adopted by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, which came into force on January 1, and to the law on amendments to the criminal code of the Lithuanian Republic. According to these documents, Lithuanian citizens, specifically communists, who can take part in the activities of foreign organisations aimed

at undermining Lithuania's sovereignty, can be sentenced to imprisonment from 10 to 15 years with the confiscation of property, or to capital punishment with the confiscation of property.

"Taking into account these documents, as well as a dramatic growth of crime in the republic, and wishing to protect its people, the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee warned beforehand the leadership of the Lithuanian Democratic Party of Labour and the republican interior minister that it would take care of the party property by itself and would not need any longer the services of the local police," Naudzunas said.

According to Naudzunas, republican communists came across facts of the illegal selling or turning over to other organisations of some property belonging to the Lithuanian Communist Party.

### Prunskiene Rejects Participation in Union Budget

*LD0301203591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2003 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[By TASS correspondent Kazys Uscila: "Kazimiera Prunskiene Opposes Lithuania's Participation in Union Structures"]

[Text] Vilnius, 3 January (TASS)— "Lithuania will not participate either in the Union budget or in a currency or any other kinds of common funds or structures of the Soviet Union," Kazimiera Prunskiene, prime minister of the Lithuanian Republic, has declared. At a press conference held in Vilnius today, she said that Egidijus Bickauskas, the Lithuanian government's representative in Moscow, who attended today's meeting of the Federation Council, was instructed to uphold this position.

At the same time, the head of the Lithuanian Government confirmed that Lithuania continues to seek to maintain mutually beneficial and equal trade and economic cooperation both with the Union republics and with the center.

Commenting on the decision of the Fourth USSR Congress of People's Deputies on holding a referendum in the republics on the question of their participation in a Union treaty, the prime minister of the Lithuanian Republic said that "the elections of deputies to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet were a referendum in favour of independence." In her view, a new referendum is unnecessary, as it "can only confirm Lithuania's choice."

### Prunskiene Cables Moscow on Funding Problems

*LD0301221691 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 2000 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[Text] A telegram signed by Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene has been sent to the USSR Council of Ministers. It points out that so far funds have not been received from the Soviet Union's budget to cover expenses in 1991 concerning the maintenance of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Soviet State security committee, the USSR Procuracy, and other Soviet offices and organizations in the Republic of Lithuania, the payment of pensions to those who have served in the Soviet Army, and to all officials of the aforementioned Soviet institutions, and also capital investment and other needs of these installations.

These expenses can be financed only after receiving funds from the Soviet Union's budget. The Government of the Republic of Lithuania, taking into consideration the needs of the persons of pensionable age, has decided to credit the payment of pensions to these pensioners in January of this year.

### Klaipeda Dockers Strike Over Salary

*LD0301201691 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Jan 90*

[Text] At about noon today in the Klaipeda sea port, the port cranes came to a standstill, and all the teams of dockers, some 150 men, stopped work. The main demands of the strikers are to raise wages in line with the rise of prices on foodstuffs and manufactured goods, of payments on communal and household services, and the rise on public transport fares.

The striking dockers have set up an initiative group which, together with the administration of the port, will search for a decision that satisfies both sides.

### 'Drunken Incident' Cited on Ozolas' Son's Murder

*LD0301175191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1656 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[Text] [no dateline as received] The murder of Dziugas Ozolas, son of Lithuanian Vice Premier Romualdas Ozolas, has no political or ethnic connection. This was stated today in an address on republican radio by Ignas Surinin, head of the Criminal Investigation Department of the Lithuanian Ministry of Internal Affairs. He said that the unfortunate event was evidently the result of a drunken incident. At the same time Petras Liubertas, Lithuanian deputy minister of internal affairs, told a TASS correspondent by telephone that final conclusions should not be drawn until an official indictment has been drawn up.

### Lithuanian Declaration Protests Soviet Troops

*91UN0500B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 6 Nov 90 p 1*

[Declaration of the Presidium of the Supreme Council and the Government of the Lithuanian Republic signed by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic, and Kazimiera Prunskiene, prime minister of the Lithuanian Republic, in Vilnius on 5 November]

[Text] USSR troops, which are deployed in Lithuania illegally, are of late once again demonstrating arbitrary rule and impunity, committing new acts of violence, and are again showing themselves to be a factor of psychological warfare in the Baltic region. It is precisely in this way that it is necessary to evaluate the cruel kidnapping of citizen Arunas Zibud on 31 October 1990 in Druskininkai and the demonstration of military force in Vilnius on 1 November of this year—on All Saints and Memorial Day. The planned movement of troops in Vilnius on 7 November is not coordinated with the regulations of city governments and state authority of the Lithuanian Republic concerning permission for the conduct of military parades. The work routine of transportation and municipal establishments will be disrupted, and difficulties will be created for the population. All this is intolerable. The kidnapped Arunas Zibud must be freed immediately, and criminal proceedings should be initiated against the chiefs who issued such an order and its executors. (A private home was invaded and, with the appearance of neighbors, citizen G. Kolpakene was injured.) The actions of the military have even more dangerous aspects in their rude behavior, however.

Military units, ignoring the laws and instructions of the Lithuanian authorities, want to show that they are an all-powerful occupation force, and hope to provoke retaliatory actions by citizens. Another possible objective is to torpedo the planned beginning of negotiations between the USSR and the Lithuanian Republic. In any case, the question arises about the subordination and responsibility of the Soviet military, which the Presidium of the Supreme Council and the Government of the Lithuanian Republic are addressing to USSR President M. Gorbachev, to USSR Minister of Defense D. Yazov, and to General M. Kuzmin, commander of the Baltic Military District of the USSR Armed Forces.

The Presidium of the Supreme Council and the Government of the Lithuanian once more declare:

Refusal to serve in the Army of another state, based on the law of a sovereign Lithuanian Republic and personal civic or other conviction, is an absolute right of every citizen of the Lithuanian Republic, as well as a generally recognized right of a person; and the persistent unwillingness of the USSR Armed Forces to find a status other than that of occupation for their stay in Lithuania and to change behavior intensifies the urgency, already expressed at the time of the mass campaign to collect signatures in the summer of 1989, of the unanimous demand of the Lithuanian people for an immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Lithuanian territory. The threat to peace, life, and the health of the people must be eliminated.

[Signed] V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic
K. Prunskiene, prime minister of the Lithuanian Republic
[Dated] Vilnius, 5 November 1990

## 'Myth' of Lithuanian Free Press Exposed

*91UN0608A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 23 Dec 90 First Edition p 6*

[Article by SOVETSKAYA LITVA Editor in Chief A. Gelbakh: "Glasnost Under a Hood, or the Myth of the Freedom of Speech and Freedom of the Press in Lithuania"]

[Text] Vilnius—That Saturday in Vilnius turned out to be a day overflowing with significant political events. A rally advocating the signing of the Union treaty by the republic, with many thousand people in attendance, was held on the square in front of the Palace of Sports. A republic meeting of the victims and witnesses of the bandit formations' terrorist activities in the post-war years was held.

On Sunday, not a single newspaper is published in Lithuania. This is why the people's judgments of the events which occurred were based mainly on the republic TV broadcasts. What did they get to see and hear?

There was not a frame or a word about the meeting of the victims and witnesses of bandit terrorism. The rally was filmed by the TV cameramen so "skillfully" that one could get the impression that only several hundred people participated in it. The commentary confirmed this: "Few ideas, few people." Television, which prides itself on its "objectivity," altogether ignored the fact that, according to the specialists, there were about 80,000 people at the rally (not bad at all for a city with a population of 600,000). Besides, many of those who wanted to get to the Palace of Sports did not, due to the absence of transportation: On days off, a considerable number of bus routes do not operate in Vilnius.

The events of one day and their reflection or, pardon me, rather their distortion in the broadcasts of one of the most powerful mass media of the republic have, unfortunately, been a customary phenomenon in Lithuania in recent months. A tendentious approach and bias in the presentation and selection of facts take us back to the days when almighty censorship manipulated public opinion. It has now been officially abolished in Lithuania; however, it is invisibly present and penetrates all editorial offices of newspapers and magazines, radio and TV. Judge for yourselves.

The Republic of Lithuania Law on the Press guarantees the free publication and distribution of registered publications; however, these are only words. Actually, all newspapers of, for example, the Communist Party of Lithuania have been forced to print outside the republic for eight months now due to continuous pressure by the authorities on the management of the printing plants. The same lot has befallen the printed organs of the Intermovement and the Socialist Federation of Workers of Lithuania. Their distribution is also impeded. This is happening despite the fact that the newspapers are officially registered by the Administration for the Control of the Press of the Lithuanian Ministry of Internal

Affairs. As recently as several months ago, the registration of such publications was still possible, albeit with great difficulties. The authorities have decided lately that the Law on the Press should be revised or... forgotten if it interferes with the creation of the national-separatist "uniform thinking" in Lithuania. "The freedom of speech" in the republic has been developing along these two avenues.

The registration application of the regional newspaper of a group of rayon party committees of Northern Lithuania, NASH PUT, was turned down on a far-fetched pretext. Communists in the republic Ministry of Internal Affairs made an attempt to register their newspaper, NA STRAZHE PRAVOPORYADKA. They were turned down because the internal affairs organs have been "de-politicized" in Lithuania.

So much for this. The newspapers of the Communist Party and public movements of a socialist character are indeed dangerous for the new leadership of the republic: They represent direct opposition with regard to the leadership. The authorities also behave ferociously with regard to the so-called "independent" publications which by no means sympathize with the communist ideology. For example, the realist weekly PERSPEKTIVY has also been forced to print outside the republic. The newspaper of the independent satirists of Lithuania, KRANKLINS, ceased to exist altogether because of the persecution and continuous pressure it was subjected to.

An unenviable future awaits editorial offices which have proclaimed their independence from both the Communist Party and Sajudis. Perceiving that independent journalists are at times critical of the decisions of the savivalda (self-government) of the cities and rayons and the government, and sometimes even venture to analyze the operation of the "impeccably democratic" legislature, legislators immediately adopted a commentary on Article 7 of the Law on the Press. As a result of this "innocuous" commentary, virtually all independent newspapers will be placed under the leadership of the newly elected city and rayon authorities.

To be sure, in some places attempts were made to put a good face on a bad situation. For example, in Kaunas the authorities decided to set up their own newspaper as a competitor to an independent newspaper which is popular in the city. A subscription campaign was held, and it turned out that the savivalda publication was of interest to several hundred readers. At the same time, about 100,000 residents of Kaunas subscribed to the independent newspaper. This is when the decision was made to discontinue the game of pluralism and to subordinate the independent editorial office to the Sajudis-controlled self-government of the city. The authorities in other cities and rayons of Lithuania acted in a similar manner.

The myth of freedom of speech and the press in Lithuania which, incidentally, has been vigorously propagated by the Union mass media as well, is bursting like a balloon before our very eyes. An anti-democratic law on political parties and the infamous commentary on Article 7 of the Law on the Press have deprived those who used to believe in the restoration of glasnost and the pluralism of opinions in Lithuania of their last illusions. Totalitarianism is not embarrassed to tear off its good natured mask when it becomes aware of its inability to manipulate public consciousness. Glasnost is immediately placed under the air-tight hood of national-extremist supervision.

All of this is obvious for the residents of the republic. Democrats from the Government of Russia, however, have so far failed to notice the changes which are taking place in Lithuania. Recently Prime Minister of Lithuania Kazimiera Prunskiene joyfully reported on TV to the residents of the republic that she had renewed contacts with the ranking representatives of the team of Ivan Silayev. They firmly promised to deliver any raw and other materials which Lithuania needs (mostly hard currency items—oil, gas, and metals). This information may be yet another "canard" which the Sajudists released on the air in order to bolster their declining authority. It is nonetheless possible that there is some truth to this information. After all, Ivan Silayev did agree to sign a trade and economic agreement with "independent" and relatively poorly developed Lithuania, which was patently disadvantageous for Russia. Therefore, he may continue his "separatist games" at present as well, despite a decision of the Congress of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputies on the need to sign the Union treaty. After all, their main objective is to undermine and impair Union power. To this end, any means are acceptable for the so-called democrats. One may also become a philanthropist with regard to Lithuania and show favor to it at the expense of the people of Russia.

## Pro-CPSU Deputy Rejects 'Official Policy'

### Shved Outlines Platform

*91UN0443C Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 22 Nov 90 p 2*

[Article by Vladislav Shved: "From the Platform of a Candidate for Deputy: 'We Are All Sailing on the Same Ship...'"]

[Text] Time flies. It is almost nine months now since our elections to the Lithuanian Supreme Council took place—months filled to the utmost with the most diverse political events in the life of the country and of the republic, events both under and out of control, both subject to and outside of common sense. It is precisely this—time—which will issue an accurate verdict after the years have passed, as to who was right in this complicated situation we are living through today.

Today we stand face to face with the ideal of independence, so priceless to us. Is there a people in the world who would dream of the opposite? At the same time we have no right to forget that independence in its "pure,"

ideal form simply does not exist. There are no states in today's world which are absolutely independent. Not America, not Japan, not Russia, with all their size and autonomy, are in any way completely independent. My understanding of independence connotes primarily a freedom in the selection of forms of dependence.

Today some people identify the independence of Lithuania with its secession from the Union. Forever. Eternally. While not giving any thought to the abyss that lies between the declaration itself and the reality in which we live. Having proclaimed independence in the act of 11 March, has the republic become independent and free? Has its people become happier or richer? Independence is not an end in itself, but rather a means to improve the people's quality of life, to create the necessary conditions for their material well-being and spiritual development. Otherwise, why declare independence? For the sake of rhetoric? To conceal one's own personal mercenary interests using universal human ones?

There is no end to the questions. What is our independence of today worth? Are our politicians sincere in their efforts to achieve it? Will it become a tangible reality? Do we really need it in this form? We—because Lithuania today, whether we like it or not, consists not just of Lithuanians, but of all the other peoples as well who inhabit this territory. The independence of one, as we know, cannot be built on the suppression of another. Pardon me, but there is a somewhat different name for this... Independence must be unified, comprehensible, and accessible to Lithuanian and Pole, Russian and Belorussian... Remember the phrase that became popular—"We are all sailing on the same ship."

What kind of independence does Lithuania have as of today? As the logic of life shows, in striving to escape from one dependence, it is falling into others—some unforetold and fraught with consequences.

In order to be genuinely independent, one must first of all be strong, not by virtue of a hastily established army for defense of the land, secret police, or a security establishment, but strong by virtue of economic and political stability. Any request for assistance or rendering of it is also, unfortunately, a dependence. The West has not yet responded to requests from the republic leadership for financial and material aid. The United States Senate also has rejected financial assistance to Lithuania for 1991; nor have we been able to get tankers with petroleum. If we do get them, what will we use to pay for them? What will be the financial or political tribute to be paid? For the time being the republic leadership has found support in talks with the Western countries only morally, so to speak, and if they have promised to help, it has been only in the humanitarian sphere.

At the same time, American experts who were in Lithuania this summer reached the conclusion that in the next 10 years, goods produced in the republic will be competitive only in the Union market. Here we should not forget that even in this market some very significant competitors for Lithuania will emerge—Argentine beef, Australian mutton, not to mention industrial products.

Unfortunately, hopes for reaching agreements with Russia and other republics have also proved to be ephemeral. They have not yet been ratified by the Supreme Soviets. People's deputies, those of Russia first and foremost, will hardly agree to raw material being sold to Lithuania at prices several times lower than world market prices when the Lithuanian products made from it are purchased at world prices.

I believe that the present official policy has no future. Attempts by the current government to stabilize the economy, while leaving the Union, are mindful of attempts to modernize the electric motor without connecting it to a power supply. It will not function for objective reasons. If the republic is going to obtain raw materials, this will mean stagnation of the economy and a catastrophic drop in the workers' standard of living. For they are the ones who will have to cover significantly increased costs of petroleum and coal.

I say to my opponents: Do not look for "Red propaganda" in my reasoning. Is it time for a "witch hunt" when, in tearing down the walls of our "common home," we risk finding ourselves crushed under its debris in the twinkling of an eye?

Is there an alternative? There is—substantive relations of cooperation. Only this will be recognized by today's civilized world, which is aware that success is determined by cooperation, even the cooperation of antagonistic world views. If there is a common goal, what else is necessary?

I am speaking about this today because questions dealing with the independence of Lithuania, its future, arise almost every day in meetings with the electorate. People are worried about prospects for their lives in the future, guarantees of stability in the economy and social life. For when we analyze the processes ongoing in the world, it becomes clear that all the major problems are to be resolved only on the paths of integration. It is impossible outside the Union to effect the fundamental reform of our economy. I am in favor of the republic having real sovereignty. The absolute sovereignty which has turned the heads of many is a myth.

I believe the voters are already well acquainted with my preelection platform. The goal of my activity, of my entire existence, is to do my little part to create a genuinely democratic, rule-of-law state which will ensure the equality of the rights and freedoms of all inhabitants of Lithuania regardless of nationality, convictions, or religion; to establish the opportunity for all peoples of the republic, where they reside together in high density, to themselves choose the ways and organizational forms of national rebirth and self-determination. Without this, it is inconceivable for us to consider continuing to live together. There is no other way.

I know my electorate quite well; I know their difficult problems and concerns. Together with my supporters, I hope to turn these into a program of action. The entire course of the development of civilization speaks to the fact that, sooner or later, we must assert the priority of individual rights over the priority of the nation. Otherwise independence, democracy, and a rule-of-law state are turned into empty words.

They say "a deputy is powerful through the wisdom of his electorate." Regardless of my current status as candidate for deputy, I believe in the wisdom of the people who live here in the republic. No matter how many events we have had to endure, and no matter how many we have yet to endure, the people will sooner or later set out on their righteous journey.

### Elected to Legislature 30 Nov

*91UN0443B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 30 Nov 90 First Edition p 2*

[Unattributed article: "V. Shved Wins Election"]

[Text] V. Shved, second secretary of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU), will occupy the single vacant position in the Lithuanian Supreme Council. This became clear today after the conclusion of the session of the republic electoral commission. Following an examination of protests and statements, 12 out of 14 commission members voted in favor of Shved's registration.

Four rounds of elections to the republic's legislature took place in the spring in the suburban region of the Lithuanian capital—Naujoji Vilnia, but they failed to yield results. The ballots for the elections conducted on 24 November included the names of five candidates to the position of deputy; many expected, therefore, that the elections would not end here. Active Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) figure V. Shved won a convincing victory, with 72 percent of Novaya Vilna residents participating in the elections having voted for him.

The Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) is operating under adverse circumstances. The Law of the Lithuanian Republic "On Political Parties" adopted 25 September, which was declared as "not having legal force from the moment of its adoption" by a USSR presidential ukase of 27 November, virtually places this party outside the law. And several days ago V. Landsbergis, chairman of the republic Supreme Council, spoke of the need to "hold V. Shved accountable."

### Shved Interviewed on Policy

*91UN0597A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Dec 90 Second Edition p 3*

[Interview with V.N. Shved, second secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party and CPSU Central Committee member, by PRAVDA correspondent Yu. Stroganov; in Vilnius, date not given: "Actions Are the Fruits of Thoughts"]

[Text] The Lithuanian Communist Party has been called all kinds of names by its adversaries! It has been called the night party, the Burokavicius party, and even the Swedish party. This epithet has nothing to do with the Swedes [shvedy]. Vladislav Nikolayevich Shved, second secretary of the Communist Party of Lithuania and member of the CPSU Central Committee, is one of the leaders of the Lithuanian Communist Party. Well, by giving such an epithet to the communists of Lithuania, the opponents have been proven right in a certain sense, though they have tried to make the name sound sarcastic. The supporters of V. Shved respect him as much as his opponents hate him. The number of his supporters keeps growing. According to a December poll conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Republic of Lithuania, V. Shved is one of the 10 most popular politicians in Lithuania. This was clearly proven by the recent by-elections to the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania; Vladimir Nikolayevich became a deputy. More than 70 percent of the voters voted for him. A convincing victory! It has opened up new opportunities for the communists of Lithuania.

I addressed V. Shved: "So, you have become a member of the republic's legislature. How are you going to use this forum? What is your view of the development of events? Opponents believe that communists are incapable of compromises. What is your attitude toward them?"

Vladislav Nikolayevich said: "It is necessary for the voice of those who advocate the Soviet Federation, and a free and sovereign Lithuania within a renewed union, to be heard in the legislature at present. The mistakes of the CPSU in its time were linked to the absence of an opposition. Incidentally, the Sajudis skillfully used this aspect in its propaganda against the CPSU. At present, however, the Supreme Council of the republic does not want to have an opposition either.

"I will argue for three ideas in the legislature. The first: I believe that the public of our republic should know the truth about the kind of union we want to create and the kind of Lithuania in this union. For example, I cannot agree with the view that Lithuania in the Union means slavery, and seceding from the Soviet Union means independence. There is not a state on the globe which is independent in the full meaning of this word. At present, independence largely means the freedom to choose a form of dependence. This is how small the world is. We are in favor of a sovereign Lithuania, independent of bureaucratic dictate in a renewed Union of republics with equal rights. No matter what they say, acts of discrimination on political, ideological, and ethnic grounds are apparent in Lithuania at present. My duty is to defend the interests of people and to ensure that these issues are raised in the legislature. The third idea: Enquiries by voters are a powerful instrument. At present, a multitude of questions to the leadership, the government of the republic, arise. It is also time for us to make constructive proposals.

"Recent months have shown that the nationalist euphoria is wearing off. As recently as March, there was a unanimous monolithic legislature, whereas at present there already are factions and groupings in it."

[Stroganov] Vladislav Nikolayevich, I would like to specify that there is still no faction of CPSU communists, though until now there have been seven Lithuanian Communist Party members in the legislature.

[Shved] I hope that such a faction will appear soon, though it may not be a strictly party one. The "Equal Rights" faction. I do not think that there will only be eight of us in the faction. I hope that we will acquire many allies by taking a stand on issues of social protection and justice and by solving economic problems. I am convinced that ultimately the legislature will subscribe to the idea of the necessity for Lithuania's participation in the union. They are not waiting for Lithuania in the Common Market, nor are they in NATO. They have not provided loans so far. The republic will not acquire independence as such even after seceding. Independence means, first of all, an opportunity to decide your fate yourself not just in a matter of speaking, but having the material conditions for this. Such conditions may only be secured in the Union for now. Being in the Union, one can obtain raw materials without hard currency. Imagine Lithuania having to pay $120 per ton of oil. The gold of the Lithuanian Republic which is now held in France, 2,200 kilograms, will be enough for literally four to five days.

Using the potential of the Soviet Union jointly and giving the people of every region an opportunity to decide their fate and organize the economy—this is the most promising way. Are compromises possible along this way? Of course.

In their time, USSR people's deputies from Lithuania did not raise the issue of the republic's secession from the USSR. Therefore, a certain fraud has been committed. However, only the people rather than individual legislaturearians, may resolve this issue. We will not get by without holding a referendum anyway. This idea was also confirmed by the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

[Stroganov] Compromises may be achieved at a "round table" in which representatives of all progressive forces of the republic would take part. The Lithuanian Communist Party was the first to voice ideas about it. So far, however, there has been no response from other political forces of the republic despite the fact that many people talk about the need for a dialogue, a consensus. Is this to say that they do not consider the CPSU a progressive force? Or is something else at issue here? Incidentally, what is your personal attitude toward other parties and movements in the republic?

[Shved] The ranks of our party are growing. Lithuanians are joining it. This process would hardly be taking place if the CPSU were not a progressive force. Many people in Lithuania believe: If you come out in favor of the old Union you are conservative. We have long advocated a renewed Union; this is a progressive tendency. The promoted image of "the black features of the CPSU" which is painted by many newspapers and magazines is working powerfully against us. By now it is far removed from reality. The Lithuanian Communist Party is absolutely independent in its actions. The CPSU is a union of like-minded people. There is, however, an image.

There is also another reason for the reluctance of our opponents to hold discussions with us: They do not want our arguments to reach the broad circles of the public. "The round table" will help us to score points, and they understand this. For example, we were accused on account of the conflict involving party archives. We proposed at that point: Let us go on TV, have the most caustic journalists sit across from us. Let them ask any questions about this. Nobody allowed us to go...

As far as parties and movements in the republic are concerned, they exist only in a technical sense—in name; in terms of ideology, all of them are variations on the Sajudis theme. My attitude toward them is unambiguous. There are many good programs, but we should pass judgment based on deeds. So far, there have been few specific endeavors. There is a reason for the saying that actions are the fruits of thoughts.

[Stroganov] As you see it, what is the position of the CPSU in the republic and the country as a whole? What role should it play?

[Shved] When I evaluate the role of the CPSU I agree in principle with the criticism of it for the shortcomings which were allowed to occur in the economy and on other issues. At present, it is paying for everything and for everyone. However, the development of modern human society is impossible without parties. The will of the people and their interests should be expressed through an organization. Taking into account the fact that at present the CPSU numbers 19 million and in view of its experience and opportunity to influence public opinion, it should be preserved while changing substantially the content of its activities, making it into a truly political organization, a party of the communist perspective, socialist option, and real social protection of the people. This is when it will become attractive.

Certain forces demand that the name of our party be changed. Tell me, maybe we should also remove from our vocabulary the words "God" and "Christianity?" Fascists went to fight with the inscription "God is with us" on their belt buckles. They committed a multitude of crimes with this slogan. Torquemada, the inquisition, the self-interest of priests in their time—has all of this made the ideas of Christianity worse? Christianity remained. Idcological flip-floppers are saying now that, supposedly, if we give up the word "communism" they will believe us. I do not distinguish between common human values and communist values. How can they be contrasted? Communist ideals are more than 2,000 years old.

We are happy to remain a part of the CPSU. It is precisely the support of the party that makes it possible for us to endure. Yes, the situation in the country is catastrophic. We paved the way for democracy, but you can see for yourself who came to power. A struggle against monuments is under way, and anti-democratic acts are being adopted. These forces which have forced their way to power in a number of republics are beginning to lose the confidence of the people. The CPSU has an opportunity to regain the trust of the masses.

[Stroganov] Vladislav Nikolayevich, as I see it, the December plenum of the CPSU Central Committee also contributed to this. You took part in it. What is your impression? How will it influence public consciousness?

[Shved] On the one hand, it proceeded more vigorously, more specifically than before. On the other hand, certain issues were omitted. As I see it, at present every plenum should be a factor which turns the wheel of public opinion in favor of the realists, in favor of the socialist option. It is necessary to do more than just evaluate what is happening in a clear and substantiated manner. No clear-cut analysis was made at the plenum of the opportunities to reinforce the Union which had been wasted. Of course, there is no point in engaging in self-disparagement; however, analysis should have been made in order not to make mistakes in the future and deprive the separatists of their trump cards. Merciless assessments are necessary. Let everybody see that we proceed with an open heart, without any ulterior motives.

Many constructive suggestions were voiced at the plenum. The most important task of the party is the consolidation of the efforts of communists of the entire country and the work of the party organizations in shaping public opinion. It is necessary to win public opinion over. In the Baltic area, for example, everything began with the conditioning of public opinion. We, the communists, need to ensure unity. This is a matter of principle.

[Stroganov] It is hard to disagree with you concerning unity. However, in this case I would ask whether the segment of communists who did not wish to sever links with the CPSU acted properly at the time of the split in the Lithuanian Communist Party late last year, at its 20th Congress? Many people believe that it should have remained a faction inside the reorganized Communist Party of Lithuania.

[Shved] Of course, we thought about it. The debate went on for a long time. Indeed, many participants in the congress proposed this variant to us. However, we asked them whether we could be part of a party whose statute and program have nothing in common with the CPSU? They told us themselves: No, we cannot. At present, there is one Communist Party in Lithuania. The other, the A. Brazauskas party, changed its name to the Democratic Labor Party (DPTL). This was to be expected.

[Stroganov] At present, the Lithuanian Communist Party is under powerful moral pressure, and not just moral. Threats against communists abound. In Taurage a hooligan attack was made on you personally, which many people treat as an attempt on your life. What has happened?

[Shved] This situation in the republic indicates that its leadership is losing power. This is why the creation of a state-legal mechanism for suppressing dissidence is proceeding at an accelerated pace. A strategy of tension is being implemented. By now we are already reading posters in the state newspaper LETUVOS AIDAS saying "Russian occupiers, go home." There are insulting inscriptions on fences. One Arnas Taujanskas informed a correspondent of the newspaper RESPUBLIKA at one of the rallies that the Lithuanian Liberation Army had been created and promised that the struggle would be waged by all wartime means. R. Ozolas, deputy prime minister of Lithuania, said straightforwardly from the pages of the newspaper GIMTASIS KRASTAS: "If need be I will take a rifle and stand up for Lithuania." This is when I recall the maxim of Aristotle on the essence of a tyrant: He continuously maintains readiness for war in a society so that the people will need a leader. Who needs such tension? To be sure, they blame us for it...

As far as Taurage goes, I went there, as I assumed, for a debate. Before I was able to approach the rayon party committee, however, I was surrounded by a group of resentful people with placards. Bricks and bottles started flying; it was a miracle that I broke away from the crowd. There were many photographers and cameramen. By all signs, the provocation was well-prepared, but it did not produce the desired results. They did not get to see communists flee and plead for mercy. Despite the abundance of photographers, we cannot find a single picture or movie frame to provide to the prosecutor. Meanwhile, in other cases, when provocations were successful, every last detail was usually shown on the republic TV newscast the same evening...

[Stroganov] Some people see only the ethnic underpinnings of the opposition of political forces in the republic. Is it so? Does your personality give a pretext for such statements?

[Shved] My personality? I do not think so. There are many Lithuanians in our party, and among the leaders First Secretary Burokavicius, Secretary Yu. Kuolelis, and others.

At present, the motives for the opposition are primarily political. However, it is always advantageous to cast it in an ethnic light. This is why we cannot dismiss the ethnic aspect. The political aspect of unsolved ethnic problems does surface also. They say that we live so poorly because Russians have been here...

[Stroganov] Vladislav Nikolayevich, let us agree with you on an interview in, say, five years. To your mind, what kinds of questions and answers will we hear?

[Shved] I hope, and I am even convinced, that we will be discussing the issues of the nascent new Union of sovereign states.

### TV Cites Savisaar on 'Civil Disobedience'

*LD0301162691 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1530 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Estonian Prime Minister Savisaar said in Helsinki that Estonia will resort to civil disobedience if the USSR president declares a state of emergency in the republic and introduces presidential rule. Analyzing the events in Riga, he voiced the opinion that the army will be used more actively in the Baltic in the near future.

### Tallinn Emigration Plan Aimed at Non-Estonians

*PM0301103791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jan 91 Union Edition p 2*

[Leonid Levitskiy dispatch under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Who Will Go to Argentina—The Estonians or..."]

[Text] Tallinn—A delegation from Tallinn City Soviet headed by chairman A. Kork has spent two weeks in Argentina. The sensational result of the trip was an agreement to the effect that that country will receive immigrants from Tallinn every year.

A. Kork made a sensational report in the newspapers VECHERNIY TALLINN which said: "The most interesting result is the fundamental agreement with the Argentine immigration service to the effect that Argentina is open to immigrants from Tallinn. Those who think that they can find happiness in that warm and beautiful country can consider moving there. All the same Argentina will not receive more than 150,000 people in one year!" Furthermore, "This discussion about resettlement is serious. It is doubtful whether people whose roots are in Estonia would wish to resettle somewhere else. There is only one Estonia in the world!"

Let me be more specific—Tallinn is a city with half a million inhabitants. If you follow this idea logically then both the old fortresses and the new nine-story blocks will be empty in a short time. Moreover, the immigration service of Tallinn itself has practically blocked two roads leading into the city from other places—so that there will be no extra people. It turns out that it will only take three years for Tallinn to become deserted.

The Latvian newspaper DIENA, an organ that is very close to the government, made an interesting comment. "Judging by the information received, this report (about the resettlement of thousands of Tallinn's inhabitants in Argentina—L.L.) refers to inhabitants of the Estonian capital who are of non-indigenous nationality..." It turns out that it is all very simple: The Argentine option is just a brilliantly conceived way of getting non-Estonians out of the republic.

## RSFSR

### RSFSR Denies Treaty Signed With Uzbek SSR

*LD0301175491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1708 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[Text] Moscow, 3 Jan (TASS)—We are transmitting a report by the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium press service:

"Today, referring to the "Postfaktum" information agency, a number of the media have been reporting on a meeting which is supposed to have taken place between Boris Yeltsin, RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman, and leaders of the workers' movement in Kemerovo, and the alleged signing of a treaty between the RSFSR and the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. The RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium press service declares that the above reports are of poor quality and do not correspond to reality."

### RSFSR Congress Deputies Oppose Gulf Appeal

*91UF0292A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Dec 90 Union Edition p 3*

[Article by RSFSR People's Deputies A. Adrov and S. Shakhray: "Clarification Is Needed"]

[Text] On 11 December, at the Extraordinary Congress of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] People's Deputies an appeal was adopted to the USSR president and the Supreme Soviet on the military-political situation in the Persian Gulf area.

The text of the appeal (see the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA for 13 December 1990) was proposed by the "Rossiya" group of deputies and actively supported by the "Kommunisty Rossii" group. There was a roll-call vote. A total of 683 deputies voted for the appeal, 161 voted against, and 61 abstained. Because many voters are asking the question "Why did a number of deputies vote against the appeal?" we would like to explain our position through your newspaper.

This kind of appeal to the USSR president and Supreme Soviet means that the RSFSR people's deputies have doubts about the well-weighed nature and correctness of USSR foreign policy being pursued by the president and the USSR minister of foreign affairs, and about whether or not the steps that they have taken are adequate (Could they be working better?). It is pointed out in the appeal how they should deal with other countries so that we do not get ourselves involved in a new Afghanistan because of lack of understanding of the extreme importance of the issue or because of thoughtless or some other reason.

It is our opinion that there are no grounds for such conclusions, since all the real achievements of perestroyka in the USSR, recognized by the entire world, relate mainly to the field of foreign policy. There is absolutely no need to reproach or prompt the leadership of the Soviet Union in this field. Nor to mistrust it.

This is the main reason for our vote against the appeal. We believe that the main purpose of the appeal is to cast doubt on the foreign policy of the USSR and strike a blow against specific persons who are pursuing that policy, namely, M.S. Gorbachev and E.A. Shevardnadze.

In our view, the following points are worthy of consideration:

1. Like the entire world community standing at the barricades against Saddam Husayn, we unconditionally favor a peaceful settlement of the conflict and the peaceful liberation of Kuwait and all hostages. Therefore, we support totally everything that has been said in the appeal on that subject.

2. We are against that part of the appeal that in our opinion is untimely and serves rather to promote the opposite effect since it increases the probability of armed conflict and thus necessarily affects both the Union and Russia and the Soviet citizens who to this day remain hostages in Iraq. This assertion requires clarification.

The only way to force Iraq to leave Kuwait peaceably is for the entire world community to condemn the aggression, along with harsh economic sanctions by all states, and, finally, a real threat of the use of the military force of the entire world against Iraq.

So what position should Russia assume? Go along with the countries of the United Nations that have stated that all sanctions are permissible against Iraq, or proclaim its own special position of total noninterference? The latter merely plays into Iraq's hands.

Let us try to offer an analogy. Gangsters have taken over a neighbor's house (it does not even have to be a friend's house) and are robbing it, and have also seized your children as hostages. Will the position of "it has nothing to do with me" be correct?...

When negotiations do not yield results in such a situation, the moral use of all means, included armed means, is necessary and permissible in order to end the robbery, protect the neighbor, free the hostages, and punish the criminals. And this has been confirmed by the UN resolution on Iraq.

It is perhaps the first time in our history that all the leading countries of the world, including the USSR and the United States, are acting on this issue in a united front.

Today, an announcement by any state that it is not participating in actions against Iraq strengthens the position of S. Husayn. By adopting this appeal, we have inopportunely given S. Husayn to understand that the enormous resources of Russia will not necessarily be directed against him, and we thus increase his resistance to the international sanctions that could bring about a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

Let us remember that on the day that the appeal was adopted, E.A. Shevardnadze was in the United States holding talks with Secretary of State J. Baker to coordinate actions to halt the Iraqi aggression. We have inopportunely and indirectly interfered in the process of the talks. The text of the final part of the appeal casts doubt on the powers of the USSR foreign minister.

And finally, the last thing. By stating that we shall not participate in actions against Iraq we are committing a kind of treachery against our own citizens in Iraq, depriving them of the protection of the state. Thus, for example, any citizen of the United States who is abroad knows and is sure that he is protected not only by his country's political and economic authority but also by the entire armed might of the United States.

Taking all the above-mentioned into account, we believe that our congress should not have adopted any documents on Iraq, and should have voted against the appeal. The voters can judge as to the correctness of these considerations. We support USSR foreign policy today and we believe that no pressure should be exerted on those pursuing that policy.

## Jewish Autonomous Oblast Secedes

*PM0301114591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jan 91 First Edition p 3*

[Report by Lieutenant Colonel V. Petrov: "Oblast Under Conditions of Sovereignty"]

[Text] Birobidzhan—The Jewish Autonomous Oblast created by an arbitrary decree of the "father of the peoples" in 1934 is essentially not an autonomous national body. In all there are about 100 nationalities living in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast. Russians comprise 83.1 percent of the population, Ukrainians 7.4 percent, and Jews 4.1 percent. There are various reasons for this, and that is not the topic of conversation today.

It is true that the local press is publishing items increasingly frequently citing one reason—the lack of national autonomy: The oblast has been "under the diktat" of the kray, to which it belongs as a "poor relation" of Khabarovsk. That, for instance, is the opinion of A. Untevskiy, chairman of the Birobidzhan City Soviet, and P. Khmaruk, chief of the oblast trade department. The conclusion is that the Jewish Autonomous Oblast is restricted in its sovereign rights and its status does not allow it to make effective use of its economic and social potential. That is how the oblast soviet presidium justifies the decision on the Jewish Autonomous Oblast's secession from Khabarovsk Kray.

### Trade Union Federation Issues Strike Warning

*LD0301143591 Moscow TASS in English 1420 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Yegorov]

[Text] Moscow January 3 TASS—The Federation of Russian Independent Trade Unions (FRITU) announced its intention to call a republican strike if laws ensuring the workers' legal and social protection during the transition to a market economy are not adopted within the next two months.

Commenting on this decision, FRITU Deputy Chairman Vasiliy Romanov explained that the trade unions demand that the Russian parliament should adopt, by the end of February, bills on employment and the indexation of population's incomes, taking into account price hikes on consumer goods and services.

"The Russian parliament should enact them from March 1," Romanov added. In his opinion, further procrastination on this issue "will entail serious negative consequences for the people, especially for socially vulnerable sections of the population".

The FRITU Council calls on union locals [as received] and Russian citizens to hold rallies and meetings immediately to urge legislators to pass vital laws quickly, Romanov said.

"I'm sure that the overwhelming majority of working people and their unions will agree," he said. "If this opinion is ignored, the FRITU Council reserves the right to call a republic-wide strike. It will probably not be limited to a warning job action," he noted.

Asked whether it is proper for trade unions to "incite" workers to mass job actions while the country's authorities are calling on the population to achieve civil accord, Romanov noted that FRITU has tried for the last eight months to settle urgent social and economic problems during the transition to market relations by civilised methods, holding conferences, meetings and top-level talks.

However, "this has not yielded any tangible results", Romanov said.

The FRITU intends to show its readiness to struggle to satisfy workers' social and economic demands during the spring joint action days of trade unions, to be held on May 1-2. Preparations for this mass action have already begun.

### Foreign Minister Confers With Swedish Envoy

*LD0301181991 Moscow TASS in English 1811 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[Text] Moscow January 3 TASS—Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev today received Swedish Ambassador to the USSR Carl Otto Orjan Berner.

The talk concerned the results of the extraordinary Congress of Russian Federation People's Deputies and the fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies, their influence on the situation in the Russian Federation and its Relations with other republics.

The sides favoured developing relations between Russia and Sweden, including within the framework of North European countries' regional cooperation. They said that direct links between Russian and Swedish employers may prove to be promising here.

The two politicians agreed to maintain regular contacts in future.

### Karelian City of Kem Opened to Foreigners

*LD0401091791 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 4 Jan 91*

[Text] The Karelian city of Kem, on the White Sea coast, has been removed—by decision of the country's Council of Ministers—from the list of inhabited localities closed to visits by foreign citizens.

This has happened following representations from the city and rayon soviets. From now on, enterprises and organizations of this rayon center will be able to conclude direct contracts with foreign partners, set up joint ventures, and establish twin-city links with foreign countries—first and foremost with cities of neighboring Finland.

### Omsk To Be Open to Foreign Visitors

*LD2112144890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 21 Dec 90*

[Text] Omsk has acquired open-city status. By a resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers, it opened its gates for visits by foreign citizens. From now on, the city on the Irtysh will have new opportunities to extend its contacts in economic and political life and in the spheres of science, culture and sport.

### 1991 RSFSR Budget Adopted

*914A0244A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 27 Dec 90 Second Edition p 3*

[Article by O. Kulikov, TASS legislative correspondent: "At the Session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Power Is Costing More"]

[Text] A joint meeting of the Soviet of the Republic and the Soviet of Nationalities led by B. Yeltsin on 28 December was devoted to next year's budget system for the Russian Federation.

Unlike in past years, the formation of the plan for the system was based on the independence of the budgets of all republics, whose combined income should amount to about 247 billion rubles [R], and expenditures—about R258 billion. As I. Silayev, who submitted the draft law

"On the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] State Budget System in 1991," noted, the proposed budget should play a creative and not a destructive role.

Recognizing the importance and the need for the most rapid adoption of this document, the deputies expressed many critical remarks, noting that it was not sufficiently developed and was superficial.

The committees and commissions that submitted conclusions regarding the draft consider its major shortcoming to be that the republic government did not submit along with this document the planning developments and the predictions of the dynamics of the national economy next year. The absence of these makes it impossible to resolve questions of the construction of housing, and facilities for public health, education, and culture.

Expenditures of maintaining organs of state power and administration will increase by more than R1.2 billion next year. Thus the RSFSR Supreme Soviet will cost the taxpayers R27 million, the apparatus of the Council of Ministers, R37 million, and the central staffs of the republic ministries and departments—R270 million.

After a stormy discussion and a flood of criticism the law was nonetheless adopted. The RSFSR Council of Ministers was instructed to make clarifications in the law.

## RSFSR Law on 1991 Budget Published

*914A0249A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 30 Dec 90 Second Edition p 3*

[Law signed by RSFSR Supreme Soviet Chairman B.N. Yeltsin in Moscow: "Law of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic on the State Budgetary System of the RSFSR in 1991"]

[Text] Proceeding from the Declaration of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] State Sovereignty, RSFSR laws that regulate a transition to market relations in the republic, and resolutions of the First and Second (Extraordinary) Congresses of RSFSR People's Deputies, and pursuant to the RSFSR Law "On the Formation of RSFSR Budgets in 1991," the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic **resolves:**

**Article 1.** To authorize the implementation of the RSFSR republic budget in 1991 amounting to 161,399,532,000 rubles [R] on the spending side, proceeding from the volume of revenues amounting to R152,399,532,000 and the maximum amount of deficit coming to R9 billion, taking into account new wholesale and procurement prices taking effect on 1 January 1991. To confirm current balances in hand as of 1 January 1992, amounting to R250 million.

**Article 2.** To confirm contributions to the Union budget in the amount of R28.4 billion for the exercise by the USSR of the powers delegated to it by the RSFSR and provided for in the resolution of the First Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies "On the Delineation of the Functions of Managing Organizations in the Territory of the RSFSR (Foundations of the New Union Treaty)."

**Article 3.** The RSFSR Council of Ministers will establish, in coordination with the republics belonging to the RSFSR, autonomous oblasts and okrugs, krays, oblasts, and the cities of Moscow and Leningrad, the standard rates of the 1991 contributions to their budgets from turnover and excise taxes, and will transfer funding for differentials in the prices of dairy and meat products consumed locally, as well as proceeds from the sales of the 1982 bonds of the State Internal Premium Loan, from the RSFSR republic budget to the budgets of territories.

**Article 4.** To give the republics belonging to the RSFSR, autonomous oblasts and okrugs, krays, oblasts, and the cities of Moscow and Leningrad the right to:

—levy taxes on the official cars of enterprises, associations, and organizations, regardless of their official affiliation (with the exception of organizations financed from the budget);

—set increased rates of fines for moving violations on the roads;

—establish rates and procedures for taxing the operation of racetracks and other gaming establishments, including their prize funds;

—establish rates and procedures for collecting taxes on advertisements;

—set the amount of one-time fees paid by those selling goods in collective-farm markets depending on local conditions;

—levy taxes on the sale of certain goods at rates of up to five percent of the value of their sales, with the exception of a list of goods confirmed by the RSFSR Council of Ministers;

—beginning 1 March 1991, establish passenger and luggage fares for urban public transit, including subways (with the exception of passenger taxies and river transportation) amounting to not more than 15 kopeks per trip, and in the territory of the far north and localities equated with the far north amounting to not more than 20 kopeks per trip, and tariffs for transportation and shipping services to the populace, as well as set the amounts of fines for travelling and carrying luggage without a ticket;

—impose taxes on the resale of cars in the amount of 10 percent of the value of the transaction for cars produced domestically and 20 percent for cars produced abroad, as well as 25 percent on the resale of computer equipment and personal computers.

To envisage, with a view to encouraging the growth of revenues of territorial budgets, additional contributions amounting to 50 percent of the turnover tax from the segment due to the superior budget by virtue of the sales of products above fulfilled state orders.

**Article 5.** To establish that the following are included in the budgets of the republics belonging to the RSFSR, budgets of autonomous republics and okrugs, krays, oblasts, and the cities of Moscow and Leningrad, as well as the budgets of administrative-territorial entities belonging to them:

—the export-import tax on coastal and cross-border trade;

—proceeds from the privatization of property in the sector of the economy reporting to the republic (RSFSR) in the amount of 10 percent, and the economy of the republics belonging to the RSFSR and other national-state and administrative-territorial entities, 70 percent.

**Article 6.** To recommend that the republics belonging to the RSFSR and other national-state and administrative-territorial entities carry out necessary measures in the process of implementing the plan and the budget in order to secure additional financial resources and budgetary revenues by running lotteries and issuing bonds locally through accepted procedures.

**Article 7.** To introduce, effective 1 January 1991, a system of excise taxes on goods in particular demand in the territory of the RSFSR with a view to regulating the production of state-monopoly goods and profits from their sales.

The excise tax is established in the form of surcharges to the retail prices in effect, and is contributed to the RSFSR republic budget, the budgets of the republics belonging to the RSFSR, the budgets of autonomous oblasts and okrugs, and local budgets through procedures established for the turnover tax.

**Article 8.** To determine that, when a segment of products subject to the turnover tax is sold at contract (freely set) prices, the calculation and payment of the tax will be made on the basis of a percentage ratio of the above segment to the overall volume of sales and the effective percentage of the turnover tax in state retail prices.

**Article 9.** To determine that taxes on the owners of the means of transportation and other self-propelled machines and mechanisms paid in the territory of the RSFSR are contributed to the revenue side of the RSFSR budgets:

—50 percent: to the revenue of the RSFSR republic budget;

—50 percent: to the revenues of the budgets of the republics belonging to the RSFSR, autonomous oblasts and okrugs, krays, oblasts, the cities of Moscow and Leningrad, as well as cities (except cities reporting to rayons), and rayons.

**Article 10.** To determine that the revenues of the RSFSR republic budget in 1991 consist of:

—100-percent contributions of the turnover tax, taxes on exports and imports, and excise taxes, with the exception of withholding for the budgets of the republics belonging to the RSFSR, autonomous oblasts and okrugs, krays, oblasts, and the cities of Moscow and Leningrad, as well as the budgets of administrative-territorial entities belonging to them, at standard rates set for 1991;

—contributions in keeping with the RSFSR laws dated 31 October 1990, "On the Formation of Budgets in the RSFSR in 1991," and 1 December 1990, "On Procedures for the Application of the USSR Law 'On the Taxation of Enterprises, Associations, and Organizations' in the Territory of the RSFSR."

To consider it possible to introduce for 1991:

—special-purpose imposts paid by citizens for one-time trips abroad (excluding business trips by the employees of establishments financed from the budget) in the amount of R100, at the time of emigrating for permanent residence—in the amount of R1,000 by individuals over 18, and R3,000 by persons who have received a higher education in the educational establishments of the country;

—taxes on the sale of nonresidential premises in the amount of 20 percent of the difference between their book value and sales price;

—stamp duty on operations with securities. The RSFSR Council of Ministers will work out the rates of stamp duty and enact them on 1 February 1991.

**Article 11.** To take into account in the RSFSR republic budget for 1991 the receipt of revenue from the main sources in the following amounts (R1,000):

| | |
|---|---|
| Taxes on the profits of enterprises, associations, and organizations | 47,178,374 |
| Turnover tax and excise tax | 46,625,427 |
| Rental payments and allowances for defraying outlays for geological prospecting and geological surveying for minerals | 15,200,000 |
| Revenues from foreign economic operations | 38,797,000 |
| Other taxes, imposts, and non-tax revenues | 4,598,731 |

**Article 12.** To determine that in 1991 the funds of the RSFSR republic budget will be allocated for the outlays of all-republic (RSFSR) significance to finance the social sphere and the foodstuffs program, to ensure the operation and development of the sectors of the national economy, including funding for state capital investments, and to create financial reserves.

**Article 13.** To confirm allocations from the RSFSR republic budget for carrying out the measures envisaged in Article 12 of the present law in the following amounts (R1,000):

| | |
|---|---|
| For financing the national economy | 29,413,347 |
| Including: | |
| the agro-industrial complex | 21,938,707 |
| including financing for centralized state capital investments | 16,939,423 |
| fund for the support of farmsteads | 1,000,000 |
| communications, data management, and space | 254,016 |

| | |
|---|---|
| road maintenance and transportation | 2,889,130 |
| the construction complex | 579,670 |
| fund for the support of certain enterprises in the environment of switching to a market economy | 927,994 |
| other expenditures of the national economy | 1,823,830 |
| For defraying the difference in the prices of agricultural products and certain types of foodstuffs, as well as some types of raw-material goods | 26,732,450 |
| For financing sociocultural measures | 11,457,038 |
| Including: | |
| education and vocational training of cadres | 7,515,820 |
| culture and art | 334,707 |
| health care and physical culture | 1,207,982 |
| state grants to single mothers and low-income families | 931,900 |
| social welfare | 1,466,629 |
| financing of science | 806,350 |
| maintaining the organs of television and radio broadcasting in conjunction with the creation of the Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company | 1,958,200 |
| For financing export and import operations | 37,288,000 |
| For maintaining the organs of the RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs | 5,251,976 |
| For maintaining republic (RSFSR) organs of state power and government and judicial organs | 2,279,495 |
| For setting up the RSFSR Council of Ministers fund for financing emergency expenditures | 1,000,000 |
| For setting up special-purpose all-republic (RSFSR) funds | 12,429,458 |
| Including: | |
| fund for eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station, as well as the nuclear discharge in Chelyabinsk Oblast (1957) and the long-range impact of nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk Test Range on the populace of Altay Kray and Orenburg Oblast | 1,300,000 |
| fund for regional development and the financing of additional measures for the development of Northern regions | 2,000,000 |
| fund of employment and social protection of the populace against unemployment | 1,000,000 |
| fund of subsidies and supports | 8,129,458 |
| for other projects administered by the republic (RSFSR) organs | 174,218 |
| For financing all-Union programs and measures to exercise the powers delegated to the USSR | 23,400,000 |
| For financing geological surveying and geological prospecting | 9,209,000 |
| Out of the total sum of expenditures of the RSFSR republic budget, allocated to finance state centralized capital investments | 21,829,440 |

**Article 14.**To allocate the following in 1991 from all budgets and sources in the RSFSR:

—R65.7 billion to finance projects aimed at the social rejuvenation of rural areas, including a fund for supporting peasant farms, and the development of industries of the agro-industrial complex, including R24.1 billion from the RSFSR budgets, providing for the special-purpose allocation of funds for the development of cultural, educational, and health-care facilities in rural areas;

—R3.5 billion for implementing measures aimed at ensuring the employment and social protection of the populace against unemployment in the environment of switching to a market economy, including R1 billion from the RSFSR republic budget.

**Article 15.**Out of the total amount of funding for maintaining republic (RSFSR) organs of state power and government and judicial organs, to confirm expenditures (R1,000) for the maintenance of:

| | |
|---|---|
| The RSFSR Supreme Soviet | 27,006 |
| Judicial organs of the RSFSR | 445,044 |
| RSFSR State Arbitration | 1,244 |
| Apparatus of the RSFSR Council of Ministers | 37,268 |
| Ministries and departments of the RSFSR and their organs | 1,768,953 |
| including for the central apparatus of ministries and departments | 269,766 |

**Article 16.** With a view to covering the deficit of the 1991 republic budget, the RSFSR Council of Ministers will carry out additional measures in the course of fulfilling the plan and implementing the budget that will be aimed at increasing the financial resources and revenues of the budget, as well as saving on expenditures due to using budgetary funds more rationally and effectively.

**Article 17.** The RSFSR Ministry of Finance will issue RSFSR state loans floated on a volunteer basis among the populace, enterprises, organizations, and banks in order to finance the deficit of the RSFSR republic budget for 1991 confirmed by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and will issue special-purpose state bonds if necessary.

With a view to servicing, refinancing, and retiring the RSFSR state debt, the RSFSR Ministry of Finance will set up in 1991 an off-budget fund for the consolidation of the state debt; [number indistinct] of proceeds from the sale of state loan will be contributed to the above fund.

**Article 18.** To recognize the effect in 1991, in the territory of the RSFSR of the USSR, Supreme Soviet decree dated 21 March 1988, "On the Withholding of the Funds of Collective and State Farms, Industry, Transportation, Construction, and Other Enterprises and Economic Organizations for Building and Maintaining Highways" and Resolution of the RSFSR Council of Ministers No. 139 dated 26 April 1989, "On Procedures for Calculating Expenditures and the Withholding of Funds for the Construction and Repairs of Roads in the RSFSR."

To determine that the withholdings from collective and state farms, industry, transportation, construction, and other enterprises and economic organizations for the construction and repair of public-access roads are included in expenditures for manufacturing products (performing work or services).

**Article 19.** To preserve in 1991, special-purpose withholdings for the construction of public-access roads of state and republic significance in the amount of 2 percent of the proceeds from the operation of motor-vehicle transportation.

**Article 20.** In 1991, the RSFSR Central Bank (Bank of Russia) will provide:

—a loan to the RSFSR Council of Ministers for financing the construction and improvement of public-access roads in the amount of up to R520 million, with subsequent repayment from the RSFSR state budget (taking into account interest for using the loan) in 1992;

—a loan to the RSFSR retirement fund for ensuring the timely payment of retirement benefits and grants in 1991, with its subsequent retirement in 1991 taking into account the payment of 5 percent annual interest from the monies of the RSFSR retirement fund; and will perform banking operations for paying retirement benefits and grants in the entire RSFSR territory.

**Article 21.** The RSFSR Council of Ministers will form an off-budget insurance fund for offsetting the loss of revenue from the sales of pipeline gas when the deliveries of it are reduced compared to contractual obligations, for financing the state programs of putting in gas mains in regions with a poor level of gas supplies and the improvement and construction of production facilities of gas enterprises of the republic, and will set forth procedures for its use.

**Article 22.** To form in 1991, the off-budget all-republic RSFSR fund of economic stabilization with:

—contributions amounting to 11 percent of expenditures for labor by the enterprises, associations, and organizations of all ownership forms (with the exception of organizations financed from the budget) located in the territory of the RSFSR;

—proceeds from the privatization of property in economic sectors reporting to the Union—in the amount of 50 percent; in economic sectors reporting to the republic (RSFSR), 90 percent; and the economies of the republics belonging to the RSFSR, national-state and administrative-territorial entities, in the amount of 30 percent. To give labor collectives the right to issue shares for buying out the property of state enterprises and organizations with the balance of their funds of economic incentives as of 1 January 1991, as well as unused net profits generated in 1991.

To restore for 1991, special bank accounts of enterprises for depositing and using depreciation allowances for renovation with a view to ensuring their special-purpose use and taking them into account in financing investments.

To determine that in 1991, the off-budget all-republic RSFSR economic stabilization fund will be used for:

—special-purpose all-republic programs and measures for the social protection of the populace, its low-income strata, families with many children, the handicapped, retirees, and students, and for ensuring the employment of the populace, taking into account the implementation of adopted decisions on indexing the incomes of the populace;

—increasing the wages of the employees of education, health care, and other establishments of the sociocultural sphere, including in rural areas;

—increasing the norms of expenditure for nutrition and medicines in the establishments of education, health care, and social security, as well as taking measures to augment their material and technical facilities and compensation in conjunction with growing prices and tariffs, with a view to priority provision to the above establishments in rural areas;

—providing price supports to units of the agro-industrial complex within the framework of the program of rejuvenating Russian rural areas, as well as financing additional expenditures for building intrafarm roads for motor vehicles on collective and state farms and public-access roads, facilities supplied with gas and electricity, industry of construction materials and structures, housing and communal facilities, and other facilities of the social infrastructure;

—financing investment, ecological, and environmental-conservation measures in the interests of all republics belonging to the RSFSR, autonomous oblasts and okrugs, krays, oblasts, and the cities of Moscow and Leningrad;

—providing financial support for the enterprises of industries in which centrally set prices are preserved.

The RSFSR Council of Ministers will determine procedures for the use of the off-budget all-republic RSFSR fund of economic stabilization, envisaging the allocation of no less than 25 percent of the monies of the above fund for financial support to the republics belonging to the RSFSR and national-state and administrative-territorial entities in carrying out the measures of regional programs.

**Article 23.** With a view to ensuring financial balance in the RSFSR economy:

—the RSFSR Central Bank (Bank of Russia) will pursue a credit policy using differentiated rates of interest in order to support priority sectors in 1991;

—the RSFSR Central Bank will proceed from the 5 to 10 percent annual limit of the increment of total money supply, using the instruments of monetary and credit policy in order to implement measures aimed at stabilizing monetary circulation in the republic and improving the solvency of the ruble;

—to introduce a standard 1991 rate of investment in the state securities of the RSFSR of up to 5 percent of their assets for commercial banks, up to 10 percent for insurance companies, and up to 15 percent for the

RSFSR Savings Bank. State securities will count toward the reserve funds of commercial banks.

**Article 24.** To write off the indebtedness of enterprises and organizations belonging to the system of state construction concerns and associations of the RSFSR, as well as the textile, light, local, and china-and-earthenware industry by virtue of bank loans granted in order to replenish working capital that amount to R1.7 billion as of 1 January 1990.

**Article 25.** To issue a State RSFSR Republic Internal Loan in order to cover the debt of the RSFSR republic budget to the RSFSR Central Bank (Bank of Russia), which amounted to R30 billion as of 1 December 1990, and the written-off debt on bank loans to the enterprises and organizations of the agro-industrial complex, enterprises and organizations belonging to the system of state construction concerns and associations of the RSFSR, as well as the textile, light, local, and china-and-earthenware industry recorded by the RSFSR Central Bank (Bank of Russia) in the amount of R49.7 billion.

To determine that the loan will be issued for 30 years at 5 percent annual interest and will be retired beginning from the 15th year in equal parts annually, with the amounts due in interest payments between 1991 and 1993 counted as an increase in the state debt.

**Article 26.** To take into account the state internal debt of the Union budget to the RSFSR system of state insurance by virtue of the reserve of premiums on life insurance policies purchased by the citizens of the Russian Federation in the amount of R14.6 billion in the process of signing the Union Treaty.

**Article 27.** The RSFSR Central Bank (Bank of Russia) and the RSFSR Ministry of Finance will ensure in 1991 the fulfillment of the RSFSR budget in cash terms, that is, the timely financing of approved undertakings.

[Signed] Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet B.N. Yeltsin.
Moscow, RSFSR House of Soviets.

### Enabling Resolution on Budget

*914A0249B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 30 Dec 90 Second Edition p 3*

[Resolution signed by Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet B.N. Yeltsin in Moscow on 26 December: "Resolution of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet: On Enacting the RSFSR Law 'On the State Budgetary System of the RSFSR in 1991'"]

[Text] The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet **resolves:**

1. To authorize the RSFSR Council of Ministers to implement in 1991, the RSFSR state budgetary system as set forth in the law "On the State Budgetary System of the RSFSR in 1991."

2. In the process of implementing the RSFSR state budgetary system, the RSFSR Council of Ministers will make the 1991 RSFSR budgets more precise and do additional work on them in the first quarter and establish procedures for the incorporation of proceeds from foreign economic activities in the RSFSR territory into the RSFSR budgets. The results of this work will be presented to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet before 25 April 1991.

3. The RSFSR Council of Ministers will submit to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet the Main Directions of the Socioeconomic Development of the RSFSR in 1991, draft legislative acts including one on price policy, and arrangements for regulating the incomes of the population, taking into account compensation for the monetary losses of the people.

4. The RSFSR Council of Ministers will prepare, in cooperation with the commissions of chambers and the committees of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, the necessary revisions of the indicators of the RSFSR state budgetary system for 1991, and present them to the Supreme Soviet no later than 15 February 1991.

[Signed] Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet B.N. Yeltsin.
Moscow, RSFSR House of Soviets, 26 December 1990

## Western Republics

### Further on Destruction of Bandera Monument

*LD0301120791 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0900 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[Report by correspondent Petr Savchak in Lvov; from the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] We shot this video last fall in the village of Staryy Ugryniv in Kalushskiy Rayon, Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast, the homeland of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists [OUN] leader Stepan Bandera. A monument was ceremonially unveiled to him in this way. The event was dedicated to the anniversary of the death of Bandera in Munich in 1959.

Here's an alarming report: At 0500 last Sunday [as heard]—Stepan Bandera's birthday—the monument was demolished by a powerful explosion. So far there's been no success in estabishing who was guilty of this action. A competent investigation is under way. A house built at the place where Bandera's parents had their estate and a chapel were damaged by the explosion. The windows of neighboring homes within a radius of 45 meters were blown out.

The sociopolitical situation in Kalushskiy Rayon, and as a whole in the west Ukraine, was normal. The local authorities are making efforts to that it continues to remain stable.

## Ukrainian Decree Protects Property

*914A0246B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 19 Dec 90 p 3*

[Decree signed by L. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, in Kiev on 29 November: "Decree of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet 'On Protecting the Sovereign Rights of Ownership in the Ukrainian SSR'"]

[Text] Proceeding from the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Ukraine, Article 71 of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], and the Law on Economic Independence for the Ukrainian SSR, and in the interests of protecting the property of the citizens and people of the republic, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet **resolves:**

Before the law of the Ukrainian SSR on state property goes into force:

to establish a moratorium on the territory of the republic on any change in forms of ownership and owner of state property whose sponsors and participants are organs of state power and management;

to prohibit the issue and sale of stocks for all state enterprises, organizations, and establishments located on the territory of the Ukraine, regardless of their departmental subordination, by physical and legal entities from outside the boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR.

[Signed] L. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet
Kiev, 29 November 1990

## New Ukrainian Party Plans Strategy

*91UN0573A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA in Russian 7 Dec 90 p 3*

[Article by I. Pogorelova: "Sworn Democrats, or What Ideals They Have Betrayed"]

[Text] **On 1 and 2 December, the Founding Congress of the Party of Democratic Revival of the Ukraine Was Held**

For those who have given up the right to lie it is impossible to imagine that thousands upon thousands of people who at first sight are not at all detestable take advantage of this "right" with pleasure and with benefit to themselves. A thinking person who takes a sarcastic view of all kinds of conspiracies can explain the fact that life around us for some reason fails to correspond to the ideal quite logically at first—by mistakes. These mistakes may and should be remedied by staying in the ranks of a vanguard which has assumed responsibility for selecting correct solutions. I believe that this was precisely the necessary and sufficient rationale why many people with integrity, who were socially active and not devoid of optimism, joined the Communist Party in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Only after they had gained inside knowledge of the system, bumped into lies many times, played the role of crazies "who make waves," and experienced the humiliating situation of a man having to prove that two plus two is four—only after that did they begin to take a closer look at the ideals and foundations of the system. They were terrified.

Perestroyka came. The party leader swept the world off its feet with the breadth of his views, expelled those who had compromised themselves the most, and promised a renewal. He promised. Five years of promises and waiting followed.

This is when they made their decision. They decided that a split was inevitable. Yesterday's communists, who rallied on the Democratic Platform in a period of perestroyka euphoria, began a mass exodus from the party in 1990 on a signal—a declaration by 28 USSR people's deputies to quit the CPSU.

Such is their prior history... Now it is still harder to blame the disappointment which caught up with intellectuals at the very top of their game even in better times on their inherent "rotten nature." For many people the exodus from the party ended in getting comfortable on cozy sofas which were an involuntary compensation for the voluntarily rejected "chairs." Their former comrades-in-arms pass no judgment on those who shrink from public activities. They themselves could not do that, and this is why they immediately undertook to create a new party.

The first thing this party gave up was an attempt to work out **a strategy for the people.** The task is to liberate the people from a system of views and actions which run counter to the mentality and will of individuals, to be sure, not by means of a bayonet or a gun but rather through the power of logic, common sense, and persuasion. The task is made easier by the fact that, in appealing to common human values, the PDVU [Party of Democratic Revival of the Ukraine] does not invent any new, incomprehensible ideas which will first have to be impressed on the particularly slow-witted and later, when their patience runs out, just imposed by decrees and resolutions. The common human values are simple and natural as air, as long at is not charged. To be sure, this is not the condition of our ideological atmosphere at present. This is why they will certainly have to resort to agitation and propaganda in order to restore the original meaning of many notions, cleansing them of class and other later admixtures. Still, it is hard to disagree: Human rights ensured by democracy without any additives have a great power of attraction. If a party demands only one right for itself—the freedom to persuade people, it cannot be accused of so-called political ambitions.

A legislative party is exactly what the Party of Democratic Revival of the Ukraine has been since day one—many people's deputies of the republic belong to it (18 of them were present at the congress), and three of them (V.F. Filenko, V.B. Grinev, and A.I. Yemets) were elected to the board's "magnificent seven." The party of

a legislative type does not at all give up fighting for power. On the contrary, the new party regards legislative activities as one of its main goals. Such activities produce tangible results even now by counteracting crude pressure brought to bear by "the majority." The main point is that the party has a clear-cut market-based economic concept which is in line with the reform concept proposed to the legislature by V.M. Pilipchuk, head of a Supreme Soviet commission. Members of the Party of Democratic Revival of the Ukraine are in a hurry to take advantage of their freedom to persuade primarily to propagate this concept whose implementation will facilitate the immediate accomplishment of the main task—asserting the priority of human rights in the republic. Parties are, however, just that—organizations, instruments created to achieve certain objectives. Whose objectives? Those of the entire people? The people who recently parted ways with "the mind, honor, and conscience of our epoch" are afraid of such a wording more than anyone else. Of course, the intellectuals who gathered at the congress, 71 percent of whom carry the burden of a higher education and the rest—those with the highest professional qualifications—await the support of their brethren in reason, diverse skills, and creative concerns. They believe, as does Doctor of Philosophy M.V. Popovich, that such people, who for the most part have not found themselves but still have hope, are a majority in our society, and this means that the new party may, and wants to, lean on them. Will they want to?

At present, the Party of Democratic Revival of the Ukraine numbers 2,340 members in 25 oblasts of the republic. In the opinion of delegate A. Boldyrev from Donetsk Oblast, out of a thousand miners who left the Ukrainian Communist Party only a few joined the new organization. The miners ask, "Will the assets of the Ukrainian Communist Party be split," leaning toward the split, as the deputy testified. One of the co-chairmen, A.I. Yemets, snapped: "No, we are going to set up our own material facilities, without claiming the loot."

Not to lay a claim to the loot, not to emulate Bolshevik ways, and to remain immune to all lingering temptations of the past is not a dubious vow of ascetic individuals next to whom those fond of excesses, fanatics, and scoundrels will definitely appear as time goes by... This is sworn democracy, as Deputy P. Litvin put it, democracy which will have to be restored not from the 1917 level (alas, there was no democracy in the Ukraine at that time either), but from the very origins of the human right to creative self-expression, free thinking, and productive endeavors, democracy which will prevent the republic from being dragged back into the quagmire of totalitarianism.

## Caucasus

### Caucasus Muslims Reject Baghdad Islamic Meeting

*LD0301152691 Riyadh SPA in Arabic 1428 GMT 3 Jan 91*

[Excerpt] Moscow, 3 Jan (SPA)—Muslims of the Soviet Caucasus have rejected the Iraqi regime's call to attend the so-called Islamic conference in Baghdad, and they have stressed their standing by the Kuwaiti people and their readiness to volunteer to liberate Kuwait from the unjust Iraqi occupation.

A statement released by the Caucasian Muslims said that it would be a dishonor for them to attend the conference, because it was to be held in a country which has violated the sanctity of a peaceful Islamic state, raped its Muslim women, and killed and banished the sons of its people. In their statement, the Caucasian Muslims added that they did not consider Iraq a Muslim country because it has attacked the Muslim State of Kuwait, which had helped Iraq when it was fighting an expansionist war against Iran, and that it had used deceit in that war as it was doing now.

Adam Ibzevitch Ghada Borshiv [name as received], who released the statement at the instruction of Caucasian Muslims, stressed the Caucasian Muslims' standing by the State of Kuwait—its government and people—until it was liberated from the unjust and sinful Iraqi invasion. He pointed out that 5,700 Caucasian Muslims had volunteered and were fully prepared to join the ranks of the Kuwaiti resistance. [passage omitted]

### Conflict in South Ossetia Examined

*91US0187A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 26 Dec 90 p 1*

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA special correspondent K. Bayalinov: "Those in Love Do Not Part Ways..."]

[Text]

#### Our Correspondent Entered South Ossetia in an Armored Personnel Carrier

It appears that the political temperature in South Ossetia has reached the boiling point. A chronicle of dates and events offered to you may make it possible to figure out and appreciate all the complexity and sensitivity of the situation which has emerged in this explosive corner of the Transcaucasian region.

The history of the Ossetians in Georgia began in the 13th and 14th centuries, when the Alans, driven from the plains of the North Caucasus, found refuge on the southern slopes of the Caucasus Range.

In 1843, the Ossetian District was officially inaugurated. Following the 1917 February Revolution, the People's Assembly of South Ossetia and the National Soviet, which were under the influence of Bolsheviks who had returned from the front, set the goal of making South Ossetia into a distinct administrative-territorial unit. Protracted negotiations began with the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. On 18 March 1918, Ossetian rebels captured the settlement of Tskhinvali and attempted to set up Soviet power there. Two years later, another attempt, likewise unsuccessful, was made:

Soviet Ossetia was declared an integral part of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic].

Yet another Ossetian uprising was defeated soon. Thousands of Ossetians died in armed confrontations with the troops of Menshevik Georgia. Tens of thousands more fled north across the Caucasus Range.

Only force succeeded in restoring Soviet power again in South Ossetia and all of Georgia together with it: On 5 March 1921, Red Army soldiers arrived here. The South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast was created by a decree dated 20 April 1922 as an integral part of the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic].

Such are the facts. The entire history of Georgia's joining the USSR and the establishment of Soviet power in it were diametrically opposed to similar processes in South Ossetia which played the role of an outpost of Bolshevism all these years.

In recent years, a trend toward the complete and absolute independence of Georgia from the USSR has become stronger. At the same time, the theory of "guests and hosts" has spread.

The same, except with the opposite sign, has been happening among the South Ossetians and Abkhazians. In response to an upsurge of separatist sentiments in South Ossetia, the Georgians undertook a march on Tskhinvali on 23 November 1989 in which thousands of people participated. This mass of people was stopped by Ossetian pickets only at the entrance to the city of 39,000. Two days of armed standoff culminated in bloodshed—six people were killed, 27 sustained gunshot wounds, and 140 were hospitalized. After this conflict, 2,500 Ossetians moved to North Ossetia. Mutual mistrust grew stronger.

On 20 September 1990, the Soviet of People's Deputies of the Autonomous Oblast adopted the declaration "On the Sovereignty of South Ossetia" which ran counter to the Constitution of the Georgian SSR. One day later, the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium canceled the decision of the South Ossetian Soviet even before receiving official written notice from Tskhinvali.

An unmanageable situation, a stalemate developed; there was an impasse in negotiations.

On 9 December, elections to the parliament of the proclaimed Soviet republic were held in South Ossetia (which ran counter to the Constitution of Georgia). As is known, the Georgian deputies subsequently abolished the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast unanimously.

The internal troops were sent to South Ossetia several hours before the event which shook all of Georgia:

On 12 December, at about 1600 hours, unknown persons fired a machine gun from a Zhiguli car at a car parked next to it.

There were five people in the shot-up car. Uridiya and Zardiashvili, members of the Society of Iliya the Righteous, were killed by the assassins' bullets. Interestingly, certificate No. 11 on the "letterhead" of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet issued to Revaz Uridiya, administrator of affairs of the Supreme Soviet, which was found at the site, said that he was a bodyguard... of the chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet.

The answers of D. Gundeshvili, who was wounded (MOLODOY IVERIETS, 18 December 1990), clarified in part what the bodyguard of Z. Gamsakhurdiya was doing in Tskhinvali. He maintained that all five people were members of... the "Green" Party, but had service (!) weapons on them. (As it turned out later, they were not only service-issue but also automatic weapons of the latest Soviet design). The dead and wounded were to accompany trucks hauling furniture for Georgian families which suffered during disturbances in November of last year...

This is a shady and mixed-up episode. One thing is clear: Regardless of who committed the murder and to what end, it sort of justified the imposition of a state of emergency and curfew in South Ossetia and seriously aggravated mutual relations between the Georgians and the Ossetians which were frail to begin with.

The troops, which entered South Ossetia at the request of the republic Supreme Soviet and sort of found themselves between the devil and the deep blue sea, try to remain neutral. The louder the pronouncements of the Georgian leadership itself about their mission of occupation becomes, the more complicated it is to remain so.

The servicemen I happened to meet maintained unanimously that the introduction of Army units was not necessitated by the operational and crime situation.

In the opinion of the leaders of the People's Front of South Ossetia, and of the servicemen as well, the leadership of Georgia needed the military presence in order to paralyze the structures of the new or, as they refer to them in the republic, separatist authorities.

They believe that this has not happened, however, and at present the leadership of Georgia itself demands that the legislature of the country either subordinate the USSR Internal Troops directly to the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet or authorize their replacement with Georgia's own military formations (which is already happening in part).

As I see it, it is extremely dangerous in both cases. The independent Internal Troops remain the only factor of stability in the region in the environment of mutual mistrust among the parties.

What does the central leadership think about this? This is a mystery. Some politicians in Georgia and the autonomous oblast seriously believe that some kind of separate bargaining between Moscow and Tbilisi is under

way because of the situation in South Ossetia in exchange for the signing of the Union treaty by Georgia...

Meanwhile, highways and railways remain closed. For now, a highway going through a tunnel under the Great Caucasus Range to Vladikavkaz remains open.

Extremism abounds on both sides. The zone overflows with weapons. Even Dmitriy Vasilyev, the leader of Pamyat, graced Tskhinvali with his presence and demanded freedom for the autonomous units.

Emissaries of various ilks go to and fro—from concerned fellow citizens to party brethren. South Ossetian extremists care little for the safety of life in the region while securing their objectives. In securing theirs, Georgian extremists care little for the international prestige of the republic, stating literally the following: "Our Lord God has entrusted Georgia with a great mission... The day is not far away for Georgia to set an example of moral greatness for the peoples of the world...

"Blessed be Georgia, the domain of the Holy Virgin!"

Meanwhile, these things keep happening.

**As We Were Going to Press**

As a representative of the temporary USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] press center in Tskhinvali informs us, the situation here and in Dzhavskiy Rayon deteriorated yesterday. Certain forces in Georgia do not desire a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Unknown people in militia uniforms and plainclothes bar trucks with foodstuffs from entering the state-of-emergency zone.

An agreement to set up a conciliation commission to resolve the situation was secured at a meeting between the leaders of Georgia and North Ossetia, which was held yesterday with the participation of the representatives of South Ossetia and the USSR MVD.

## Gamsakhurdia Speech to Round Table Reported

*91US0177A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 2 Dec 90 p 1*

[Report by SAKARTVELO news agency correspondent Georgiy Kordzadze: "A Gathering of the 'Round Table' Political Organizations"]

[Text] Two issues—"The Political and Economic Situation in Georgia" and "Preparations for the Upcoming Municipal Elections"—were the main subjects of debate at an all-Georgian gathering of the political organizations of the Round Table-Free Georgia that took place on 30 November in the Philharmonia Large Concert Hall in Tbilisi. Zviad Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet, presented reports on both these issues.

It was noted at the gathering that the national liberation movement is entering a qualitatively new phase. Its attainment of official power has altered a great deal, and its activity has become more multifaceted and crucial. Whereas earlier the task for the national liberation movement was only to change the existing system and thus obtain freedom for Georgia, which has been partially achieved, today there is much more to do. Let no one think that we have already achieved our main purpose, won the ultimate victory, or already completed our main tasks. We are only at the beginning of the road. The solid victory in the elections is not worth much while the legislature and government still do not have control over a significant part of Georgia's territory. Of course, Communist power is also to blame here. The Communist Party dismembered Georgia and gave the dominant position to representatives of other nationalities, handing over entire regions to them. Unfortunately, Mr. Zviad Gamsakhurdia told the gathering, even in those regions where the population is mainly Georgian and where the national movement has been to one extent or another more active, we have not established control over the situation. This is most regrettable because the main aim of our revolution is precisely that. In a number of rayons, the arbitrary rule of the communists continues, and likewise the arbitrary rule of self-styled national parties and military groupings. Serious crimes are being committed and the population is terrorized, and there is theft of citizens' and state property, and robbery, and armed gangs are attacking not only individual citizens but even the militia and servicemen. All of this is destabilizing the situation in a whole number of rayons. The speaker called on those present at the gathering to unmask the criminals and those persons who want to defeat the Georgian national liberation movement and a new dominance by imperial forces in Georgia, so that it will remain forever part of the Soviet empire.

A major part of Mr. Zviad Gamsakhurdia's report was given over to matters pertaining to mutual relations with the center. It must be candidly said, he noted, that our peaceful revolution has been followed by the most acute kind of reaction from the center, which cannot reconcile itself to our independent national policy and cadre policy and the successes along the road to real independence, and is systematically reminding us of its diktat and sending us various kinds of orders and instructions, with which, naturally, we are not complying. This irritates the center even more. We must reckon with all of this. We must be ready, Mr. Zviad Gamsakhurdia stressed, at any time, if the center does not abandon its diktat, to engage in national disobedience throughout Georgia. We have already stated at the first session of the Supreme Soviet that we are not only the authorities, not only the official government, but also an institution of national disobedience and uncompromising opposition to the center.

In order to reach our goals and targets it is, of course, necessary to take specific steps. Previously, power in the

rayons was represented by the Communist Party rayon committees. Now they have virtually ceased to function, and it is also difficult for the executive committees to carry out their functions. In this kind of situation, the path is open to anarchy and arbitrary rule. At the local level there are many who claim power, and gangs of criminals who are trying to create their own cells and, by terrorizing the population, to fulfill the role of the local authorities. It is therefore essential to activate practical work in the rayons. We intend to set up immediately local legislative commissions that will be led by the Supreme Soviet deputies elected in the rayons. Representatives of the Round Table organizations will also sit on these commissions. They will help to stabilize the situation and strengthen legality and, if necessary, mobilize the population in the rayons to deal with manifestations of anarchy. As far as the executive committees are concerned, this institution of government must be retained for the time being because the elections for the organs of local self-government have not yet been held.

A Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers decree on the creation of legislative commissions both in the rayons and in the cities has already been adopted and will be published in the press.

As far as the transfer of land to private ownership is concerned, it has been said here at this gathering that this process has been halted for the present because it is necessary to pass a law on land. Notwithstanding, in some rayons there have been instances of willful seizure of land; this is totally impermissible. The same can be said of the buying and selling of government property. The people have rightly perceived the changes that have taken place in the state order in Georgia as a revolution, but this does not mean that everyone should let things take their course and violate the law. Any process must be regulated by law, otherwise we shall find ourselves facing catastrophe.

Those attending the gathering talked specifically about the situation that has been created in particular sectors of the national economy, and they commented sharply on the work of the trade organizations, where, as Minister of Internal Affairs Dilar Khabuliani stated, total tyranny reigns. Under conditions of acute shortages of foodstuffs at the trade bases, a large number of goods in short supply had been hidden under the counter. In the very near future these products will be sold to the population.

It was decided at the gathering to set up a legislative commission that will be assigned the task of monitoring the activity of existing local organs of power in the cities and rayons of Georgia.

## Georgian National Congress Meets 1 Dec

*91US0179A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 2 Dec 90 p 1*

[Report by SAKARTVELO news agency correspondent Nino Tatrulaidze: "A Session of the Georgian National Congress"]

[Text] The second session of the Georgian National Congress continued its work on 1 December in Tbilisi in the Republic Palace of Student Youth of Georgia.

The session was chaired by Mr. Ivliane Khaindrava, board member of the Union of Free Democrats.

At the session, Mr. Valerian Advadze made a statement on behalf of the Union of National Accord and Rebirth. The statement noted, in particular, that these are the final days of the empire, but it has no wish to die. This can be seen, on the one hand, from the announcement that a draft Union treaty has been created, according to which admission as part of the USSR is voluntary, while on the other hand there is the statement by USSR President M. Gorbachev that no republic will be able to leave the USSR voluntarily. In this kind of complicated situation, a no less difficult situation has been created in Georgia. Interethnic relations have become strained, and there is a danger of confrontation between the Georgian Supreme Soviet and the Georgian National Congress. All this will play into the hands of the empire. On behalf of his union, Valerian Advadze called upon the members of the Georgian Supreme Soviet and the congressmen, and all political parties and associations in Georgia for alliance and cooperation in order jointly to outline the road along which to reach the cherished goal of all the Georgian people, namely, to restore Georgia's state independence.

It was noted at the session that representatives of the National Congress and the organizations in it are experiencing constraints from the mass media. Mr. Irakliy Tsereteli made a statement on this. In particular, he said that if the political report presented at the second session to the congressmen by Teymuraz Sumbatashvili and all the documents adopted at the session are not published in the official newspapers before 10 December 1990, an official protest will be lodged against the press.

Those attending the session debated a draft resolution "On the Georgian Supreme Soviet and Its Activity," and other matters.

## Congress Concludes Session

*91US0179B Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 4 Dec 90 p 1*

[Report by SAKARTVELO news agency correspondent Nino Tatrulaidze: "The Session of the Georgian National Congress Has Completed Its Work"]

[Text] The second session of the Georgian National Congress completed its work late at night on 1 December in Tbilisi.

The congress appointed a deputation that was assigned the task of holding talks with the Georgian Supreme Soviet on representative meetings of the Supreme Soviet and National Congress of Georgia. These meetings, and cooperation, are essential in today's complicated political situation in order to help in rallying the Georgian

people and people of all nationalities living in Georgia, together with existing political parties and organizations, to achieve our primary aim—restoring Georgia's state independence.

It was decided at the session to create an Assembly of the National Congress of Georgia. If it so desired it could unite those parties and organizations that did not take part in the elections for the congress, and also individual persons.

The congressmen decided that a meeting would be held on 10 December 1990 in Tbilisi to mark the 42nd anniversary of the adoption of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

At the session, congressmen also discussed a whole range of other issues and reached appropriate decisions.

## Georgian Party Head Comments

*91US0178A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 1 Dec 90 p 3*

[Interview with Georgiy Chanturiya, leader of the Georgian National Democratic Party, by Vladimir Gogidze on 29 November; place not given: "The Session of the Georgian National Congress"]

[Text] **Georgiy Chanturiya may be reproached for whatever you may like, but not for any lack of independent thinking! Given all the dispute about the opinions of the leader of the National Democratic Party, they are always interesting. He returned recently from Poland, and on 29 November, on the eve of the session, gave an interview to the newspaper.**

[Gogidze] Batono [Mr] Georgi, please tell us about your latest visit to Poland.

[Chanturiya] My visit was of both an official and an unofficial nature. I attended the first, Constituent Congress of the Freedom Party, created on the basis of Fighting Solidarity. In terms of type it may be assigned to the uncompromising opposition. They think that Poland can achieve its aims only if the Soviet empire collapses completely, and this is their point of contact with us. The party chairman is Doctor of Physics Kornelius Moravecki. That was the official part of the trip, but not the main part.

After the congress there were unofficial talks among representatives of all the parties attending the congress. Those invited included the leader of the International Opposition, Vladimir Bukovskiy, and representatives of the parties of uncompromising opposition in the Baltics, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine. We agreed not to publicize the results of those talks yet.

[Gogidze] No person in Georgia remains indifferent to the statement by General Patrikeyev on Georgian television. What is your opinion?

[Chanturiya] It was a provocative statement. For example, he cited the murder of an ordinary enlisted serviceman in the center of Tbilisi. So, we have clarified the circumstances surrounding this matter and have ascertained that he was killed by his own comrades during a drunken brawl. Overall General Patrikeyev's statement was a provocation because the incidents that he cited occur throughout the Soviet Union, not just here.

Moreover, we do not understand why the new authorities in Georgia permitted this statement. I am astonished because no officials are offering any assessment of the general's statement. This is all happening in conditions in which the National Congress and its parties are being given no opportunity to appeal to the public via television. In this sense the Round Table is a worthy successor to the traditions of the Communist Party. Today we are in the kind of position that the entire national movement was in in 1986-1987. We have been forced to print our journal MOAMBE in the Baltic area.

[Gogidze] What issues will be discussed at the second session of the National Congress that opens tomorrow?

[Chanturiya] This session will last two days and many issues will be considered. They include the following: "The Political Situation in Georgia," "The Occupation Troops," "The So-Called Georgian Supreme Soviet," "The Need for Measures To Restore the Independence of Georgia"... On the second day the National Congress Assembly will be constituted. It will include organizations that are not part of either the congress or the Supreme Soviet, including religious organizations.

[Gogidze] Does your party, and the National Congress in general, have militarized formations?

[Chanturiya] The National Democratic Party of Georgia [NDPG] is a political organization, not a military one, and we have no armed groupings. Which does not preclude some of the members of our party from bearing personal weapons. As far as the National Congress is concerned, this issue has not yet been decided. There is a dispute about whether or not it should have its own armed groups.

There is an organization called "Mkhedrioni," whose leader, Dzhaba Ioseliani, is a member of the National Congress. He ran on the ticket of the National Independence Party of Georgia. But "Mkhedrioni" as an organization is not a member of the National Congress.

[Gogidze] What kind of party is yours today on the organizational plane?

[Chanturiya] The numerical strength of the NDPG is today 4,000. Literally yesterday 12 new members joined. We have a paradoxical situation: We have lost many political points but over the last one-and-a-half months there has not been a day when people have not joined the party. And the procedure is quite complicated: First the new member joins our base organization, "Meotkhe

Dasi," and then, after a trial period, is admitted directly to the NDPG. In a year there has been no instance of desertion or resignation from the party.

We also have our, what you might call committees abroad—in Moscow, Pitere, Saratov, Tartu. We have one representative in the FRG and three in the United States.

[Gogidze] A trend has recently been seen—admittedly still only a slight trend—toward consolidation, unification of parties close on the political spectrum. Is the NDPG about to unite with the Democratic Party?

[Chanturiya] Serious work is being done. A two-party committee has been set up. Our regional committees have initiated joint work. Joint meetings of the leadership of the two organizations have been held. In Poland I represented the interests not only of our party but also the Democratic Party.

[Gogidze] Can we expect a congress of unification in the near future?

[Chanturiya] Of course. And in general I believe that the worst stupidity for Georgia is to have a hundred small parties. The optimal scenario is, I think, five or six parties, 10 at the most.

## Central Asia

### Kazakh President Cited on Future Nuclear Tests

*LD0101120791 Berlin ADN in German 1127 GMT 1 Jan 91*

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev fears "political and social repercussions" in his republic if Moscow continues with its nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk test site. Nazarbayev told the Soviet news agency NOVOSTI that all talks between the Kazakh leadership and Defense Ministry leaders have so far remained unsuccessful. Everybody is sticking to his positions. Irrespective of the fact that Kazakhstan has strictly banned any further nuclear tests on its territory, it has recently emerged from the army leadership that a total of 18 underground nuclear explosions in Semipalatinsk have been planned for 1991 and 1992. The Kazakhstan president sees in the attitude of Defense Minister Yazov a sign of the "imperial policy of the center" which refuses to abandon the totalitarian system which exists in the USSR. "Obviously, the center has no idea of the real situation that exists here," Nazarbayev said. "They should finally understand that there will be no turning back from sovereignty in the republics. Policies should be developed which are based on that premise."

### Plan for Kazakh Free Economic Zones Outlined

*PM0301122991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jan 91 Union Edition p 2*

[Report by Oleg Stefashin under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Free Economic Zones in Kazakhstan"]

[Text] Kazakhstan—The free economic zones which the Kazakh Supreme Soviet has legislated will be created in two phases.

The first phase envisages the joint use of natural resources on the territory of Kazakhstan, and the second involves organizing a powerful processing industry network and equipping it with modern machinery and technology.

The first free economic zones will come into being in Guryev, Mangistau, Dzhezkazgan, and East Kazakhstan Oblasts; later, it seems, they will appear in the Aral Sea area, Karaganda, and Zhayrem and on the Soviet-Chinese railroad. The republic's legislature has started drawing up a package of normative acts that will guarantee the effectiveness of the new law.

Commenting on these decisions, S. Takezhanov, chairman of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Economic Reform, the Budget, and Finances, noted:

"The free zones are good in that they have a self-developing structure, thus they easily fit into the new conditions and can be integrated into any political system. The republic law allows for literally all of their basic principles and guarantees complete business freedom to both our enterprises and their foreign partners."

### Party Official Discusses Tajik Situation

*PM0201163691 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 51, 30 Dec 90-6 Jan 91 p 6*

[Interview with Tajik Communist Party Central Committee First Secretary Kakhar Makhkamov; date and place not given: "Tajikistan: Firm Hand Needed?"—first two paragraphs are an introduction]

[Text] The February tragedy in Dushanbe, where tens of people were killed and hundreds wounded, belongs to those socio-political upheavals which are usually followed either by the resignation of the government or a total overhaul of its views. K. Makhkamov [K.M.], First Secretary of the CP Tajikistan Central Committee [CC], not only remained at the party's head, but was shortly thereafter elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and at the Supreme Soviet's session on November 30—President of the Republic. He was favoured by 131 deputies and opposed by 90. His rival and predecessor at the post of First Secretary of the CP Central Committee, R. Nabiyev, polled 89 votes "for" and 132 "against".

The questions put to the President of Tajikistan by Mukhammedmurad Salamatov of "MN" [MOSCOW NEWS] pursued just one aim: to grasp the political situation in the Republic, its far from simple realities and prospects.

MN: What do you think the results of the voting show?

K.M.: They are perfectly natural. A Democratic Party has been officially formed in Tajikistan. We now have different public organizations which also seek to vindicate their views about the Republic's future. I would be surprised if no one voted against Makhkamov's candidature.

MN: Why in this case did you decide not to hold nationwide elections?

K.M.: Because this would have taken a long time. In conditions of the transition to market relations, this is an impermissible luxury. Besides, we are concerned about the nation's consolidation and reinforcing civic accord.

MN: The lack of confidence voiced at the presidential elections by 90 deputies has been explained by many of them by the fact that it is you who issued the order to use arms in February.

K.M.: Nonsense. I had no authority to issue an order to shoot. If I were so trigger-happy, I would have done anything for the sake of retaining power. I would never have signed the protocol at that time on my resignation. After all, I assumed a commitment to the so-called provisional people's committee to quit the post I held in accordance with the law. However, the plenum, held after this, did not accept my resignation. At the first session of the new convocation I was elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet on an alternative basis. At the latest Congress of the CP Tajikistan I was re-elected First Secretary of the CC, and now I have been elected President on an alternative basis. To my mind, before the presidential elections there were some who wanted a scenario similar to the Kirghizian one. (It is believed that the Osh events became the root cause of the fiasco suffered by the First Secretary of the CP Kirghizia Central Committee at the elections of the Republic's President—Ed.) Indeed, I made a televised address to the inhabitants of Dushanbe calling upon them to arm themselves, though not with submachine guns, I still believe that this averted a still greater wave of violence.

MN: On the one hand, you've been accused of inhumanity, on the other, of meekness and of lacking a firm hand.

K.M.: This shows there is a lot of misunderstanding. I refer myself to the supporters of democratic change and believe that everyone has a right to an independent judgement, but when readiness for dialogue is seen as a sign of meekness and indecision, that leads to despotism and ultimatums. Many of these critics may well be worried about the destiny of the Republic. But I'm all in favour of looking for an finding a common language and common points of contact, instead of taking the path of confrontation.

MN: The curfew is still in force in Dushanbe. Isn't this rather revealing about the population's attitude towards the army?

K.M.: Soviet Army Day was marked ten days after the beginning of the tragedy. The whole territory where armoured personnel carriers were parked was strewn with flowers. People cooked pilaf in their homes and took it into the streets for the soldiers. It's a pity that Central TV didn't show any of this. Incidentally, for some reason the letter which we sent to PRAVDA in response to the lies it told about past events was never published.

MN: How true is it that Afghan rebel forces consider Tajikistan to be one of Afghanistan's provinces?

K.M.: I have no trustworthy information on this score. But that they would like to see Afghanistan as an Islamic state, and also to see an Islamic Tajikistan—this is true. The stockpiling of arms along the frontier testifies to many things.

MN: Islam's growing influence in the Tajik Republic is self-evident—it's a reality which must be reckoned with.

K.M.: Islam as such, or normal Islam as I define it, presents no threat to society. But there is a second current—fundamentalism, a movement for "pure Islam", so to speak. During the February events its preachers had an active role to play whereas five clergymen were sentenced for their part in the riots. Incidentally, one of them publicly apologized in court for what he had done. Not long ago we had to turn down a request for holding a constituent conference of the Islamic Renaissance Party. Several provisions of its programme run counter to universally recognized human rights, violating the rights of women, among other things. We decided this at the level of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and then submitted the question for discussion by the session. The initial decision was not only endorsed by the deputies, but they insisted on including an additional point in the agenda—on banning the Islamic Renaissance Party in Tajikistan. Thus it has actually been outlawed.

MN: What is your attitude towards the idea of creating a single Central Asian state?

K.M.: I'm against it. What for? What would be its benefits? If at present each Republic is becoming sovereign, what need is there to create a new state? In order ultimately to secede from the Soviet Union and lose our sovereignty?

MN.: When characterizing you as a "stooge of the Centre", your opponents cite the example of the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan whom they call "strong national leaders".

K.M.: This evidently has its own reason, for both have sharply criticized the Centre in their statements. I believe that there is a need to criticize, but this must be well founded. How can I charge the Centre today for what Tajikistan has become in the last 73 years? Although the people have a rich ancient history full of famous personalities of world renown, prior to the October Revolution they were downtrodden to such an extent that they had lost practically everything. As to being a "stooge of Moscow" I can say that I have always championed and will continue standing up for the interests of my people.

MN.: Doesn't republican sovereignty in this sense rule out a Union treaty?

K.M.: The concept of absolute sovereignty has never existed. To one extent or another we are all dependent on one another, and it's impossible to live in isolation all by yourself. Consideration of economic expedience and mutual benefit must come to the fore in the Republic's relations with the Centre and between themselves. All this is envisaged in the Declaration on the Republic's Sovereignty adopted by the Supreme Soviet. Incidentally, there was an alternative draft of the Declaration on Sovereignty presented by the Rastokhez movement. We distributed copies of this draft among the deputies, and some of its points version. This shows the usefulness of dialogue.

MN: What about the exodus of Russian speakers from the Republic today?

K.M.: The number of those who left during the first three quarters of this year exceeded 65,000, about 35,000 of them being Russians. The number of new arrivals in the Republics over the same period was 15,886, of whom 4,759 were Russians. Some of those who left are now coming back. Indeed, their homeland is here, the graves of their ancestors are here. Moreover, as they soon came to realize, no one was waiting for them with open arms in their new places.

MN: Central Asia has a tradition of strong leaders. If this demand increases, what will your attitude be?

K.M.: I shall never take up the whip. Suppose an "iron fist" comes along and starts bringing about "order", victimizing both the guilty and the innocent. That would be a terrible tragedy.